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IT’S TIME TO PUT CHARACTER BACK INTO 
THE CHARACTER-EVIDENCE RULE 
STEVEN GOODE 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs the admissibility of other-
acts evidence, is a mess, and recently-promulgated amendments will not fix it.  
The amendments fail to address the two major problems underlying Rule 
404(b).  First, the rule is based on a categorical judgment about the relative 
probative value and unfair prejudice of other-acts evidence when offered as 
character evidence; that is, to prove the defendant acted in accordance with his 
or her character.  In numerous cases, however, other-acts evidence is highly 
probative and the rule’s categorical judgment is decidedly wrong.  Not 
surprisingly, courts often admit such evidence, typically by erroneously 
denying that the evidence is being offered to prove the defendant acted in 
accordance with his or her character.  The second problem exacerbates the 
first.  Although the rule prohibits only character evidence, no one knows what 
character means.  Neither the case law nor the rules define character in any 
meaningful way.  Consequently, we have a body of case law that authorizes the 
admission of not only high-probative-value other-acts evidence but also 
precisely the type of low-probative-value other-acts evidence that Rule 404(b) 
was designed to exclude.   
The way to reverse this practice is, paradoxically, to make it easier for 
courts to admit high-probative-value other-acts evidence.  Rule 404(b) should 
be written and applied in a manner that aligns with its goal of furthering 
accurate factfinding.  This Article suggests two ways of doing this.  First, courts 
must confront the issue they have so long avoided: they must grapple with the 
meaning of character.  By doing so, courts can recognize that some types of 
high-probative-value other-acts evidence should not be considered character 
evidence.  That will permit them to admit such evidence while acknowledging 
that it requires a propensity inference.  Likewise, evidence of a person’s 
attitudes or psychological or medical conditions should not be considered 
character.  Second, Rule 404(b) should be amended to provide a true exception 
for one particular type of other-acts evidence whose probative value is 
 
* W. James Kronzer Chair in Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University Distinguished Teaching 
Professor, University of Texas School of Law.  I wish to thank Grace Seidl and Thomas Forster for 
their invaluable research assistance and my colleagues Graham Strong and Guy Wellborn for their 
helpful comments.  Special thanks go to my former student, Michael Davis.  His probing questions 
about character evidence inspired me to write this article.   
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categorically greater than its prejudicial effect.  Other-acts evidence should be 
admissible to prove a defendant’s intent unless the defendant agrees not to 
controvert state of mind.   
Providing courts legitimate grounds for admitting such high-probative-
value other-acts evidence even when its probative value flows from a propensity 
inference will mean that courts will no longer have to engage in propensity-
inference denial.  In time, a new body of case law should emerge that gives 
prosecutors fewer avenues for arguing that low-probative-value other-acts 
evidence should be admitted.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is one thing about Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) on which nearly 
everyone agrees: it is a mess.  It is “slippery and recondite,”1 a “crazy quilt of 
unprincipled restrictions and exceptions,”2 and of “horrifying complexity.”3  It 
establishes “standards” rather than a rule.4  And these are some of the nicer 
things said about it.5  Despite, or more likely because of this, Rule 404(b) is the 
most litigated evidence rule.6  The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure and its Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
recently undertook a multi-year effort to revise Rule 404(b).7  But they wound 
 
1. Frederic Bloom, Character Flaws, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2018).   
2. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE 
ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL HISTORIES AT TRIAL (1986), reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 709, 715 
(1989) [hereinafter OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT].   
3. Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 754 (1998) [hereinafter 
Park, Character at the Crossroads].   
4. United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278–79 (7th Cir. 1987) (“There are no bright line 
rules; it is easy to identify polar cases but impossible to draw a line of demarcation. . . . Rules 403 and 
404(b) establish standards rather than rules.”).   
5. See, e.g., PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 404 practice cmt. II, 
Westlaw (database updated April 2020) (“logical conundrum . . . that sometimes can be exploited by 
attorneys”); Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character 
Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 184 (1998) (lacks “any coherent 
purpose”); Justin Sevier, Legitimizing Character Evidence, 68 EMORY L.J. 441, 455 (2019) 
(“incoherent, internally inconsistent, and according to some scholars, the legal equivalent of Swiss 
cheese”).  This is not a new development.  More than a century ago, Wigmore bemoaned the 
“bewildering variances of rulings in the different jurisdictions and even in the same jurisdiction” in 
this area of evidence law.  1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302, at 394 (1904). 
6. Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble With Rule 404(b), 
78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) (“No other evidentiary rule comes close to this rule as a breeder of 
issues for appeals.”); 22B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 95 (2014); David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in 
Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 441 (2001) [hereinafter Leonard, Character and Motive].   
7. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules began discussing substantive changes to Rule 
404(b) in October 2016.  Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 
21, 2016, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-10-21-
evidence_rules_minutes_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E3C-DYLP].  The proposed amendments to 
Rule 404(b) were submitted to the Supreme Court three years later.  Memorandum from Hon. David 
G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. 
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10-
23_scotus_package_final_for_posting_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C79A-ZMWH].  The Supreme Court 
transmitted the proposed amendments to Congress on April 27, 2020.  Letter to Hon. Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, & Hon. Michael R. Pence, Pres., U.S. Senate, from C.J. John 
G. Roberts (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frev20_2d8f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6DV-V54R]. 
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up producing amendments so trifling that nothing is likely to change.8  The 
amendments9 fail to address the underlying causes of the incoherence that 
plagues the case law applying Rule 404(b).  It is time to do so.  
Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the introduction of evidence of a person’s other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts if offered to prove the person’s character so that the 
factfinder might infer that the person acted in accordance with that character on 
the occasion in question.10  Put another way, Rule 404(b)(1) excludes other-acts 
evidence11 if its probative value requires a character-propensity inference.  Rule 
404(b)(2) provides, however, that such evidence may be admissible if offered 
for a different purpose and lists a number of possible appropriate things that 
other-acts evidence may be offered to prove: “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”12  Rule 404(b) is based on a judgment that—when offered for a 
character-propensity inference—the category of other-acts evidence presents 
too great a danger of unfair prejudice to warrant its admissibility.  
Categorically, the probative value of such other-acts evidence is outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.13  Courts often invoke the maxim that people 
should be tried for what they have done and not for who they are.14  But like 
many a bumper sticker, this adage embraces a kernel of truth and spurns nuance: 
who a person is may sometimes tell us a great deal about what the person has 
done. 
Two underlying problems lie at the root of much of Rule 404(b)’s 
incoherence.  The first is its categorical judgment about the relative probative 
value and unfair prejudice of other-acts evidence.  In many cases, that judgment 
is markedly wrong: the probative value of other-act character-propensity 
evidence far outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.  Consider the case of 
 
8. The amendments focused on Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement.  New paragraph Rule 
404(b)(3) requires prosecutors to provide defendants reasonable notice of any other-acts evidence they 
intend to offer.  Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, supra note 7.  Previously, defendants 
had to request such information.  Id.  Prosecutors must also articulate the permissible purpose for which 
they seek to offer such evidence and their reasoning.  Id.  The amendment also modifies Rule 404(b)(1) 
stylistically, moving the word “other” in front of “crime, wrong, or act” from its former placement in 
front of “act.”  Id.  The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure’s Report notes that these are 
not substantive changes.  Id.  
9. These amendments became effective December 1, 2020.  Id. 
10. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
11. Throughout this Article, I use “other-acts evidence” as a shorthand for other crimes, wrongs, 
and acts. 
12. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 861 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Linares, 
367 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Bradley, 5 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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Felix Vail.  In August 2016, Vail went on trial for a 54-year-old murder.  He 
claimed then, as he did in October 1962, that his wife’s death was a tragic 
accident, that Mary Horton Vail drowned after accidentally falling from their 
boat while they were laying trotlines on the Calcasieu River.  In 1962, the 
coroner had declared the death accidental.  But publication in late 2012 of a 
remarkable piece of investigative journalism in the Jackson, Mississippi 
Clarion-Ledger15 prompted Calcasieu Parish16 authorities to reopen the case.  
Their reexamination of the autopsy report, photos of Ms. Vail’s body, and a 
contemporaneous sheriff’s report led them to a very different conclusion: Felix 
Vail had murdered his wife.17 
The newspaper story that triggered the reexamination contained far more 
explosive evidence.  The story’s title summarized it nicely—“Gone: One Wife 
Dead.  Two Others Missing.”  In 1973, Sharon Hensley, a woman with whom 
Vail had been living an itinerant existence for several years, disappeared.  Vail 
later told Hensley’s mother that Sharon had gone off with a couple that was 
planning to sail the world.18  Sharon was never heard from again.  Ten years 
later, Vail married seventeen-year-old Annette Craver.19  The following year, 
after she had deeded Vail property she received through an inheritance, Annette 
also disappeared.  Vail told her mother that Annette had decided to go to 
Mexico; he last saw her when he dropped her off at the bus station.20  Like 
Sharon Hensley, Annette Craver Vail was never heard from again.21  Later 
 
15. The original work, updated to include subsequent events, can be found online.  Jerry 
Mitchell, Gone, CLARION LEDGER (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:08 PM) [hereinafter Mitchell, Gone], 
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/local/felixvailgone/2016/12/29/felix-vail-gone-one-wife-
dead-two-other-missing-jerry-mitchell/95895894/ [https://perma.cc/5WCQ-FF9G].  Another version 
of Gone, supplemented with videos, can also be found online.  Gone, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/gone/ [https://perma.cc/AF63-QHET].  
16. Although Mary Horton Vail died in Louisiana, Felix Vail was living in Mississippi when 
Jerry Mitchell, the author of the report, received a phone call asking whether he would be interested in 
writing about a serial killer living in Mississippi.  Mitchell, Gone, supra note 15. 
17. The autopsy report noted large bruises on Ms. Vail’s neck, suggesting that she suffered 
forceful neck trauma before she entered the water, and other bruises consistent with a struggle.  Id.  
More significantly, the report indicated that a scarf around Ms. Vail’s neck extended four inches into 
her mouth, which suggested pre-submersion traumatic asphyxia.  Id.  The sheriff’s report also raised 
several questions about the validity of Vail’s story.  Id.  In addition, the newspaper report revealed that 
Vail’s son Bill mentioned several times that he had overheard his father say that he had killed Ms. Vail.  
Id.  Months before the son died in 2009, he memorialized this recollection in an audio recording.  Id.  
18. Id. 
19. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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investigation revealed inconsistencies in Vail’s stories about both women’s 
disappearances.22 
Evidence of Vail’s association with23 the mysterious disappearances of 
these two women would lead most people to believe that Mary Horton Vail’s 
death in 1962 was hardly accidental.  But Louisiana, like every other state,24 
has a rule corresponding to Rule 404(b).25  Evidence that Vail killed Hensley 
and Craver could not, therefore, be used to prove Vail’s violent character so 
that jurors might infer he acted in accordance with his violent character and 
killed Mary Horton Vail.  The prosecution successfully argued, however, that 
this evidence was not being offered for a character-propensity inference, and 
the evidence was admitted.  At the close of Vail’s four-day trial, the prosecutor 
argued to the jury: 
How unlucky is this guy?  His first wife dies.  His second wife-
girlfriend disappears off the planet.  His third wife disappears 
from the planet.  He is either the most unlucky person born on 
the planet since Job or it is what it looks like—a killer who 
learned from his mistakes.26 
The jury deliberated for thirty-three minutes before convicting Vail.27  
The evidence of both Sharon Hensley’s and Annette Craver Vail’s 
disappearance was certainly probative of Vail’s guilt.  But it was probative only 
because it invited the jurors to make an inference about Vail’s character so that 
they could then conclude he acted in accordance with that character and killed 
his first wife.  Properly applied, therefore, the Louisiana rule would have 
mandated the exclusion of this highly probative evidence.  Understandably 
loath to do this, both the trial court and the Louisiana Court of Appeals, in a 
pre-trial opinion, simply denied that this was character-propensity evidence.  
 
22. Id. 
23. I use here the neutral phrase “association with,” but, as explained later, it would be more 
precise to say that this would be offered as evidence that Vail murdered the other two women.  See 
infra text accompanying note 336. 
24. See 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE app. I, Westlaw 
(database updated December 2020) [hereinafter IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT 
EVIDENCE] (collecting state versions of FED. R. EVID. 404(b)). 
25. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(B) (2020). 
26. Mitchell, Gone, supra note 15. 
27. Astrid Rodrigues, Cat Rakowski, Glenn Ruppel, Alexa Valiente & Lauren Effron, Felix Vail 
Found Guilty of Murder in Wife’s 1962 Death, While Disappearances of 2 Other Women Remain a 
Mystery, ABC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016, 3:41 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/felix-vail-found-guilty-
murder-wifes-1962-death/story?id=41305632 [https://perma.cc/V8YT-WYT7]. 
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They both invoked an increasingly-recognized, but flawed,28 theory known as 
the “doctrine of chances”29 to circumvent the rule.  
The Vail opinion is hardly unique.  Any rule that excludes a type of 
evidence based on a categorical judgment that its probative value is outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect is bound to butt up against lots of counter-instances.  
While it is true that other evidence rules are based, at least in part, on a similar 
judgment,30 no other rule attempts to exclude from a jury’s consideration such 
a broad swath of human conduct.31  Consequently, the categorical judgment 
about other-acts evidence is likely often to be decidedly wrong.32  Not 
surprisingly, when trial courts encounter highly-probative other-acts evidence, 
they are tempted to admit it.  And they frequently heed Oscar Wilde’s advice 
and yield to the temptation.33  Appellate courts often then look to affirm, 
typically doing so in one of two ways.  Sometimes—like the court in Vail—
they expressly deny that the probative value of the evidence flows from a 
propensity inference.  More commonly, they implicitly deny this by reciting 
one, two, many, or sometimes all of Rule 404(b)(2)’s laundry list of permissible 
uses for other-acts evidence with little or no explanation.34   
The second underlying cause for Rule 404(b)’s incoherence is more 
surprising, at least to anyone unversed in the law of evidence.  No one knows 
what “character” means.  Rule 404(b) purports to prohibit only character-
 
28. See infra Part III.F. 
29. State v. Vail, 150 So. 3d 576, 583–90 (La. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 176 So. 3d 401 (La. 
2015). 
30. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407, 408, 411, 412.  
31. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of 
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 534 (1991) (referring to a “vast range of contexts” to which 
character-evidence rule applies); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of 
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2001) (“The fact that the prohibition is categorical and a priori 
is what makes the question difficult.”).  The hearsay rules also cover a wide range of evidence.  But 
unlike the character-evidence rule, hearsay is relatively well-defined, see FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c), 
and numerous well-articulated exemptions and exceptions authorize the admission of a substantial 
amount of hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803, 804, 807. 
32. See Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 743–44; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 737. 
33. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (1890) (“The only way to get rid of a 
temptation is to yield to it.”). 
34. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:28, 
Westlaw (database updated May 2020) (“[I]t is lamentably common to see recitations of laundry lists 
of permissive uses, with little analysis or attention to the particulars.”); Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. 
Richter, Character Assassination: Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Protect Criminal 
Defendants, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 779 (2018) (criticizing “knee-jerk” approach courts take to Rule 
404(b) rulings); 22B KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5247, 
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2020) (referring to “smorgasbord ploy” and citing cases). 
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propensity evidence; that is, other-acts evidence offered to prove a person’s 
character to show that the person acted in accordance with that character on a 
particular occasion.  It does not bar noncharacter-propensity evidence.35  Yet 
the rules of evidence fail to define character.  Few courts even attempt to define 
it; those that do, try half-heartedly at best.36  And despite multiple treatises37 
and scores of articles38 that explore the law of character evidence, no viable 
definition has emerged.39  The recent amendments to Rule 404(b) reveal a 
similar inattention to character.40  Imagine trying to interpret and apply the 
income tax law without “income” being defined;41 it could not be done.  Yet 
that is exactly what courts have been doing with the character-evidence rule.  
Consider Austin v. State.42  Kimberly Sue Austin was tried for injuring her 
nineteen-month-old son by injecting him with insulin.  Her husband found little 
Noah convulsing, and Noah soon entered a deep coma.  Doctors determined 
that he had been injected with insulin, to which the defendant had access.43  The 
prosecution’s theory was that the defendant suffered from Munchausen 
 
35. Habit evidence is a form of noncharacter propensity evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 406. 
36. See infra Part V.A. 
37. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24; DAVID P. 
LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AND SIMILAR EVENTS (2d ed. 
2019) [hereinafter LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE]; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, 
§§ 4:21–4:40; 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, §§ 5231–5248. 
38. See, e.g., LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, tbl. of authorities (collecting 
articles). 
39. See infra Part V.B. 
40. The new mandatory notice requirement obligates the prosecution to articulate in its notice 
the “permitted purpose” for which it intends to offer the evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3).  The 
Advisory Committee Note explains that this means the prosecution must articulate “a non-propensity 
purpose” for which the evidence is offered.  Letter to Hon. Nancy Pelosi & Hon. Michael R. Pence, 
supra note 7.  The Advisory Committee’s draft of the amendment used “non-propensity purpose” in 
the text.  The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure substituted “permitted purpose” for “non-
propensity purpose” in the text, but did not explain why.  Memorandum from Hon. Debra A Livingston, 
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of 
Prac. & Proc. (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_evidence_rules_-
_may_2019_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUX2-XS68]; Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, 
supra note 7.  Neither committee, however, acknowledged that Rule 404(b) allows other-acts evidence 
to be used for some propensity purposes.  It bars only character-propensity purposes. 
41. Income is extensively defined.  See I.R.C. §§ 61–64 (defining “gross income,” “adjusted 
gross income,” “taxable income,” and “ordinary income”); Treas. Reg. § 1.61–1(a) (2019) (elaborating 
the Code’s definition of “gross income”).  
42. 222 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
43. Id. at 805.  Her father-in-law, who suffered from diabetes and dementia, lived with the 
defendant and her husband.  Id.  He relied on other household members, including the defendant, to 
give him insulin injections.  Id.  
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Syndrome By Proxy (MSBP), which the court referred to as a mental condition 
that describes a caregiver—often the mother of a young child—who falsifies or 
induces illness in the child to gain attention and sympathy.44  The trial court 
allowed the prosecution to introduce thousands of pages of Noah’s and his three 
siblings’ medical records.  The records documented an abnormally high number 
of medical contacts when the children were in the defendant’s care but not when 
others were caring for them.45  Five doctors testified that the defendant’s 
children were victims of MSBP.46  The appellate court rejected the defendant’s 
Rule 404(b) claim, holding that the MSBP evidence was admissible to prove 
motive.  It helped the jury understand “why this otherwise seemingly caring 
and devoted mother would intentionally inject her son with unnecessary 
insulin.”47  The court denied that it was propensity evidence.48  That is wrong: 
the MSBP evidence’s probative value requires a propensity inference.49   
If we had a better idea of what character means for purposes of Rule 404(b), 
the court might not have had to deny that this evidence’s probative value flowed 
from a propensity inference.  No one considers epilepsy or schizophrenia a 
character trait.  If MSBP is a disease, like epilepsy or schizophrenia, and not a 
character trait, the evidence in Austin would not run afoul of Rule 404(b).  It 
would be offered for a noncharacter-propensity inference.  While this may 
seem obvious, it wasn’t to the parties in Austin.  This is likely because other 
conditions that modern medicine regards as diseases—alcoholism and 
addiction—are often treated by courts as raising character-evidence issues.50  
This, too, is done without considering whether these conditions should fall 
under the heading of character.  
More critically, the lack of understanding of what character means extends 
beyond whether diseases should be considered a form of character.  At some 
point, other-acts evidence and the propensity-inference for which it is offered 
is so specific that it should not be considered character evidence.  Habit 
 
44. Id. at 804.  Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy is now called Factitious Disorder Imposed on 
Another (FDIA).  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 325 (5th ed.) [hereinafter DSM].  See The Act: Jan Peter Meyboom (Hulu limited series 
2019); MOMMY DEAD AND DEAREST (HBO 2017). 
45. Austin, 222 S.W.3d at 806.  
46. Id. at 805–06. 
47. Id. at 807.  
48. Id.  Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the evidence was “classic conformity evidence,” 
the court stated, “MSBP describes not appellant’s character but her behavior toward her children.”  Id. 
at 808.  But that is like saying that a defendant’s proclivity for violence describes only his behavior 
toward his victims and not his character.  
49. See infra Part III.E. 
50. See infra notes 435–36. 
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evidence is admissible even though it is simply a form of highly specific other-
acts evidence offered for a propensity inference.  Between what every court 
would consider inadmissible character evidence and admissible habit evidence 
lies a wide range of other-acts evidence.  Courts should explicitly address which 
of this is character and which is not.  And they must do so in a way that furthers 
the underlying reasons for the character-evidence rule.  For purposes of Rule 
404(b), character must be viewed as a legal construct.  Neither dictionary 
definitions of character nor the way in which philosophers or psychologists use 
the term should dictate what evidence law considers character.  
This is not just a matter of analytical nicety.  Faced with other-acts evidence 
that defies Rule 404(b)’s underlying categorical judgment about the balance 
between probative value and unfair prejudice, courts often admit the evidence.  
They typically deny, without any real analysis, that other-acts evidence is being 
used for a propensity inference.  The consequences of this character-propensity-
denial behavior are far reaching.  Prosecutors frequently leverage the precedent 
from these cases to successfully advocate for admitting low-probative-value 
other-acts evidence that should be excluded under any reasonable reading of 
Rule 404(b).   
The thesis of this Article is that decision-making under Rule 404(b) can be 
improved only by making it easier for courts to admit high-probative-value 
other-acts evidence without having to engage in character-propensity denial.  I 
suggest two steps that can be taken.  First, courts should develop a notion of 
what character means for purposes of Rule 404(b).  Second, a true exception to 
Rule 404 should be created for the type of other-acts evidence for which the 
categorical judgment about probative value and unfair prejudice is most 
consistently wrong.  Other-acts evidence should be admissible to prove a 
criminal defendant’s intent through a character-propensity inference unless the 
defendant agrees not to controvert state of mind.51  These two steps would allow 
courts legitimately to admit a substantial amount of highly-probative other-acts 
evidence, either because it is not being offered for a character-propensity 
inference or, if it is, because it is offered to prove intent.  This should reduce 
the pressure on courts to engage in propensity-inference denial.  Once courts 
begin to acknowledge when other-acts evidence actually depends on character-
propensity reasoning, they should begin to exclude lower-probative value 
other-acts evidence.  I harbor no illusions that either of these proposals will 
 
51. See infra Part VI.  Although Rule 404 applies in both civil and criminal cases, my focus in 
this Article is on criminal cases.  I believe that the categorical balancing of probative value versus 
unfair prejudice is even more off-kilter in civil cases.  In a later article, I will argue that Rule 404 should 
be amended to authorize the admission of other-acts evidence for a character-propensity purpose in 
civil cases.  
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neatly solve the problem.  Any interpretation of Rule 404(b) ultimately must be 
rooted in categorical judgments about the probative value and prejudicial effect 
of types of other-acts evidence, judgments for which there is no “right” answer.  
Moreover, whatever categorical judgments are made, there will still be cases 
where the other-acts evidence defies the categorical judgment.  There will 
always be cases where courts will feel pressure to circumvent the rule.  I 
contend only that my proposals may bring some measure of honest analysis 
and, ultimately, results more consistent with the purposes for the rule.  
Part II provides a brief overview of Rule 404.  In Part III, I demonstrate 
how courts often mistakenly deny that the other-acts evidence they are 
admitting is probative only through a character-propensity inference.  Part IV 
then explores and evaluates the reasons for the character-evidence rule.  
Building on this foundation, Parts V and VI present my proposed reforms.  Part 
V assays how character should be defined, and Part VI sets forth my proposed 
true exception for other-acts evidence offered to prove intent.  Part VII provides 
a brief conclusion.  
II.  A QUICK OVERVIEW OF THE CHARACTER-EVIDENCE RULE 
Rule 404(b) is designed to operate as a specific application of the more 
general character-evidence rule announced in Rule 404(a).  Rule 404(a)(1)52 
codifies the common law’s centuries-old hostility toward using evidence of a 
person’s character to prove the person behaved in a certain way on a given 
occasion.  It bars evidence of a “person’s character or character trait” if offered 
for a character-propensity inference—as proof “that on a particular occasion 
the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”53  Rule 404(a)(2) 
codifies some long-recognized exceptions.  Criminal defendants may offer 
evidence of their good character, and if they do, the prosecution may introduce 
rebuttal evidence.54  In a criminal case, evidence of the alleged victim’s 
character may be offered,55 usually first by the defendant56 and then by the 
prosecution in rebuttal.  But proof of character under these exceptions is limited 
 
52. I focus here and throughout much of this Article primarily on Federal Rule 404 and federal 
case law.  Most state character-evidence rules are based on either the original or restyled federal rule, 
and the issues arising in state court cases closely track those arising in federal courts.  
53. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
54. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). 
55. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B).  A defendant’s ability to offer evidence of an alleged victim’s 
character is limited by Rule 412, which bars evidence, in cases involving alleged sexual misconduct, 
of an alleged victim’s other sexual behavior, or sexual predisposition.  FED. R. EVID. 412. 
56. In homicide prosecutions, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged victim’s 
peaceable character to rebut any evidence—even noncharacter evidence—that the victim was the first 
aggressor.  FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(C). 
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to relatively anodyne reputation and opinion testimony.57  Specific instances of 
conduct are not admissible to prove character.  Finally, Rule 404(a)(3) sanctions 
use of evidence of a witness’s character as allowed in Rules 607, 608, and 609, 
which govern impeachment.  Many aspects of Rule 404(a) are troublesome.  
Justice Jackson famously decried the “grotesque structure” of the “archaic” 
common-law rules that governed evidence of a criminal defendant’s 
character.58  A quarter-century later, the Federal Rules of Evidence essentially 
codified those rules.59  The use of character evidence to impeach witnesses has 
likewise been the target of withering criticism.60  But this Article puts these 
issues to the side and focuses on Rule 404(b).   
Rule 404(b)(1) restates Rule 404(a)(1)’s injunction against the use of 
character evidence, but in a more particular way.  While Rule 404(a)(1) 
prohibits all evidence of a person’s character61 for a character-propensity62 
inference, Rule 404(b)(1) bars a subset of such evidence.  It renders 
inadmissible evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” if offered “to prove 
a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character.”63  Rule 404(b)(2) provides, however, 
 
57. FED. R. EVID. 405; see Jennifer S. Hunt & Thomas Lee Budesheim, How Jurors Use and 
Misuse Character Evidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 347, 352, 355 (2004) (reporting that exposing mock 
jurors to such character evidence had very little effect). 
58. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). 
59. The only “reform” introduced by the federal rules was allowing character to be proved by 
opinion, as well as reputation, testimony.  See FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
60. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 168 (2016); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: 
Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1991); Robert G. 
Spector, Commentary, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334 (1979). 
61. Reputation and opinion testimony and evidence of specific acts comprise the three possible 
means of proving character.  See FED. R. EVID. 405. 
62. A propensity inference is one that has its basis in the person’s tendency to act in a particular 
way over time in a manner that distinguishes the person from people generally.  For example, a violent 
person tends to act violently over time in a way that most people do not.  In contrast, one might say 
that a person who is hungry has a propensity to eat, but that does not distinguish that person from other 
people generally.  For purposes of Rule 404(b), therefore, we would not say that a propensity inference 
is required to go from proof that a person was hungry to the conclusion that the person ate.  See David 
P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 
541 n.39 (1994).  But see Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific 
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 781–94 (1981) (defining propensity so broadly as to obliterate 
any distinction between propensity and nonpropensity inferences). 
63. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).  As has been often noted, Rule 404(b)(1) logically is redundant.  
E.g., LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 4.1; GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. 
DUANE, WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.11 (7th ed. 2011) (referring to Rule 404(b)(1) 
as “extension” of Rule 404(a)(1)’s exclusionary principle and a “restatement” Rule 405’s limitation on 
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that such other-acts evidence may be admissible if offered for a different 
purpose (that is, a noncharacter-propensity purpose), and provides a non-
exclusive list of possible permissible uses.  Other-acts evidence may be 
admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”64  
Rule 404’s general ban on character-propensity evidence and its acceptance 
of other-acts evidence offered for another purpose reflect a centuries-old 
common-law approach.65  This approach has always been rooted in a judgment 
about the relative probative value and prejudicial effect of this category of 
evidence.  Although evidence of a person’s character, offered to prove the 
person acted in accordance with that character, is relevant, its probative value 
tends to be slight.66  Evidence that a person has a violent or untruthful 
disposition may tell us something about whether that person acted violently or 
untruthfully on a particular occasion, but not necessarily very much.  Violent 
people aren’t violent all the time and dishonest people don’t always lie.  But 
such evidence is likely to have a prejudicial effect.  For various reasons, jurors 
may tend to overvalue such evidence or to convict a defendant even if they are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the current 
charge.67   
When other-acts evidence is offered for a noncharacter-propensity purpose, 
however, the probative value increases and categorically tilts the probative 
value/prejudicial effect balance in favor of admissibility.  A few light-hearted 
examples illustrate how other-acts evidence may prove—without requiring a 
character-propensity inference—one of the permissible purposes listed in Rule 
404(b)(2).  Take the first item on the list: motive.  One episode of The 
Untouchables, an old television series about crime-fighting in Chicago during 
Prohibition, began with Santa Claus being gunned down as he left a boys’ 
 
how character may be proved); Michael L. Russell, Previous Acts of Employment Discrimination: 
Probative or Prejudicial?, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 297, 300–01 (2001). 
64. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
65. See David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of 
the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1170 (1998) [hereinafter Leonard, In Defense] 
(stating that character-evidence rule was “well settled” by early nineteenth century); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications 
of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried, Reshaping] (“The character evidence prohibition is a settled fixture of the common law 
of evidence.”).  Some date the origins of the character-evidence rule as far back as the late seventeenth 
century.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 346 P.3d 455, 458–59 (Or. 2015); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 716–17. 
66. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 192. 
67. See infra Part IV. 
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orphanage.68  Santa, it turned out, had the misfortune of witnessing an earlier 
gangland slaying and was killed so he would not snitch.  Suppose the gunman 
were tried for murdering Santa.  The prosecution would certainly be allowed to 
offer evidence of the earlier killing—not to prove that the defendant was a 
violent person and so killed Santa, but to show he had a motive for the otherwise 
inexplicable slaying of Santa Claus.  This does not require a character-
propensity inference and is undoubtedly highly probative.69   
Intent is the most commonly invoked item on the Rule 404(b)(2) list.70  In 
Arsenic and Old Lace,71 two elderly women kill a series of gentlemen callers 
by putting arsenic in their elderberry wine.  Suppose they were tried for the 
murder of victim number six.  They claim that they did not intend to kill him 
because they did not know that arsenic was poisonous.  Evidence of the 
previous five deaths would be probative without requiring an inference about 
the defendants’ character.  However innocent their intention when they put 
arsenic in their first victim’s elderberry wine, by the time they spiked victim 
number six’s wine, they knew exactly what they were doing.  They intended to 
kill him.72  
The film Kind Hearts and Coronets73 illustrates how other-acts evidence 
could be used to show “plan.”  The protagonist, who is ninth in line of 
succession to a dukedom, embarked on a plan to kill the eight individuals with 
precedence to the title.  If tried for the murder of any of them, evidence of the 
other killings could be used for a noncharacter-propensity purpose.  Each of the 
killings was indispensable to bringing his plan to fruition.74    
 
68. CeltieNess, The Night They Shot Santa Claus_Open Seg 1 of 5.mpg, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m65_pUiTHzY [https://perma.cc/48GL-TKP5]. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206–09 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding admission 
in murder prosecution that victim was to be primary witness against defendant in prosecution for 
another murder); cf. United States v. Watson, 695 F.3d 159, 161 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding defendant’s 
conviction for attempting to kill witness with intent to prevent testimony and communication with law 
enforcement).  
70. See infra note 81. 
71. ARSENIC AND OLD LACE (WARNER BROS. 1944). 
72. See, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 81 F. App’x 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that trial 
court properly admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for passing counterfeit currency 
to show he knew currency was counterfeit); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 253–54 (6th 
Cir. 1979) (admitting evidence of prior financial fraud by defendant to show his financial acumen and 
rebut his claim he was duped in transactions at issue). 
73. KIND HEARTS AND CORONETS (EALING STUDIOS 1949).  Professors Bryden and Park use 
this example.  Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 546–47. 
74. See, e.g., United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2018) (defendant wanted 
to murder victim in Mexico and so had victim’s father murdered to lure victim to return to Mexico for 
his funeral, and when that did not work, had victim’s sister murdered to again lure victim there). 
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Anyone who has seen Home Alone75 understands the use of other-acts 
evidence to prove identity.  Marv and Harry, our young hero’s foils, are 
burglars.  After completing one burglary, Marv asks Harry why he once again 
stuffed a cloth into a sink drain and left the water running: “Harry, it’s our 
calling card.  All the great ones leave their mark.  We’re the Wet Bandits.”  
Later when they are arrested, a cop says to them, “Nice move.  Always leaving 
the water running.  Now we know each and every house you’ve hit.”76  Courts 
routinely allow such “calling card” or “signature”77 evidence—proof that a 
defendant committed other crimes in a distinctive manner—to identify the 
defendant as the person who committed the charged crime, which was executed 
in the same distinctive manner.   
These are easy cases.  In each one, the other-acts evidence is probative 
without requiring a character-propensity inference.78  To be sure, in each the 
evidence also reflects on the defendant’s character and so poses a danger of 
unfair prejudice.  In the first three examples, for instance, the jury might infer 
the defendants were violent people and so committed the charged murder.  The 
defendants certainly could ask the court to exclude the evidence under Rule 403 
on the grounds that the legitimate probative value of evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  But the point here is that if the 
evidence is probative without requiring a character-propensity inference, Rule 
404(b)(1)’s prohibition is inapplicable.  The problem, as the next Part 
demonstrates, is that, contrary to the rule, courts often admit other-acts evidence 
when its probative value flows only from such an inference.   
III.  COURTS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE PROPENSITY-BASED INFERENCES 
Rule 404(b)(2)’s laundry list of permissible uses for other-acts evidence 
supplies courts with an easy way to avoid scrutinizing how the evidence is 
probative.  Rather than asking whether the evidence’s probative value flows 
only through a character-propensity inference, courts often merely point to one 
or more of the listed permissible uses and state that Rule 404(b) authorizes its 
 
75. HOME ALONE (HUGHES ENTERTAINMENT 1990).  
76. Id.  
77. See, e.g., Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 896 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that in closing 
statement, prosecutor made numerous remarks regarding prior instances in which defendant hit victims 
in or extinguished cigarettes on victim’s face and then argued, “That’s his trademark, that’s his calling 
card.  He may as well have left a calling card saying this was done by James Cristini”). 
78. Contrary to what is often argued, using modus operandi to prove identity may require a 
propensity inference, but not necessarily a character-propensity inference.  See infra Part III.D. 
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admission.79  Sometimes courts address the matter in more detail and 
strenuously maintain that the evidence is probative without any character-
propensity inference, even though careful analysis shows that such an inference 
is required.  Typically, they then perform a Rule 403 balancing to determine 
whether the danger that the jury will use the evidence for an impermissible 
character-propensity inference substantially outweighs the probative value of 
the evidence for its permissible purpose.80  But this Rule 403 balancing is 
hopelessly skewed because courts consider the (unrecognized) character-
propensity-based inference as proper, rather than improper, and so place it on 
the probative-value side of the scale and not on the unfair-prejudice side.  In 
this Part, using some of the more commonly invoked permissible purposes 
listed in Rule 404(b)(2), I first demonstrate how courts frequently and 
mistakenly deny that the probative value of other-acts evidence depends on a 
character-propensity inference.  I then analyze the doctrine of chances, an 
increasingly popular means that courts use to deny—again, erroneously—that 
a propensity inference is at work. 
A.  Intent 
Of the permissible purposes for other-acts evidence listed in Rule 404(b), 
intent is far and away the most frequently invoked,81 primarily because it is so 
 
79. See Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 778 (describing the careless manner in which courts 
“routinely admit” such evidence, thereby “threatening to undermine the bedrock ban on character 
evidence”). 
80. Each circuit court of appeals—except the Seventh—has either a two-, three-, or four-part test 
to evaluate other-acts evidence admissibility questions.  Almost all include a Rule 403 balancing 
component.  See STEVEN GOODE & OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE 294–96 (2020) (compiling tests).  Most of these tests are meaningless at best.  They do 
nothing but remind courts to apply all relevant evidence rules.  See, e.g., United States v. Benford, 875 
F.3d 1007, 1012 (10th Cir. 2017).  Some tests are sometimes misleading.  For example, in instructing 
trial courts that the other-acts evidence must be relevant (hardly a necessary reminder), the Fourth 
Circuit states “the more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the 
act being proved, the more relevant it becomes.”  United States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 
2018) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 296 (4th Cir. 2010)).  While similarity between 
the other act and the charged crime is sometimes important, other times it is irrelevant.  A defendant 
may commit arson to destroy proof of an earlier crime.  It doesn’t matter whether the earlier crime is 
similar to arson; it still provides the motive.  See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 
2014) (noting that need for similarity may be diminished or nonexistent depending on purpose for 
which other-acts evidence is offered). 
81. 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5242, at 152.  Professors Saltzburg, Martin, and 
Capra devote more than forty pages of their federal evidence manual to annotating cases invoking the 
intent “exception” to Rule 404(b), far more than they devote to their case annotations involving any of 
the other permissible uses.  2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 404.03[2] (11th ed. 2015).  Professor Imwinkelried notes 
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often an element of the crime with which a defendant is charged.82  Other-acts 
evidence may tend to prove intent in innumerable ways.83  As in Arsenic and 
Old Lace, it may tend to show the defendant’s knowledge of something (the 
fatal effect of ingesting arsenic), which in turn tends to prove intent.84  Or, other-
acts evidence may show the defendant had a motive to act.  In The 
Untouchables, this would tend to show the defendant intended to kill Santa.  In 
other cases, the motive may be used to rebut any claim that the defendant did 
not intend the result (“the machine gun fired accidentally”).85  Such cases 
typically involve a legitimate, nonpropensity use of other-acts evidence.  Other-
acts evidence, however, is frequently used to prove intent in a way that requires 
a propensity inference.86  Drug prosecutions offer numerous examples; indeed, 
courts and commentators commonly note how routinely other-acts evidence is 
admitted to show intent in drug cases.87  
 
that one criminal law treatise contains a five-page list of the types of cases in which prosecutors have 
offered other-acts evidence to prove mens rea.  1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT 
EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:3 (referring to WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 237 (12th ed.)). 
82. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:34. 
83. See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:3 
(listing types of prosecutions in which other-acts evidence used to prove mens rea). 
84. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 6.3; see, e.g., United States v. Anzaldi, 800 
F.3d 872, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant requested fees be 
paid in manner that violated anti-structuring law to prove defendant knew her conduct was illegal and 
so intended to defraud government). 
85. Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 449; see, e.g., Huckabee v. State, 785 
S.W.2d 223, 225–26 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (holding evidence of defendant’s previous assaultive 
conduct toward wife was admissible to disprove defendant’s claim that charged shooting of wife was 
accidental). 
86. See Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 806 (noting that intent “has been one of the most 
abused ‘proper purposes’ under existing precedent”); David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) 
on the Issue of Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 218 (2011); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The 
Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO STATE L.J. 575, 
583–84 (1990); United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that “in many cases, 
impermissible propensity reasoning lurks as one of the links in the logical chain of relevance”). 
87. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:22 (“It would 
be fair to generalize that the courts are very liberal in admitting evidence of prior drug transactions for 
this purpose.”); Morris, supra note 5, at 190 (“evidence of prior drug activity pours in unexamined” to 
prove intent); United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Especially in drug cases 
like this one, other-act evidence is too often admitted almost automatically, without consideration of 
the ‘legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and the need for it.’” (quoting 
United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012))).  This may by a by-product of the 
dominance of drug cases in the federal criminal docket.  Drug offenders comprise nearly 30% of all 
defendants in criminal cases.  U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Commenced, by Offense, 
During the 12-Monthy Periods Ending March 31, 2013 Through 2017, in CASELOAD STATISTICS 
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United States v. Banks,88 for example, was a simple, run-of-the-mill drug 
case.  Banks was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine.  He was arrested after he and his coconspirator attempted to buy two 
kilograms of cocaine for $42,000 from an undercover agent.  During the 
purchase, Banks inspected the cocaine and said, “I can work with that.”89  At 
trial, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of Banks’s ten-
year-old conviction for marijuana possession to prove his knowledge of the 
conspiracy’s existence and his intent to join it.90  The court of appeals affirmed.  
In the space of a single paragraph, the court quoted circuit precedent that 
approved use of prior drug convictions to prove knowledge and intent,91 
observed that Banks’s prior conviction was neither too remote nor too 
dissimilar, and declared that he had failed to show how he had been prejudiced 
by its admission.92  The court never tried to explain how this evidence was 
relevant without a propensity inference.  Nor could it.  Banks’s prior conviction 
for marijuana possession tended to prove his knowledge of or intent to join a 
 
DATA TABLES (2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d2_0331.2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4Y8Z-3VCA].  Immigration defendants constitute the only group close in number.  
Id.  
88. 706 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2013). 
89. Id. at 903. 
90. Id. at 904. 
91. Id. at 907 (“Prior felony drug convictions are relevant to show intent and knowledge in a 
drug prosecution when a defendant makes a general denial defense, which necessarily places the 
defendant’s state of mind at issue.” (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 548 F.3d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 
2008))). 
92. Id.  
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conspiracy to distribute cocaine only through a propensity inference.93  Drug 
cases like Banks are all too common.94  
But propensity-only use of other-acts evidence to prove intent goes well 
beyond drug cases.  One of the best-known intent cases is United States v. 
Beechum.95  Postal authorities suspected that Beechum, a substitute letter 
carrier, was stealing items from the mail.  They planted in a mailbox on his 
route an envelope containing a silver dollar, $16 in currency, and a greeting 
card.  A postal inspector watched Beechum retrieve mail from the mailbox.  
Later that day, Beechum turned in the retrieved mail to the postal station.  It 
contained the planted envelope, which authorities discovered had been opened 
and resealed.  The silver dollar and currency were missing.  Beechum was 
stopped as he left the station; a frisk revealed he had the silver dollar.96  In 
addition, the postal inspectors found in Beechum’s wallet two credit cards—
not issued to him—that had been mailed ten months earlier to two different 
addresses on routes that Beechum serviced.97  At his trial for unlawfully 
possessing the silver dollar, Beechum claimed that he had found it in the 
 
93. Compare id., with Holmes v. Slay, 895 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2018) (a section 1983 action).  
Holmes claimed the defendant police officers had conspired to deprive him of his civil rights and that 
he had been maliciously prosecuted and falsely imprisoned.  Holmes, 895 F.3d at 997.  In 2006, Holmes 
had been convicted of drug possession.  Id. at 996.  The police officers claimed they received a tip that 
drug dealing was occurring in a particular house and found Holmes there, in possession of drugs.  Id. 
at 998.  Holmes contended that he had been visiting the house and knew nothing of the drug activity.  
Id.  At his criminal trial, the prosecution was permitted to offer evidence that Holmes had been 
convicted of drug trafficking in 1996.  Id. at 999.  The Eighth Circuit cursorily affirmed the admission 
of this evidence.  United States v. Holmes, 231 F. App’x. 535, 536 (8th Cir. 2007).  Subsequently, 
however, the officers who arrested Holmes were investigated for repeated misconduct.  Holmes, 895 
F.3d at 996.  One was prosecuted; the other resigned.  Id.  Holmes’s conviction was vacated under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 because the officers had “been discredited,” and the prosecution chose not to retry him.  
Id. at 997.  In Holmes’s section 1983 action, the jury found for Holmes.  Id.  The officers appealed, 
claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of Holmes’s 1996 drug trafficking 
conviction.  Id. at 997, 999.  They argued that his claim against them was predicated on his contention 
that he did not possess drugs and was unaware of drug activity in the house when the officers arrested 
him.  Id. at 999.  Citing Rule 404(b), the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument.  Id.  The officers’ 
“reasoning supports the admission of this evidence for just the type of propensity purpose that Rule 
404(b) prohibits, i.e., to show that because Holmes sold drugs in the past, he had the propensity to do 
so again.”  Id.  The Eighth Circuit thus found Holmes’s conviction could be used against him in a 
criminal prosecution to prove that he possessed the drugs, but that the exact same evidence could not 
be used against him in a civil case to prove the exact same thing.  
94. E.g., United States v. Shelledy, 961 F.3d 1014, 1021–23 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Jones, 930 F.3d 366, 373–75 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 792–93 (7th Cir. 
2005).  
95. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).  Beechum has been cited by courts more than 200 times.  
96. Id. at 903–04. 
97. Id. at 903. 
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mailbox and had intended to give it to his supervisor, but could not find him.98  
To prove Beechum’s intent to possess the silver dollar unlawfully, the 
prosecution introduced evidence about the credit cards they found in 
Beechum’s wallet.99   
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed Beechum’s conviction.100  
The other-acts evidence, ruled the court, was relevant “to an issue other than 
propensity because it lessens the likelihood that the defendant committed the 
charged offense with innocent intent.”101  While most people would likely agree 
that Beechum’s apparent theft of the credit cards made it more likely that he 
intended to steal the silver dollar, the question, as the court itself recognized, is 
whether it does so without a propensity inference.102  The court’s discussion 
consisted largely of repeating that the evidence was probative without carefully 
examining how: “That Beechum possessed the credit cards with illicit intent 
diminishes the likelihood that at the same moment he intended to turn in the 
silver dollar.”103  This, said the court, sufficed to establish a nonpropensity use 
of the evidence.104  Later, the court elaborated.  The force of the stolen-credit-
cards evidence was demonstrated by what Beechum would have had to have 
avowed to rebut it: “He would have been forced to argue that his state of mind 
was schizoid—that he intended at the same time to relinquish the coin but to 
keep the cards.”105  Apart from the remarkable assertion that one would have to 
be “schizoid” to harbor two different mental states at the same time—has this 
court never heard of a love-hate relationship?—the court simply failed to 
recognize the inferential process it was endorsing.  Because Beechum stole the 
credit cards, he was the type of person who steals.  Therefore, he intended to 
steal the silver dollar.  That is propensity reasoning, pure and simple.106   
United States v. Thomas107 demonstrates that little has changed in the Fifth 
Circuit in the last forty years.  Thomas was charged with overbilling the New 
Orleans Traffic Court for accounting services he provided.  He sometimes 
billed for more than twenty-four hours of work performed in a single day, for 
 
98. Id. at 905.  
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 918. 
101. Id. at 913. 
102. Id. at 916 (noting that under Rule 404(b), evidence must be “relevant to an issue other than 
propensity”). 
103. Id. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 917. 
106. This did not go unnoticed.  Judge Goldberg criticized the majority on this very ground.  Id. 
at 920–21 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  
107. 847 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2017). 
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services he did not provide, and at hourly rates exceeding those in his contract.  
He also backdated transactions to cover-up his fraud.108  The indictment 
covered overbilling from late 2008 to 2011, totaling between $600,000 and 
$800,000.  At trial, the court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence that 
from 2006 to October 2008—a period not embraced by the indictment—
Thomas submitted inflated and duplicate invoices to the Traffic Court.109  The 
Fifth Circuit rejected Thomas’s claim that this violated Rule 404(b): “[T]he 
evidence was relevant to an issue other than Thomas’s character as it 
‘lessen[ed] the likelihood that [Thomas] committed the charged offense with 
innocent intent.’”110  The court did not bother to explain how.  As in Beechum, 
however, the inferential chain required propensity reasoning: Thomas 
fraudulently overbilled before; therefore, he fraudulently overbilled this time.  
Beechum and Thomas are hardly outliers; such cases are numerous.111  On some 
occasions, courts have even allowed other-acts evidence to prove intent where 
intent was not an element of the required proof.112  
 
108. Id. at 197–98. 
109. Id. at 207. 
110. Id. at 207–08 (quoting United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2015)) (alteration 
in original). 
111. E.g., United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 860–63 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating both that 
defendant jailer’s past assault of inmate could be used to prove his specific intent in assaulting current 
inmate-victim and that it could not permissibly be used to prove he committed charged assault); United 
States v. Boone, 828 F.3d 705, 711 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding admissible in defendant police officer’s 
trial for use of unreasonable force on arrestee evidence that he used unreasonable force on another 
arrestee four years before; “[b]y testifying that he did not intend to hurt Hill or kick him in the head, 
but was instead trying to assist his fellow officers in securing Hill, Boone placed his state of mind 
squarely at issue and rendered evidence of his prior use of unreasonable force probative of his intent, 
knowledge, motive, and absence of mistake in his use of force against Hill”); United States v. Geddes, 
844 F.3d 983, 987–90 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing defendant’s former girlfriend to testify that he 
assaulted and threatened to kill her to prove that he intended to force another woman to engage in 
prostitution); United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 735–36 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding admissible 
evidence that defendant discussed soliciting another bribe to prove defendant had intent to commit 
charged bribery); United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 594–96 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding admissible 
evidence that defendant attorney had misrepresented his status as member of bar on multiple occasions 
to prove he made false statements to bankruptcy court with fraudulent intent).  
112. In Pride v. State, 473 So. 2d 576 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), for example, the prosecution 
presented evidence that the defendant committed a violent sexual assault.  Because the defendant 
claimed that the victim had consented, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence that the 
defendant had committed a previous violent rape to prove his “intent to commit rape . . . and negate 
his defense of consent.”  Id. at 578.  Under Alabama law, a person is guilty of rape in the first degree 
if he “engages in sexual intercourse . . . by forcible compulsion.”  ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(1)(2021).  
Similarly, in Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), the defendant was accused of 
aggravated rape.  The victim testified the defendant raped her at gunpoint.  Id. at 499.  The defendant 
claimed she consented and that he used neither force nor threats.  Id.  The court said that the defendant 
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B.  Knowledge  
Knowledge is an element of many crimes.  In such cases, other-acts 
evidence often tends to prove it without requiring an inference about 
propensity.  For example, in United States v. Whitney,113 the defendant was 
convicted of knowingly making a false statement to a firearms dealer while 
attempting to buy a firearm.114  In filling out the required ATF Form 4473, 
which asked whether he was under a court order restraining him from harassing 
a child or an intimate partner, he answered, “No.”115  The prosecution was 
permitted to offer evidence that, three weeks before he filled out the form, he 
had been arrested for violating such a protective order.116  Clearly, this tended 
to prove his knowledge of the protective order—and that he knowingly made a 
false statement about it—without a propensity inference.117   
Other-acts evidence may also be used without a propensity inference to 
establish knowledge, which then provides circumstantial proof of another 
material element.  For example, proof of a defendant’s knowledge may tend to 
prove the defendant’s intent.118  Likewise, evidence that a defendant knew how 
to do something unusual, such as disarm a sophisticated alarm system, may help 
identify the defendant as a perpetrator of a crime that required such skill.119   
The use of other-acts evidence to prove knowledge in other cases, however, 
is far more problematic.  Consider United States v. Moran.120  The defendant 
was tried for being a felon in possession of a firearm.121  Moran was driving his 
girlfriend’s SUV when he was stopped by a police officer.  When the officer 
 
thereby disputed his intent to act without the victim’s consent and affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
admit evidence that the defendant violently sexually assaulted another woman.  Id. at 499–502.  At the 
time, Texas defined rape as “sexual intercourse with a female . . . without the female’s consent.”  TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West 1974) (repealed); see Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? 
Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 621–22 (1997).  
113. 524 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2008). 
114. Id. at 135; 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). 
115. Whitney, 524 F.3d at 136. 
116. Id. at 137–42. 
117. See also United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 710 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding, in 
defendant’s prosecution for possession of pipe bomb, evidence of defendant’s prior attempts to make 
pipe bombs as proof that defendant knew he was making a “destructive device”). 
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 247–48 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding 
admission of evidence of defendant’s previous disarming of an alarm system to identify him as 
participant in charged museum theft, which involved neutralizing museum’s alarm system); United 
States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 165–68 (5th Cir. 2003) (admitting chapter of book defendant owned 
that detailed how to construct explosives to prove defendant knew how to construct explosive device).  
120. 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007). 
121. Id. at 1139; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
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reached the car, he saw the butt of a rifle stock sticking out of an unzipped rifle 
case on the back seat.  In response to the officer’s queries, Moran stated that the 
rifle belonged to his girlfriend, it was loaded, and he always had a rifle in his 
vehicle.122  At trial, Moran disputed neither that he had a previous felony 
conviction nor that there was a firearm in the car he was driving.123  He claimed 
only that he did not know that the rifle was in the car.124  To prove that Moran 
knowingly possessed the rifle, the prosecution introduced evidence that Moran 
had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm more than ten 
years before.125  The appellate court approved: “the fact that Mr. Moran 
knowingly possessed a firearm in the past supports the inference that he had the 
same knowledge in the context of the charged offense.”126  At one point, the 
court acknowledged this required “a kind of propensity inference,” but simply 
asserted that this was not impermissible character evidence.127  Moran is not at 
all like Whitney, where the prior act demonstrated that the defendant had 
knowledge of the very thing he claimed not to know.  Moran’s prior conviction 
for knowingly possessing a firearm in no way provided him knowledge that, 
more than ten years later, a rifle would be in the back seat of a car he was 
driving.  To the extent it proved his knowledge, it was only through the type of 
“once a knowing possessor, always a knowing possessor” inference that Rule 
404(b) purportedly forbids.128  Like Banks, Beechum, and Thomas, Moran is no 
aberration.129  
 
122. Moran, 503 F.3d at 1139. 
123. Id. at 1139, 1144. 
124. Id. at 1144. 
125. Id.  
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1145 (“We acknowledge that the use of Mr. Moran’s prior conviction to prove 
knowledge involves a kind of propensity inference (i.e., because he knowingly possessed a firearm in 
the past, he knowingly possessed the firearm in the present case).  But the inference is specific and 
does not require a jury to first draw the forbidden general inference of bad character or criminal 
disposition; rather, it rests on a logic of improbability that recognizes that a prior act involving the 
same knowledge decreases the likelihood that the defendant lacked the requisite knowledge in 
committing the charged offense.”).  The court may have been arguing that the doctrine of chances 
applies here.  It cited United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 996 (4th Cir. 1997), which explicitly 
referenced the doctrine.  But the doctrine of chances purports to demonstrate that other-acts evidence 
may be probative without a propensity inference.  As shown infra in Part III.F, this is a flawed 
argument. 
128. Cf. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 700 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating about other-acts 
evidence in a drug case: “The relevance of the prior conviction here boils down to the prohibited ‘once 
a drug dealer, always a drug dealer’ argument”).  
129. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 951 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2020) (upholding admission 
of evidence that defendant had gun while committing robbery in 2010 to prove he knowingly and 
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C.  Plan 
While intent or knowledge is often an element of a charged crime, plan 
typically is not.130  Other-acts evidence offered under Rule 404(b) to prove plan, 
therefore, is usually introduced to prove state of mind, identity, or the 
performance of a criminal act.131  In some instances, the noncharacter-
propensity chain of reasoning is apparent; in others, far less so.  More than a 
century ago, Wigmore articulated the justification for allowing evidence of a 
plan.132  Someone who plans to do something is likely to do that thing.133  
Evidence that the police found in the defendant’s apartment, a sketch of a 
bank’s interior and a timeline for robbing the bank, would tend to prove that the 
defendant robbed the bank without requiring any inference about the 
defendant’s character.134  Similarly, other-acts evidence may be probative 
without a propensity inference when the commission of the other act is an 
integral part of a larger scheme.  Kind Hearts and Coronets provides a fanciful 
such example;135 real-life cases tend more toward the prosaic.  For instance, in 
a trial for burglarizing a post office, the prosecution was permitted to prove that 
the defendant had, a few hours earlier, stolen a cutting torch that he used to 
 
intentionally possessed gun in relation to drug trafficking crime); United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 
639, 652–54 (5th Cir. 2019) (upholding admission of involvement in subsequent Medicare kickback 
scheme to prove that defendant knowingly and willfully participated in earlier scheme); United States 
v. Benford, 875 F.3d 1007, 1012 (10th Cir. 2017) (relying on Moran and referring to it as “often-
cited”); United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1048–50 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding admission of 
defendant’s prior felon-in-possession conviction to prove that defendant, and not other occupants of 
car, knowingly possessed gun found wedged behind arm rest in back seat); United States v. Brown, 
398 F. App’x 915, 916 (4th Cir. 2010) (admitting two prior felon-in-possession convictions to prove 
knowing possession).  See generally David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 
to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 136–60 (2002); Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other 
Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 127–
34 (1984). 
130. Plan may sometimes be an element of a crime.  For example, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a), provides that the target criminal conduct must be done “in furtherance of a plan or purpose 
to do anything in violation of this section.”  
131. See 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5252 (collecting cases). 
132. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 102; see also LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, 
§ 9.1; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:35. 
133. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (hearsay exception for statement of intent to do something in the 
future). 
134. Cf. United States v. DeCicco, 370 F.3d 206, 209, 213 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding admissible, 
in trial of defendant for burning down building, evidence of defendant’s previous attempt to burn down 
same building). 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74. 
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commit the charged burglary.136  In all these examples, the other-acts evidence 
is probative because it tends to prove the defendant had a plan to commit the 
very crime charged.137  
But courts read Rule 404(b) as sanctioning plan evidence in numerous 
situations where the “plan” consists of the defendant’s having committed the 
same type of crime on other occasions.  While these other acts may reveal a 
tendency to commit that type of crime, they don’t tend to show a plan to commit 
the very crime charged.  Sometimes, the charged and other crimes share 
substantial similarities; other times, less so.  Commentators categorize these 
cases in various ways: “linked methodology,”138 “unlinked plan,”139 “spurious 
plan,”140 and “template” or “repeated choice” model.141  Many commentators 
criticize the way courts have employed plan, decrying its “protean”142 quality 
and warning that courts invoke it as a “magic incantation”143 to admit other-acts 
evidence for a propensity purpose.144  A look at a few cases illustrates why plan 
is so troublesome and why, ultimately, the failure to define “character” 
confounds any attempt to bring coherence to the character-evidence rule.  
 
136. Lewis v. United States, 771 F.2d 454, 455 (10th Cir. 1985) (admitting evidence that 
defendant stole cutting torch and oxygen bottles, which defendant used in committing charged burglary 
several hours later); see also United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2018) (defendant 
wanted to murder victim in Mexico and so had victim’s father murdered to lure victim to return to 
Mexico for his funeral, and when that did not work, had victim’s sister murdered there to again lure 
victim there).  
137. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:35. 
138. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve the Dispute Over The 
Meaning of The Term “Plan” in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1012–13 
(1995) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Contextual Construction]. 
139. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 9.2.2; see Bryden & Park, supra note 62, 
at 547. 
140. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 3:26; Roger C. 
Park & David P. Bryden, The Twenty-Second Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases: Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L. REV. 171, 
179 (1993); Note, Admissibility of Similar Crimes: 1901–1951, 18 BROOK. L. REV. 80, 104–05 (1952). 
141. Imwinkelried, Contextual Construction, supra note 138, at 1013. 
142. Park & Bryden, supra note 140, at 177. 
143. Imwinkelried, Contextual Construction, supra note 138, at 1008. 
144. See, e.g., RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS, JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JOHN H. BLUME, 
STEPHAN LANDSMAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, 
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 367 (5th ed. 2014) (“most elastic and bewildering category of 
nonpropensity uses of other-acts evidence”); 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5244, at 163 
(noting that some commentators treat plan as a “dumping ground”); Bloom, supra note 1, at 1132 (“If 
Rule 404 permitted evidence based only on repetition, the bar on character would dip toward 
nothing.”); Reed, supra note 6, at 227 (“vague and amorphous”).  
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State v. Roth145 is a modern-day “brides in the bath” case.146  Roth’s fourth 
wife, a single mother who married him after a short courtship, died in 1991.147  
Roth said she accidentally fell off an inflatable raft; the prosecution said he 
murdered her.148  Soon after they were married, Roth had purchased life 
insurance in his wife’s name and, upon her death, collected nearly $400,000.149  
Without objection, the prosecution offered evidence about two of Roth’s other 
relationships.150  Six years before his fourth wife died, Roth met another single 
mother.151  After a short courtship, he married her.152  He promptly convinced 
her to name him as beneficiary of a life insurance policy she already had and 
tried to persuade her to procure another one.153  She left him after three 
months.154  The following year, Roth struck up a relationship with another 
single mother, who soon moved in with him.155  But their relationship ended 
soon after he suggested she buy some life insurance and she informed him that 
she was uninsurable because she had been diagnosed with cancer.156  Over 
Roth’s objection, the prosecution introduced evidence about one other 
relationship.157  In 1981, Roth married his second wife.158  You guessed it: she 
was a single mother whom he married after a brief courtship.159  Twenty days 
after a $100,000 life insurance policy on her life went into effect, she died from 
 
145. 881 P.2d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
146. The notorious “brides in the baths case” is R. v. Smith [1915] 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 
L.J.K.B. 2153.  Smith was convicted of murdering three wives by drowning them in the bathtub.  Id.  
The case has become a staple of popular culture in England.  See George Joseph Smith, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Joseph_Smith [https://perma.cc/8Z7A-FVUH]; THE BRIDES IN 
THE BATH (ITV 2003).  Until recently, one could even find at Madame Tussauds in London a wax 
representation of Smith standing over the body of one of his drowned victims.  Shon Ellerton, 
Reminiscing on the Creepiness of Waxworks Museums, MEDIUM (Jan. 2, 2020), 
https://medium.com/ironkeel/reminiscing-on-the-creepiness-of-waxworks-museums-3f75121fe264 
[https://perma.cc/JH5U-56Y2].  See infra Part III.F for a discussion of this case’s significance to the 
doctrine of chances. 
147. Roth, 881 P.2d at 271, 272. 
148. Id. at 271. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 272. 






157. Id.  
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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a 300-foot fall.160  The Washington Court of Appeals upheld the admission of 
this evidence.161  The court acknowledged that the other acts here did not form 
part of a single transaction.162  The question, therefore, was whether the 
evidence tended to show that “the defendant planned to commit a series of 
crimes, including the specific crime being tried,” or whether it merely tended 
to show that he committed two or more crimes that happened to be of a similar 
nature.163  Not surprisingly, the court found that the other-acts evidence tended 
to prove that Roth had an “overarching plan to marry, insure, and murder 
women in order to obtain large insurance recoveries.”164   
Compare Roth to United States v. Kravchuk.165  Kravchuk was convicted of 
stealing money from an automatic teller machine (ATM) in a convenience 
store.166  The government called his co-participants to testify not only about that 
theft but also about two earlier uncharged crimes they committed with 
Kravchuk.167  Six months before, they removed an ATM from a mall; five 
months later, they unsuccessfully attempted to remove an ATM from a different 
convenience store.168  The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court properly 
admitted this evidence under Rule 404(b) as proof of Kravchuk’s plan.169  The 
incidents all involved ATMs and the same participants and occurred within a 
six-month period.170  “These similarities show that Kravchuk had plainly 
 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 275. 
162. Id. at 276. 
163. Id. (quoting State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920, 928 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d, 889 P.2d 487 
(1995) (emphasis in original)).  The court disapprovingly noted that another division of the Washington 
Court of Appeals took a more restrictive approach to admitting “plan” evidence, limiting it to cases in 
which a common scheme or plan is actually an element of the crime charged.  Id. at 276 n.6 (citing 
State v. Stanton, 845 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)). 
164. Id. at 277.  The court also stated that the planning Roth devoted to the earlier wife’s death—
especially his selection of a remote location and preparation of a credible explanation for her death—
would be useful in accomplishing the charged crime.  Id. at 276–77.  It did not bother to explain, 
however, how Roth needed the prior episode to teach him of the value of using a remote location to 
stage an accidental death or having a credible story at hand; he seemed to know how to do this the first 
time.  Likewise, Professor Sullivan argues that evidence that a defendant, charged with drowning his 
wife, had previously drowned another wife should be admissible to prove the husband possessed the 
knowledge needed to successfully drown his victim.  Sean P. Sullivan, Probative Inference From 
Phenomenal Coincidence: Demystifying the Doctrine of Chances, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 27, 
42–43 (2015).  Is drowning another person in a bathtub really so complicated that it takes several 
efforts to learn how to do it?  But see FATAL ATTRACTION (PARAMOUNT PICTURES 1987). 
165. 335 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2003). 
166. Id. at 1151–52. 
167. Id. at 1156. 
168. Id. at 1152, 1156. 
169. Id. at 1156. 
170. Id.  
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developed a plan and stable team of co-participants to burglarize ATM 
machines.”171  
Finally, consider United States v. Riepe,172 in which the defendant was 
charged with attempted enticement of a minor.  This required the government 
to prove that he intended to entice MB, a fifteen-year-old, to engage in illegal 
sexual activity.173  The prosecution proved that MB did not know the 
defendant.174  When she received a letter from him, she showed it to her parents, 
who went to the police.175  Posing as MB, an agent of the state’s Internet Crimes 
Against Children Task Force began exchanging text messages with Riepe.176  
These ultimately included discussions about having sex and plans to meet.177  
Riepe was arrested at the intended rendezvous location.178  The prosecution also 
offered other-acts evidence from two seventeen-year-olds about their 
experiences with Riepe the year before.179  One testified that Riepe approached 
her several times while she was working as a cashier at a local grocery and tried 
to converse with her.180  Little came of this.  She told her boss about Riepe and 
filed a complaint with the police.181  A few weeks later, she saw him outside 
her high school and called the police.182  The other witness testified that she 
received a friend request from Riepe on a social network site.183  She accepted 
the request, but when Riepe sent her a message she realized that he was 
considerably older and told him not to contact her.184  Riepe showed up at one 
of her high school football games, appeared once at her high school, and called 
her twice.185  Her parents contacted the police about Riepe.186  Neither witness 
testified about further contacts with Riepe or claimed that he made any sexual 
overtures.187  Despite this, the court held their testimony was admissible 
 
171. Id. 
172. 858 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2017). 
173. Id. at 559; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422. 
174. Riepe, 858 F.3d at 555. 
175. Id.  
176. Id.  
177. Id. at 555–58. 





183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 560. 
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evidence of Riepe’s plan to contact MB with the intent to persuade her to 
engage in sexual activity.188  
The other-acts evidence of plan admitted in these three cases vary 
dramatically in their probative value.  In one, and perhaps in two, the evidence’s 
probative force flows only through a propensity inference; in one, and perhaps 
two, the required inference is a character-propensity one.  It is possible to 
construct a plausible nonpropensity chain of inferences that tends to prove guilt 
in the Roth case, and to do so in a way that does not effectively gut the character-
evidence rule.  Roth is but a small step from the uncontroversial hypothetical 
with which I began this Part—evidence that the defendant had a sketch of a 
bank’s interior and a timeline for robbing the bank as proof that he robbed that 
particular bank.  Suppose Roth had kept a diary in which he described a plan to 
find and court a down-on-her-luck, single mother, marry her, buy insurance on 
her life, and kill her.  That would certainly be admissible if he were later 
charged with murder and the alleged victim was a single mother whom he had 
married and whose life he had insured.  Although his diary plan did not target 
a particular individual, his plan was specific and would tend to establish his 
guilt without a propensity inference.  The evidence of Roth’s prior conduct can 
be viewed as proving that he continued to harbor such a plan in mind; i.e., as 
the equivalent of his memorializing a plan in his diary.  In that sense, therefore, 
its probative value does not require a propensity inference.189   
A similar argument can be made about the Kravchuk case.  But the logic is 
more attenuated and presents a more significant threat to the character-evidence 
rule.  Evidence that he had twice before tried to remove (once successfully) an 
ATM could tend to prove that he continued to harbor a plan to steal ATMs.  
Unlike Roth’s plan, however, Kravchuk’s plan was not terribly specific.  It was 
not directed at a particular target, and while his previous efforts might manifest 
a plan to pilfer money by physically removing an ATM, that was not what he 
was charged with doing.  He apparently made no attempt to remove the ATM; 
he just broke into it and took the money.190  The probative value of the Kravchuk 
other-acts evidence, therefore, flows more directly from a propensity inference.  
He burglarized ATMs twice previously; therefore, he burglarized this ATM.  
Acceptance of the nonpropensity reasoning would effectively authorize the 
widespread admission of a defendant’s previous efforts to commit the same 
 
188. Id.  The court said this evidence was “unquestionably relevant to his planning, his 
knowledge, and his preparation for his later contact” with MB.  Id. 
189. See LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 9.2.2.  Of course, evidence of his 
prior conduct would also support a propensity-based chain of reasoning: he married and killed before 
for financial gain; therefore, he again married and killed for financial gain.  But that would simply 
trigger a Rule 403 inquiry. 
190. United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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type of crime for which he stands trial.  That is precisely why so many 
commentators and even some courts191 have decried the liberality with which 
courts invoke “plan” as a means to admissibility under Rule 404(b).   
Riepe stands as an extreme example of this, although other candidates 
abound.192  Indeed, it is hard even to see the basis for the court’s conclusion that 
the defendant’s contacts with the two other high school girls—creepy as they 
may have been—tend to prove he had a plan to entice minors into illegal sexual 
activity.  The other contacts were quite limited and devoid of any sexual 
references.  This was propensity evidence, pure and simple: proof that because 
the defendant had acted improperly toward two female teenagers before, he did 
it this time.  If anything, the court reasoned backward, inferring from the 
defendant’s express sexual intentions in the charged case the conclusion that he 
approached the other teenagers intending to entice them into a sexual 
relationship.  
Rule 404(b) does not, however, bar all propensity evidence; it bars only 
character-propensity evidence.  These cases, therefore, illustrate the importance 
of understanding what should be considered character under Rule 404(b) and 
what should not.  Whatever the law of evidence means by character, it should 
not include Roth’s practice of courting single mothers, marrying them, and 
convincing them to buy life insurance and name him as beneficiary.193  
Likewise, if Rule 404(b)’s ban on other-acts evidence to prove character-
propensity is to have any meaning at all, the defendant’s prior actions in Riepke 
must be viewed as describing character.  Kravchuk falls between these two.  I 
will come back to it after discussing further the meaning of character in Part V.  
D.  Identity and Modus Operandi  
Identity may be proved in many ways under Rule 404(b).  Other-acts 
evidence that tends to show that a person had a motive to commit a particular 
 
191. E.g., State v. Verde, 296 P.3d 673, 682–84 (Utah 2013).  Compare People v. Tassell, 679 
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1984) (criticizing plan as often “really nothing but the bestowing of a respectable label 
on a disreputable basis for admissibility—the defendant’s disposition”), with People v. Ewoldt, 867 
P.2d 757, 769 (Cal. 1994) (overruling Tassell to extent that it limited plan to instances where other acts 
and charged crime were part of single, continuing conception or plot). 
192. See, e.g., Lamar v. Steele, 693 F.2d 559, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing plaintiff, a prison 
writ writer who claimed defendant prison official asked other inmates to assault or kill him, to introduce 
evidence that defendant asked a different inmate to kill another writ writer); Benefiel v. State, 578 
N.E.2d 338, 346–47 (Ind. 1991) (upholding, in rape and murder trial, evidence that defendant had 
raped two women six and eight years before charged crime); Atkisson v. State, 640 So. 2d 33, 34–36 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (admitting evidence that, seven or eight years before charged sexual abuse of 
daughter, defendant had sexually abused stepdaughter). 
193. See infra Part V.C.ii.  
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crime helps identify the person as the perpetrator.194  Similarly, other-acts proof 
that demonstrates a person possessed a particular skill or knowledge critical to 
completing a crime may demonstrate the person’s involvement.195  The 
paradigmatic proof of identity flows from what is commonly called “modus 
operandi” evidence—proof that the defendant committed other crimes in the 
same distinctive way in which the charged crime was committed.196  Courts 
refer to such other-acts evidence as equivalent to establishing a defendant’s 
“calling card,”197 “signature,”198 “handiwork,”199 or “fingerprint.”200  What 
courts and commentators rarely do is explain precisely how modus operandi 
evidence is probative without violating the character-evidence rule.  Most either 
 
194. See, e.g., United States v. Schiller, 264 F. App’x 44, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that trial 
court properly admitted evidence that defendant previously purchased large amounts of cocaine, which 
he could not afford, to prove his motive to commit charged embezzlement and identity as perpetrator); 
United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding admission, in trial of 
deputy sheriff for soliciting murder of FBI agent and informant, of prior crimes defendant had 
committed that informant had reported and that FBI agent was investigating); United States v. Turpin, 
707 F.2d 332, 334–36 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant, charged with 
attempting to derail train, had killed victim and placed body in car and parked car on railroad tracks in 
attempt to conceal cause of victim’s death). 
195. See, e.g., United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419–21 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
admission of evidence that defendant had illegally excavated artifacts at same site seven years earlier); 
United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 52–56 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence that defendant had 
previously made similar bomb was properly admitted to prove he built bomb used in charged offense).  
It may also help prove identity in other ways.  See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915, 923–25 
(9th Cir. 2020) (using other messages sent by defendant to prove her identity as person who sent, using 
alias, messages at issue because other messages linked defendant to alias). 
196. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 13.1 (identity has become “virtually 
synonymous with modus operandi”).  United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 2018) provides 
a recent example.  Two defendants robbed three local cash-and-check stores while wearing 1970’s-
themed disguises.  Id.  As the court described it: “The heavier man was dressed as funk legend Rick 
James, with a braided, beaded wig and flashy sunglasses; the thinner man was dressed, seemingly, as 
Youngblood Priest from the 1972 hit film Super Fly, with a long-haired wig, mustache, and oversized 
sunglasses of his own.  Both men wore bright orange construction vests.”  Id. at 261.  
197. E.g., People v. Zack, 184 Cal. App. 3d 409, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Segundo v. State, 
270 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
198. E.g., United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 2000); Shumway, 112 F.3d at 
1419; United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 
1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2014). 
199. E.g., United States v. Martínez-Mercado, 919 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
200. E.g., Washington v. State, 737 So.2d 1208, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brooks, 
810 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Clinton, 108 N.E.3d 1, 30 (Ohio 2017); see also 2 
MARK S. BRODIN, JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.22[5][c] (2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE] 
(“prints” of their crimes).  
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simply assert that modus operandi evidence is not propensity evidence201 or 
apparently assume that it is so obvious that they do not even have to explain 
why it is admissible under Rule 404(b).202  The few who do explore this issue 
express different views.  Professors Bloom and Imwinkelried both contend that 
modus operandi evidence does not require a propensity inference.  Each argues 
that it is probative instead because of the unlikelihood that anyone else would 
commit a crime in the same distinctive manner.203  This latter observation is 
undoubtedly correct.  It is unlikely that two different people would employ the 
same, very distinctive technique to commit a particular type of crime.204  Think 
of Home Alone.  How likely is it that some other burglar stuffed a cloth into his 
victim’s sink drain and left the water running?  But Bloom and Imwinkelried 
both fail to ask the critical question: If it is unlikely that someone else would 
commit a crime in that distinctive manner, what makes it likely that the 
defendant would?  
One possibility is that modus operandi can be viewed as a particularized 
version of plan evidence.  From proof that a defendant committed other crimes 
in a highly distinctive manner a juror might infer the defendant continued to 
 
201. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 915 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2019) (modus-operandi evidence 
“supplied propensity-free reasoning” to prove identity); United States v. Kornegay, 641 F. App’x 79, 
84 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he government used [the modus operandi evidence] to prove identity, . . . not 
propensity.”); United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The evidence was not 
used to show propensity, but rather to show modus operandi.”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 
329 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]o distinguish [modus-operandi evidence] from impermissible conclusions 
based on propensity or bad character, however, the admissibility of such evidence critically depends 
on the degree to which the ‘manner’ employed is ‘unusual and distinctive.’” (quoting 1 MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE 662–63 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999))). 
202. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:36; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
supra note 201, § 190; WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 200, § 404.22[5][c]; WEISSENBERGER & 
DUANE, supra note 63, § 404.17. 
203. Bloom, supra note 1, at 1138; Imwinkelried, Contextual Construction, supra note 138, at 
1029–30.  Imwinkelried’s position is a bit ambiguous.  He says that “it is easy to discern a noncharacter 
theory because it is objectively unlikely that any one else would employ such a distinctive 
methodology.”  Imwinkelried, Contextual Construction, supra note 138, at 1030.  Thus he concludes 
that this does not involve “any inference as to the accused’s personal character.”  Id.  This obscures 
whether he is arguing that propensity reasoning is not involved or only that character-propensity 
reasoning is not involved.  Because his argument is based on someone else’s behavior—the objective 
unlikelihood that someone else would act in a similar manner—it does not draw a distinction based on 
whether the defendant’s actions are character- or noncharacter-based.  So, it is fair to infer that he is 
arguing that the evidence is probative without resort to propensity reasoning.  
204. A copycat criminal is, of course, a possibility.  But that simply goes to the probative strength 
of the evidence—just how unlikely it is that someone else would have committed this crime in the 
same distinctive manner—and not to the inferential process that generates the evidence’s probative 
force. 
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harbor such a plan and then executed the plan on the occasion in question.205  
As discussed above, this is a plausible nonpropensity-based chain of 
reasoning.206  Sometimes, however, this nonpropensity argument will not work.  
In Home Alone, for example, the distinctive feature may not have been part of 
the plan.  It certainly was not the means by which Marv and Harry committed 
their burglaries.  Harry may have stuffed the sink drain only when the spirit 
moved him.207  A more consistently satisfying answer is modus operandi 
evidence operates through a propensity inference—that Marv and Harry are 
acting in a manner consistent with their previous conduct.  Professors 
Lempert208 and Leonard209 agree that modus operandi evidence requires a 
propensity inference but contend that it is not an inadmissible character-
propensity inference.210  Just as Roth’s repeated conduct in courting single 
mothers, marrying them, convincing them to buy life insurance, and naming 
himself as beneficiary hardly seems to describe a character trait,211 the practice 
of stuffing a cloth into a sink drain and leaving the water running does not seem 
to fit within any reasonable definition of character.212  Reaching this conclusion, 
however, requires an understanding of what character means for purposes of 
Rule 404(b).  The failure of the cases and literature to discuss the meaning of 
character, however, results in modus operandi evidence being liberally admitted 
 
205. Cf. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 63, § 404.17 (noting courts often confuse 
modus operandi and plan). 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 132–34, 189. 
207. Although this diminishes the chance that stuffing the drain and leaving the water running 
was part of any plan, it would still tend to link Marv and Harry to all the local burglaries in which the 
water had been left running.  See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
208. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 368–69, 
384–86. 
209. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 13.2. 
210. See also Park & Bryden, supra note 140, at 178–79.  Leonard reaches his conclusion, in 
part, based on his arguably narrow view of what character means.  Id. § 9.2.1; see infra Part V.A.  
211. See supra text accompanying notes 132–34, 189.  
212. See infra Part V.C.ii. 
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at trial213 despite appellate courts’ repeated exhortations214 that there must be a 
“high degree of similarity”215 or “numerous and striking similarities”216 
between the other crimes and the charged offense and that the similarities must 
be “distinctive”217 or “idiosyncratic.”218  
Lane v. State,219 a Texas capital murder case, illustrates how loosely these 
requirements are sometimes applied.  The victim was eight-years old; she had 
been kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and strangled.220  The prosecution 
possessed neither eyewitnesses nor physical evidence that implicated Lane.221  
Its primary evidence was the defendant’s confession, but he attacked its 
voluntariness and accuracy.222  To shore up its case, the prosecution offered 
evidence that Lane had confessed to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of 
another young girl.223  It presented to the trial judge a chart highlighting all the 
similarities between the two crimes, which the appellate court reproduced.224  
The prosecution had a substantial hurdle to overcome.  Lane was on trial for 
murdering a girl in Texas in 1980; the other murder occurred ten years later, in 
 
213. Sometimes appellate courts hold the trial courts erred; sometimes they affirm.  Compare, 
e.g., United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 467–70 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that trial court erred in 
admitting evidence that defendant committed bank robbery ten years before where only commonalities 
with charged robbery were that in both perpetrator wore a nylon mask, carried a gun, and jumped over 
the counter to put the bank’s money in a bag), and United States v. Carrillo, 981 F.2d 772, 775 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that trial erred in admitting error of other drug sales to show identity where charged 
sale was merely “a typical drug sale in a drug-ridden urban neighborhood where such transactions are 
commonplace”), with United States v. Vance, 764 F.3d 667, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
admission of three restaurant robberies to prove defendant’s identity in two charged bank robberies; 
perpetrators wore ski masks in both charged and extrinsic robberies, defendant brandished .44 caliber 
revolver in all restaurant robberies as did perpetrator in one of two bank robberies, and defendant 
rushed counter to get money in two of three restaurant robberies, as did perpetrator in both bank 
robberies), and United States v. Robinson, 687 F.2d 359, 360–61 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming, in trial 
for transporting stolen table silver, admission as modus operandi evidence that defendant had served 
as fence for other silver burglars).  
214. See cases cited at 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, 
§§ 3:11–3.12.  
215. E.g., United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1995). 
216. E.g., United States v. Anifowoshe, 307 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2002). 
217. E.g., United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2014). 
218. E.g., United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1996). 
219. 933 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
220. Id. at 507. 
221. Id. at 518. 
222. Texas allows defendants to relitigate the voluntariness of their confessions before the jury.  
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6 (West 2019). 
223. Lane confessed to the Texas murder only after confessing to the Kansas murder.  Lane, 933 
S.W.2d at 510. 
224. Id. at 517. 
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Kansas.225  The prosecution sought to paper over these temporal and locational 
gaps by highlighting a slew of unexceptional similarities.  Both crimes involved 
the murder of a young girl by a stranger;226 in both, the victim was abducted 
from a public area near her home and physically relocated; the defendant lived 
or worked near both abduction sites; both victims were physically and sexually 
assaulted and strangled, and their bodies were “dumped”; and the defendant did 
not act alone.227  Only at the bottom of the chart were two interesting similarities 
raised.  In both instances, the defendant participated in the search for the victim 
and claimed a “trophy”–the girl’s underwear.228  After dutifully repeating that 
to prove identity in a nonpropensity manner “an extraneous offense must be so 
similar to the offense charged that the offenses are marked as the accused’s 
handiwork,”229 the court quickly upheld the trial court’s decision to admit this 
evidence.230  Its analysis was perfunctory, consisting largely of agreeing that 
the State’s chart accurately displayed the similarities between the two crimes.231  
Most of these similarities, however, were hardly unique: removing a young girl 
from some “public area” near her home, abducting, sexually assaulting and 
killing her, and “dumping” her body is hardly a distinctive manner of 
committing a kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a young girl.  The only 
distinctive items on the list were that Lane participated in the search for both 
girls’ bodies and that he claimed a “trophy” from each crime.  
This does not come remotely close to proving Lane’s guilt through a 
nonpropensity theory.  Suppose Lane had not been suspected of the Texas 
killing.  Evidence that he sexually assaulted and murdered a nine-year-old girl 
in Kansas ten years later would hardly point to him as the Texas killer.  There 
was nothing particularly distinctive about the manner in which Lane committed 
the Kansas crime that would lead someone to conclude that it is unlikely that 
anyone else could have committed the Texas crime.  Indeed, Texas police 
learned about the only distinctive points of similarity—the participation in the 
search and taking the victim’s underwear—after Lane confessed to the Texas 
killing.  The Kansas crime may have confirmed Lane’s guilt, but it did not lead 
 
225. Id. at 506, 508. 
226. The prosecution’s chart stretched this into five points of similarity.  Id. at 517. 
227. But in the charged crime, Lane had two accomplices, while in the Kansas murder he had 
only one, and that person had no connection to the Texas killing.  Id. at 510, 520. 
228. Id. at 517. 
229. Id. at 519. 
230. Id.  
231. Id. (“[T]he mode of committing the offenses and the circumstances surrounding the 
offenses are sufficiently similar for the extraneous offense to be relevant to the issue of identity.  Those 
similarities are accurately addressed in the State’s chart depicted above, and we need not repeat them 
here.”). 
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the Texas police to Lane.  Nor can the use of this other crime to prove Lane’s 
guilt be salvaged by resort to a plan theory.  Evidence that Lane had a plan to 
kill a young girl in Kansas in 1990 does not tend to prove he had a plan to kill 
a young girl in Texas ten years before.  This evidence has probative value only 
through a propensity inference; the only question is whether it is a character-
propensity inference.  And like the Kravchuk case,232 this requires an inquiry 
into what we mean by character.  Kravchuk raises the character question in 
terms of the level of specificity of the conduct.  Lane poses a different issue 
about the nature of character.  In the punishment phase of his case, the 
prosecution presented evidence that he possessed multiple sexual disorders, 
including pervasive and chronic pedophilia, and that he hoarded female 
underwear.233  Is the evidence, then, that Lane claimed his victim’s underwear 
as a trophy in both cases evidence that he acted in accordance with his 
character?  This issue—the relationship of mental illness and character—arises 
with greater frequency in motive cases.  
E.  Motive 
The meaning of motive is generally understood: “an emotion or state of 
mind that prompts a person to act in a particular way; an incentive for certain 
volitional activity.”234  As it is itself rarely an element of a charge,235 motive is 
typically used circumstantially to prove identity, state of mind, or the actus 
reus.236  Other-acts evidence may demonstrate motive in one of several different 
ways.  Most frequently, as in the Santa Claus murder example above,237 the 
other act provides the motive for the defendant to commit the charged crime.238  
 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 165–71.  
233. Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 507–08. 
234. 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5248 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF 
JUDICIAL PROOF § 57 (3d ed. 1937)); see also M. C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other 
Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 328 (1956) (“Motive may be defined as an inducement or state of feeling 
that impels and tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act.”); State v. Torres, 812 N.W.2d 213, 223 
(Neb. 2012) (“[M]otive is defined more specifically as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge 
in a criminal act.”); People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 296 (N.Y. 1901) (“the moving power which 
impels to action for a definite result”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:32 (including 
among the “archetypal motives that seem inherent in the human condition” greed, personal animosity, 
anger, desire for revenge, amorous or sexual desires, jealousy, acting out consequences of drug 
addiction, cover up another crime, political views, and ethnic, racial, gender biases). 
235. Motive is an element, however, in bias crimes.  See infra note 465.   
236. Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 447; see supra notes 84, 193, 194. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 68. 
238. E.g., United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding admission 
of defendants’ membership in white supremacist gang as providing motive for racially-charged 
murder); United States v. Earls, 704 F.3d 466, 470–72 (7th Cir. 2012) (admitting evidence that 
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Rather than providing the motive to commit the charged crime, however, 
the other-acts evidence may manifest a pre-existing motive to commit a crime 
against a particular person or property.  Suppose Victim is shot dead.  Evidence 
that Defendant had previously assaulted Victim on a number of occasions 
would be reflective of Defendant’s animosity toward Victim.239  This evidence 
could therefore be used to prove Defendant’s identity as the person who killed 
Victim.  Or, if Defendant admitted shooting Victim, but claimed the shooting 
was accidental, the prior assaults could be used to prove his state of mind.  
Neither of these requires a character-propensity inference;240 in each, the 
probative value hinges on the nature of Defendant’s relationship to Victim.241  
Defendant may otherwise be the most peaceable of persons, but something 
about his relationship with Victim—perhaps jealousy, anger, or fear—impels 
him to act uncharacteristically242 toward Victim.243  
 
defendant faced three felony charges to establish motive for committing charged crime of obtaining 
fraudulent passport and fleeing abroad); United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1000 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding admission, in defendant’s trial for soliciting murder of informant and FBI agent, that 
informant had recorded defendant discussing crimes he had committed and provided this to FBI agent). 
239. See, e.g., United States v. Berckmann, 971 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding 
admission of evidence of other assaults on victim as proof of defendant’s animosity toward her and 
intent to assault her); United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1034–36 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding 
admissible defendant’s previous violent acts against child-murder victim as establishing animosity 
toward victim, hence motive to kill); United States v. Howard, 692 F.3d 697, 702–06 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that evidence of defendant’s alternating acts of assaults on ex-girlfriend and attempts to 
reconcile manifested defendant’s obsession with her tended to prove defendant committed charged 
solicitation of murder).  
240. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 366, 
dispute this, claiming that “there is little to distinguish” this reasoning “from the forbidden inference 
that defendant had a propensity to attack the victim.”  But Lempert and his co-authors here use 
propensity in much too broad a sense, much as Professor Kuhns did.  See supra note 612.  Rule 404(b) 
prohibits an inference that a defendant acted violently toward a particular person because the defendant 
is generally a violent person.  It does not prohibit an inference that a defendant acted violently toward 
a particular person because the defendant hates that person.  
241. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B) (creating exception to inadmissibility in sex-offense cases 
of victim’s prior sexual behavior for instances of sexual behavior towards defendant offered to prove 
consent; note that this exception does not require forbidden propensity-based inference about victim 
that lies at core of Rule 412).  
242. See, e.g., THE SUSPECT (UNIVERSAL PICTURES 1944).  People who unquestionably have a 
violent character may nevertheless act tenderly toward certain people.  Marlon Brando’s Don Corleone, 
see THE GODFATHER (PARAMOUNT PICTURES 1972), and James Gandolfini’s Tony Soprano, see THE 
SOPRANOS (HBO), spring to mind.  
243. Strangely, courts sometimes fail to realize that other acts directed at the same person may 
manifest a feeling toward that person and not require a propensity inference.  In United States v. 
Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2017), discussed infra text accompanying notes 551–65, the 
court could have easily held admissible defendant’s previous attempt to kill his victim as it tended to 
establish his animosity toward her.  Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37(b) (West 2019) 
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A much more problematic use of other-acts evidence to prove motive arises 
when the other acts tend to manifest a motive generally to commit a type of 
crime.  Traditionally, this has arisen most frequently in child abuse cases.244  
Many courts have admitted evidence that the defendant abused other children 
to show the defendant’s “depraved sexual instinct” or “lustful disposition.”245  
Numerous critics have rightly observed that these courts were simply 
sanctioning character-propensity evidence.246  The defendant’s other acts 
showed that the defendant had a desire (motive) to act in a particular way.  But 
the source of that desire (motive) arose solely from the defendant’s enduring 
make-up.  That is exactly the type of character-propensity inference Rule 
404(b) forbids.  In response, the federal system247 and many states have 
addressed the issue more directly by enacting provisions that create express 
exceptions to the character-evidence rule in such cases.248  But in jurisdictions 
that have not codified such exceptions, courts still endorse the use of this type 
of evidence.249 
Subtler problems arise in connection with other uses of other-acts evidence 
to manifest motive.  Judge Posner struggled with this issue in United States v. 
 
(providing that when defendant is tried for enumerated assaultive crimes against minors, evidence of 
defendant’s other assaultive acts against child-victim are admissible “[n]otwithstanding Rules 404 and 
405”). 
244. Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 490–97; Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 
543–44; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT, supra note 2, at 723–24.  
245. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct 
Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 168–77, 190–208 (1993); LEONARD, THE 
NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 8.5.3. 
246. Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 490–97; Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 
543–44; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT, supra note 2, at 723–24. 
247. See FED. R. EVID. 414, 415. 
248. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5391; Tamara Rice Lave & Aviva Orenstein, 
Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 795, 800–03 (2013). 
249. See Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (noting that approximately twenty 
states have judicially created such exceptions); see also United States v. Bartunek, 969 F.3d 860, 862–
63 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that evidence that defendant possessed photographs of four life-sized dolls 
—replicas of very young children and altered to include a rubber nodule that appeared to be a penis—
was admissible to show defendant’s motive for possessing child pornography); United States v. Roux, 
715 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2013) (admitting, in defendant’s trial for coercing a minor to produce 
sexually explicit images, evidence defendant had sexually abused victim’s two sisters to prove 
defendant’s motive); United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2006) (admitting, in 
defendant’s trial for child pornography crimes, evidence that defendant had sexually assaulted a young 
male to prove defendant’s motive).  It is not clear why the government in Roux and Sebolt offered the 
evidence under Rule 404(b) and not under Rule 414.  Both defendants were prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251, which falls within the definition of child molestation under Rule 414(d)(2)(B). 
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Cunningham.250  Cunningham, a nurse, stood trial for tampering with syringes 
that contained Demerol, a powerful painkiller.251  She was one of five nurses 
who had access to the locked cabinet in which the hospital stored the 
syringes.252  In some instances, the Demerol was replaced with a saline 
solution.253  The trial court allowed the jury to hear about Cunningham’s prior 
entanglement with Demerol.254  Four years before, she had been addicted to 
Demerol and stolen some from another hospital.255  Her nurse’s license was 
suspended, and when it was reinstated subject to her agreeing to undergo 
periodic drug testing, she falsified some of her drug test results.256  The Seventh 
Circuit held that the evidence was properly admitted.257  Judge Posner 
acknowledged that evidence of Cunningham’s previous theft of Demerol would 
violate Rule 404(b) if offered merely to prove she was likely to have again 
stolen Demerol.258  But he ruled that it was admissible for another purpose: to 
prove Cunningham’s motive to commit the crime.259  “[B]eing a Demerol 
addict gave Cunningham a motive to tamper with the Demerol-filled 
syringes.”260  Posner, however, recognized the problematic nature of this proof 
and labored hard to distinguish what he called “propensity” evidence from 
“motive” evidence and to delineate when they did and did not “overlap.”261  
Because Cunningham was addicted to consuming Demerol, not to stealing it, 
propensity and motive did not overlap here.262  He cited two cases to support 
this proposition—one in which the defendant’s heroin addiction was used to 
show his motive for a robbery,263 the other where the defendant’s sexual fetish 
supplied the motive for his stealing women’s underwear.264  Therefore, Posner 
found, Rule 404(b) did not bar the prosecution’s other-acts evidence.  This is 
an unremarkable conclusion, particularly as it pertains to the use of addiction 
 
250. 103 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 
251. Id. at 555. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 557. 
255. Id. at 555. 
256. Id. at 556.  The court did not permit the jury to hear that Cunningham had been convicted 
of stealing the Demerol.  Id. 
257. Id. at 557. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 556. 
260. Id. at 557. 
261. Id. at 556. 
262. Id. at 556–57. 
263. People v. McConnell, 335 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
264. People v. Moreno, 61 Cal. App. 3d 688, 693–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
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to show a financial motive to steal.  Courts are quick to allow such evidence,265 
with only a few dissenting.266 
But it is Posner’s dicta that pose more fundamental questions.  Having 
decided that propensity and motive did not overlap here, he explored when they 
do: 
[“Propensity” evidence and “motive” evidence] overlap when 
the crime is motivated by a taste for engaging in that crime or 
a compulsion to engage in it (an “addiction”), rather than by a 
desire for pecuniary gain or for some other advantage to which 
the crime is instrumental in the sense that it would not be 
committed if the advantage could be obtained as easily by a 
lawful route.267 
Posner offers sex crimes as “a particularly clear example.”268  A person’s 
history as a child molester manifests the person’s “taste for sexually molesting 
children,”269 which provides the person’s motive for committing a particular act 
of child molestation.270  After noting that Rule 414 now authorizes admission 
of such evidence without regard to Rule 404(b), he added that the same analysis 
would apply to a “firebug”—someone “who commits arson not for insurance 
proceeds or revenge or to eliminate a competitor, but for the sheer joy of 
watching a fire.”271  In an arson trial, evidence that a defendant had set other 
fires would be admissible as motive evidence under Rule 404(b).  It would show 
 
265. See United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with “obvious 
proposition” that drug use is probative to prove bank robbery); United States v. Kadouh, 768 F.2d 20, 
21–22 (1st Cir. 1985) (treating cocaine addiction as character, but admissible to prove motive); United 
States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1979).  
266. See State v. Mazowski, 766 A.2d 1176, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  Some courts 
require an additional showing of a defendant’s financial need before admitting addiction-to-prove-
motive evidence.  E.g., Madden, 38 F.3d at 751–52; Leger v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 745, 751 
(Ky. 2013).  One commentator has recently argued that Posner’s reasoning ignores its underlying 
propensity-based assumption that addicts have a propensity to acquire drugs.  Michael Davis, Note, 
Addiction, Criminalization, and Character Evidence, 96 TEX. L. REV. 619, 633 (2018) (arguing that 
the “motive theory does not work without the defendant’s propensity to purchase narcotics, which is, 
of course, criminal”). 
267. Cunningham, 103 F.3d at 556. 
268. Id.  
269. Id. 
270. Id.  Posner phrases his argument in terms of using the motive to enable law enforcement or 
factfinders to distinguish the child molester from another possible suspect.  Id.  While this may make 
this argument superficially more convincing, the Rule 404(b) question is not whether the evidence is 
probative, it is how it is probative.  If its probative value flows only from a character-propensity 
inference, it is inadmissible under Rule 404(b). 
271. Id. 
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she has a “taste” for setting fires, which would tend to prove she had a motive 
to commit the charged offense.272  Posner acknowledged that propensity and 
motive overlap here but only in the following way.  Instead of using the other 
fire-setting evidence as proof of motive, the jury might use it as propensity 
evidence; that is, as the basis for inferring the defendant’s “habitual 
criminality.”  This, said Posner, means that trial courts should be careful in 
admitting such other-acts evidence.  But this, he pointed out, is a Rule 403, not 
a Rule 404(b), problem.273  In other words, trial courts should balance the 
probative value of the nonpropensity-motive inference against the danger that 
the jury would impermissibly use the evidence for a propensity-habitual-
criminal inference. 
The problem with this analysis is that the motive inference is pure 
propensity.  A child molester has a “taste” for molesting children because that 
is what it means to be a child molester.  A firebug has a “taste” for setting fires 
because that is what firebugs do.  Taken to its logical conclusion, Posner’s 
nonpropensity-motive argument could be used to circumvent Rule 404(b) in all 
sorts of cases.  In the trial of a serial killer for the death of one victim, the 
prosecution could offer evidence of other killings to show the defendant’s 
“taste” for killing.  What else explains why someone would be a serial killer?  
Similarly, in a sexual assault case, the prosecution could offer evidence of other 
sexual assaults to show the defendant’s motive—say, his need to exert power 
over women274—to commit this sexual assault.275 
Ever the good law-and-economist, Posner distinguishes the use of other 
crimes that are motivated by financial or other gain extrinsic to the desire 
simply to commit the crime.  Therefore, in a shoplifting trial, the defendant’s 
previous shoplifting convictions could not be used to prove the defendant’s 
motive to shoplift.  In Posner’s mind, people steal for financial reasons; “taste,” 
hence motive, is not implicated.  But this betrays a rather limited view of human 
psychology.  Recall the case of movie star Winona Ryder.  In 2002, she was 
convicted of shoplifting more than $5,500 worth of designer goods from a 
Beverly Hills store.276  She clearly did not need the money,277 and this was not 
 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 557. 
274. See Baker, supra note 112, at 597–612 (discussing various motives for sexual assaults). 
275. Professor Baker urges that courts do exactly this.  Id. at 618–20. 
276. Rick Lyman, Winona Ryder Convicted of 2 Counts in Shoplifting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2002, at A24. 
277. According to her filmography on the IMDb website, at this point in her career Ryder was 
appearing in one or two feature films per year plus a smattering of television shows.  Winona Ryder, 
Actress, IMDB, https://m.imdb.com/name/nm0000213/filmotype/actress?ref_=m_nmfm_1 
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her first shoplifting episode.278  Whatever the underlying psychological forces, 
Ryder seemed to have a “taste” for shoplifting.  And she is not alone.279  Lots 
of criminals embark on thefts or robbery not simply for financial gain.  There 
are, after all, lots of less risky ways of acquiring property.  The thrill of 
committing the crime or the need to act out anti-authoritarian impulses may 
provide the dominant impulse.280  Extraordinarily wealthy people who commit 
white-collar financial crimes are likely acting out of more complicated 
motivations than simple pecuniary gain.281  They already have more money than 
they can possibly spend.  
Posner’s nonpropensity argument for other-acts evidence that is used to 
show a defendant’s “taste” for committing, and thus motive to commit, the 
charged crime misses the mark.  What it does, however, is demonstrate the need 
to define character.  Is being an addict, arsonist, or compulsive shoplifter or 
suffering from Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy a character trait?  If not, such 
evidence is admissible even though it requires a propensity inference; Rule 404 
bars only character-propensity reasoning.  If these are character traits, however, 
Posner’s analysis collapses. 
 
[https://perma.cc/B85P-SAUD].  She had already been twice nominated for an Academy Award for 
Best Actress (Little Women (leading role) and Age of Innocence (supporting role)). Winona Ryder, 
Awards, IMDB, https://m.imdb.com/name/nm0000213/awards?ref_=m_nm_awd [perma.cc/QWE9-
RWC7].   
278. Nadya Labi, Why Did She Do It?, TIME (Nov. 12, 2002), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,388993,00.html [https://perma.cc/4VHM-
CYFZ].  
279. See Carlos Blanco, Jon Grant, Nancy M. Petry, H. Blair Simpson, Analucia Alegria, Shang-
Min Liu & Deborah Hasin, Prevalence and Correlates of Shoplifting in the United States: Results 
From the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), 165 AM. J. 
PSYCH. 905 (2008) (noting that shoplifting is associated with substantial rates of comorbid disorders, 
psychosocial impairment, and mental health service use). 
280. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME : MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL 
(1988); Callie H. Burt & Ronald L. Simons, Self-Control, Thrill Seeking, and Crime: Motivation 
Matters, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1326 (2013), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0093854813485575 [https://perma.cc/2ATK-BZ68]; see 
THE OLD MAN AND THE GUN (FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES 2018), 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2837574/quotes/?tab=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu [https://perma.cc/4ZN8-
RC8G] (“I remember I sat down with him once and I said, ‘Forrest, surely there’s an easier way for 
somebody in your position to make a living.’  And he looked at me and he said, ‘Brother, I’m not 
talking about making a living.  I’m just talking about . . . living.’”). 
281. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Tyco Executives Get 8 to 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/business/extyco-executivesget-8-to-25-years-
in-prison.html [https://perma.cc/6R55-RLW9] (discussing sentencing of L. Dennis Kozlowski, who 
earned more than $300 million in last two years as CEO of Tyco International but stole $50 million 
from company). 
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F.  The Doctrine of Chances 
Let’s return to the case of Felix Vail.  To prove that Vail murdered his wife 
in 1962, the prosecution wanted to introduce evidence that two other women 
with whom Vail had been intimately involved had disappeared and presumably 
died at Vail’s hand.  But these disappearances occurred in 1973 and 1984—
eleven and twenty-two years after the charged crime.  Therefore, the 
prosecution could not argue that they showed knowledge—that they somehow 
taught Vail how to kill a companion and get away with it282—or that he had a 
plan back in 1962.  And without any idea how Vail allegedly killed the other 
two women, the prosecution could hardly argue Vail had a signature method of 
committing these crimes.  So, the prosecution seized on Vail’s claim that Mary 
Horton Vail’s death was an accident and argued the evidence was admissible 
to prove “absence of mistake or accident.”283  But the prosecution had to show 
how this did not involve a character-propensity inference: Vail killed two other 
women; therefore, he was a murderer; therefore, he killed his wife.  To 
circumvent a propensity chain of inferences, the prosecution relied on the 
doctrine of chances. 
The doctrine, which traces its origins to Wigmore’s early writing284 and the 
famous Brides in the Bath case,285 is enjoying a renaissance.286  Courts287 and 
many commentators288 tout it as a means of using other-acts evidence without 
requiring a propensity inference.  The Reporter to the Advisory Committee on 
 
282. Strangely, the prosecutor seemed to make this illogical argument in his closing statement.  
See supra text accompanying note 26. 
283. State v. Vail, 150 So. 3d 576, 580 (La. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 176 So. 3d 401 (La. 
2015).  Absence of mistake or accident is the last item in Louisiana’s nonexclusive list of other 
purposes for which other-acts evidence may be admitted.  LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(B) (2020). 
284. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 242, 302. 
285. R. v. Smith [1915] 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153; see supra note 146 and infra text 
accompanying notes 580–83. 
286. A Westlaw search of all states and all federal cases databases with the terms “‘doctrine of 
chances’ /p Wigmore” produced 7 cases before 1950; 9 from 1950–1975; 50 from 1975–2000; and 75 
from 2000 through December 15, 2020. 
287. E.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 615 (4th Cir. 1998); People v. Mardlin, 
790 N.W.2d 607, 610–19 (Mich. 2010); State v. Johns, 725 P.2d 312, 322–25 (Or. 1986); State v. 
Lowther, 398 P.3d 1032, 1037–44 (Utah 2017); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 347–48, (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2009). 
288. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 201, § 190, at 1040; 22B GRAHAM, supra 
note 34, § 5247.1; LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 
366; LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 7.3.2; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
34, § 4:34; David. P. Leonard, The Legacy of Old Chief and The Definition of Relevant Evidence: 
Implications for Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 819, 847 (2008).  But see Bloom, 
supra note 1, at 1141–45; Morris, supra note 5, at 199–205; Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence 
in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1259, 1262–63 (1995); Sullivan, supra note 164, at 27. 
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Evidence Rules289 and the Committee itself290 seem to agree.  Wigmore 
explained the theory in an oft-cited passage: 
The argument here is purely from the point of view of the 
doctrine of chances,—the instinctive recognition of that logical 
process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by 
multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived 
that this element cannot explain them all. . . . [T]he mind 
applies this rough and instinctive process of reasoning, namely, 
that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present 
in one instance, but the oftener similar instances occur with 
similar results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely to 
be the true explanation of them.291 
Many years later, in United States v. York,292 the Seventh Circuit explained its 
use of the doctrine in more vivid terms.  York owned a failing bar named the 
Just Friends Lounge.293  His partner, who lived in an apartment over the bar, 
died when two explosions rocked the bar.294  York’s attempt to collect on 
insurance policies he had taken out on the bar’s assets and his partner’s life 
ultimately led to criminal charges of attempted insurance fraud.295  Although 
the prosecution amassed substantial evidence of York’s guilt,296 it also offered 
 
289. Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 807–08. 
290. The Advisory Committee was a bit enigmatic on the doctrine of chances in connection with 
its recent proposal to amend Rule 404(b).  Explaining its decision to reject a proposal to require courts 
to find a nonpropensity chain of inferences before admitting other-acts evidence, the Committee wrote, 
“[A]n attempt to require the court to establish the probative value of a bad act by a chain of inferences 
that did not involve propensity would add substantial complexity, while ignoring that in some cases, a 
bad act is legitimately offered for a proper purpose but is nonetheless bound up with a propensity 
inference—an example would be use of the well-known ‘doctrine of chances’ to prove the unlikelihood 
that two unusual acts could have both been accidental.”  Memorandum from Hon. Debra A Livingston 
to Hon. David G. Campbell, supra note 40.  One possible interpretation of this language is that the 
Committee means to endorse the doctrine of chances even though it involves a propensity inference.  
Another possibility is that the Committee believes that the doctrine generates a valid nonpropensity 
inference but that the jury is also likely to draw a propensity inference as well.  Either way, it appears 
that the Committee approves of courts using the doctrine of chances. 
291. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 302, at 390. 
292. 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991). 
293. Id. at 1345. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 1345–47. 
296. York had been heavily in debt when he procured the insurance and lied to his insurance 
agent.  Id. at 1345.  His partner told others that they were planning to torch the building.  Id. at 1346.  
Although ordinarily open seven days a week, the bar was closed the night of the explosion, and the 
partner had sent her daughter away that night.  Id.  The prosecution also produced ample evidence that 
arson was involved and of York’s post-event behavior, including attempts to tamper with his children’s 
testimony and a confession he made to a cellmate.  Id. at 1345–48. 
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evidence that York had murdered his wife three years before.297  Her 
decomposing body had been found in a creek, a bullet hole in her head.298  Two 
weeks before, she had informed York she was divorcing him.299  She had a life 
insurance policy, with a double-indemnity clause, and York was the 
beneficiary.300  He collected the proceeds, apparently without difficulty; he was 
not charged with killing his wife.301  York argued evidence of his wife’s death 
was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).302  Rejecting York’s claim, the Seventh 
Circuit explained: 
The man who wins the lottery once is envied; the one who wins 
it twice is investigated.  It is not every day that one’s wife is 
murdered; it is more uncommon still that the murder occurs 
after the wife says she wants a divorce; and more unusual still 
that the jilted husband collects on a life insurance policy with 
a double-indemnity provision.  That the same individual 
should later collect on exactly the same sort of policy after the 
grisly death of a business partner who owed him money raises 
eyebrows; the odds of the same individual reaping the benefits, 
within the space of three years, of two grisly murders of people 
he had reason to be hostile toward seem incredibly low, 
certainly low enough to support an inference that the windfalls 
were the product of design rather than the vagaries of chance.  
This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with 
a subjective assessment of York’s character.303 
This explanation is hardly persuasive.  To the contrary, it almost screams that 
propensity inferences are at work.  If the insurance “windfalls were the product 
of design rather than the vagaries of chance,” whose evil design was it?  Had 
the Seventh Circuit answered this obvious question, it would scarcely have been 
able to say that this had “nothing to do with a subjective assessment” of York’s 
character.  Likewise, Wigmore’s analysis begs the question: Why do multiple 
instances of the same result eliminate the element of innocent intent?  The 
 
297. Id. at 1348. 
298. Id. at 1347. 
299. Id.  
300. Id. at 1345–46.  York may have tried to include a double-indemnity clause in the insurance 
on his partner’s life, but the evidence on this was ambiguous.  Id.  
301. Id. at 1346–47.  The prosecution was able to muster a fair amount of evidence implicating 
York in his wife’s death.  Id. at 1347–48. 
302. Id. at 1349. 
303. Id. at 1350 (citation omitted).  Other courts use colorful language in attempting to explain 
how the doctrine of chances does not involve a propensity inference.  See, e.g., De La Paz v. State, 279 
S.W.3d 336, 348, (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“As Auric Goldfinger, the infamous James Bond villain, 
said, ‘Once is happenstance.  Twice is coincidence.  The third time it’s enemy action.’”). 
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answer should be clear—because the common thread running through these 
multiple instances is a malevolent actor.304  
At least Wigmore promoted the doctrine of chances only as a means of 
demonstrating a defendant’s state of mind.  Courts, however, have frequently 
allowed prosecutors to use it to prove a defendant did the charged act.305  
Probably the most dramatic example of this is United States v. Woods.306  
Woods was charged with murdering her infant, foster son Paul.  He died after 
suffering a series of cyanotic episodes while in the defendant’s care.307  The 
prosecution’s forensic pathologist testified that he was 75% certain that Paul 
had been smothered.  He conceded, however, that there was a 25% chance that 
Paul died from natural causes.308  Left unsupplemented, this testimony would 
have inevitably led to a judgment of acquittal.  But the prosecution had more 
evidence.  It proved that over twenty-four years, nine children (including Paul) 
whom Woods had custody of or access to had suffered at least twenty cyanotic 
episodes.309  Like Paul, six of the other children died.310  This was more than 
sufficient to convince the jury,311 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  The court’s 
 
304. Bloom, supra note 1, at 1144. 
305. See, e.g., State v. Vail, 150 So. 3d 576, 586 (La. App. 2014), cert. denied, 176 So. 3d 401 
(La. 2015) (to prove murder); People v. Mardlin, 790 N.W.2d 607, 610–19 (Mich. 2010) (to prove 
arson); State v. Verde, 296 P.3d 673, 685–86 (Utah 2012) (to prove sexual assault).  In his most recent 
article promoting the doctrine of chances, Professor Imwinkelried curiously contends that it was used 
by prosecutors in Bill Cosby’s sexual assault prosecution to prove “identity.”  Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Evidentiary Issue Crystalized By the Cosby and Weinstein Scandals: The Propriety of Admitting 
Testimony About An Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct Under the Doctrine of Objective Chances to 
Prove Identity, 48 SW. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Cosby and Weinstein].  But 
identity was not an issue in that prosecution.  Cosby did not deny that he had sex with his accuser.  His 
defense was that it was consensual.  The prosecution sought admission of its other-acts evidence “to 
demonstrate a common scheme, plan, or design” and “absence of mistake or accident.”  
Commonwealth’s Motion to Introduce Evidence of 19 Prior Bad Acts of Defendant at 2–3, 
Commonwealth v. Cosby, No. CP-46-CR-0003932-2016, 2018 WL 1626647 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 
18, 2018).  The prosecution also claimed the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of chances 
“to negate the presence of any non-criminal intent and, concomitantly, to establish an absence of 
mistake.”  Id. at 3. 
306. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).  A child suffering a cyanotic episode turns blue, principally 
around the lips, from lack of oxygen.  Id. at 129. 
307. Id. at 130. 
308. Id. 
309. Id.  Three were Woods’s natural-born children; two were adopted children; one was a niece, 
one a nephew; and two were the children of friends.  Id. 
310. Id. at 130–32. 
311. Perhaps surprisingly, the jury’s deliberations took two days.  VINCENT DI MAIO & RON 
FRANSCELL, MORGUE: A LIFE IN DEATH 81 (2016).  This may have been because the prosecution 
offered “no real evidence of any motive.”  Woods, 484 F.2d at 132.  Vincent DiMaio, the forensic 
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opinion, while not expressly referring to the “doctrine of chances,” relied on 
the Brides in the Bath case and used language echoing Wigmore’s: 
[W]e think that the evidence would prove that a crime had been 
committed because of the remoteness of the possibility that so 
many infants in the care and custody of defendant would suffer 
cyanotic episodes and respiratory difficulties if they were not 
induced by the defendant’s wrongdoing, and at the same time, 
would prove the identity of defendant as the wrongdoer.312 
But as powerful as this other-acts evidence may have been, its use required a 
propensity inference.313  
For nearly thirty years, Professor Edward Imwinkelried has been the most 
stalwart proponent of the doctrine of chances.  In a series of articles314 and his 
well-known treatise,315 he has vigorously urged that the doctrine of chances can 
be deployed without requiring a propensity inference.  Imwinkelried sketches 
two possible chains of inferences—one involving propensity, the other not—
that might lead from the other-acts evidence to the defendant’s guilt.  From the 
defendant’s other acts, the jury might draw an inference about the defendant’s 
“personal, subjective bad character” from which it might then infer that the 
defendant acted in accordance with that bad character and committed the 
charged offense.316  This is the forbidden character-propensity inference.  But, 
Imwinkelried says, if a defendant “has been involved in such incidents more 
frequently than the typical, innocent person,”317 the jury may draw a 
 
pathologist who testified for the prosecution in the case, later speculated that Woods may have suffered 
from Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy.  DI MAIO & FRANSCELL, supra, at 83.  At the time of Woods’s 
trial, it had yet not been defined as a psychological disorder.  Id.  
312. Woods, 484 F.2d at 135. 
313. Such other-acts evidence, however, may sometimes be misleading.  See A FISH CALLED 
WANDA (METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER 1988), in which a dog-loving would-be murderer, to his horror, 
unintentionally kills three small dogs in his successive attempts to kill the dogs’ owner. 
314. Imwinkelried, Cosby and Weinstein, supra note 305; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Criminal 
Minds: The Need to Refine the Application of the Doctrine of Objective Chances as a Justification for 
Introducing Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Intent, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851 (2017) 
[hereinafter Imwinkelried, Need to Refine]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: 
Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition By Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical 
Relevance, The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419 (2006) [hereinafter, Imwinkelried, 
Evidentiary Paradox]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute Over the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM. 
JUST. 16 (1992) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Dispute]. 
315. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, §§ 4:1–4:3, 5:5–
5:8, 5:28. 
316. Imwinkelried, Cosby and Weinstein, supra note 305, at 11; Imwinkelried, Need to Refine, 
supra note 314, at 859.  
317. Imwinkelried, Need to Refine, supra note 314, at 863. 
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nonpropensity inference.318  From the other acts, the jury may infer “the 
objective improbability of so many accidents befalling the defendant or the 
defendant becoming innocently enmeshed in suspicious circumstances so 
frequently.”319  From this, the jury may infer that “one or some” of the incidents 
were not accidents.320  
The clue that Imwinkelried is glossing over the propensity inference lies in 
this statement of what the jury may infer from the other-acts evidence.  Juries 
are not asked to determine whether the defendant is guilty with regard to “one 
or some” of the incidents.  They are asked to decide whether the defendant 
committed the charged offense.  A major underpinning of the character-
evidence rule is the fear that jurors will convict a defendant for what she has 
done in the past rather than what she is presently charged with.321  
Imwinkelried’s formulation322 invites jurors to do just that.323  
More fundamentally, Imwinkelried conflates two different questions.  The 
first is whether the repeated occurrence of similar other acts can give rise— 
without propensity reasoning—to an inference that the other acts were not all 
accidents.  The second question is quite different: whether the repeated other 
acts tend to prove—without propensity reasoning—that the defendant 
committed the charged offense.  The answer to the first question is yes; the 
second, no.  For example, a jury could conclude, without propensity reasoning, 
 
318. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:28; 
Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 314, at 438. 
319. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 314, at 437; Imwinkelried, Dispute, supra 
note 314, at 19–20.  
320. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 314, at 437; Imwinkelried, Need to Refine, 
supra note 314, at 865; Imwinkelried, Cosby and Weinstein, supra note 305, at 12 (“[O]ne or some of 
the events involve an actus reus and criminal agency.”). 
321. See infra Part IV.B. 
322. To be fair, Inwinkelried is not the original source of the “one or some” language.  The 
Brides in the Bath court used that exact language.  R. v. Smith [1915] 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 
2153. 
323. Imwinkelried has proposed jury instructions to reduce the danger that a jury would indulge 
in impermissible character-propensity reasoning, but these highlight, rather than alleviate, the problem.  
He poses a hypothetical case in which a police officer stops the defendant’s car and finds cocaine in 
the trunk.  Imwinkelried, Need to Refine, supra note 314, at 876–78.  The defendant denies knowing 
cocaine was there.  Id. at 876.  In the defendant’s trial for possession of the cocaine, the prosecution 
then offers evidence that the same thing happened a year before.  Id. at 877.  Imwinkelried’s proposed 
instruction has the judge telling jurors that they should use their common sense and decide whether it 
is likely that this “would happen to an innocent person twice.”  Id. at 878.  If not, the instruction 
continues, the jurors “may conclude that on one or both of those occasions the defendant had the intent 
to possess the cocaine.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
2021] PUT CHARACTER BACK INTO CHARACTER EVIDENCE 757 
 
that at least some of the seventeen324 cyanotic episodes suffered by the eight 
children (other than the infant Paul) in Woods’s care were not natural 
occurrences.  But this other-acts evidence is being offered to prove that Woods 
murdered Paul, and the propensity inference is apparent.  The defendant 
murdered at least some of the other children, and so she murdered Paul.  
Imwinkelried’s efforts to circumvent this inference are a bit hazy.  Although he 
claims to have “largely rebutted” arguments that the doctrine of chances 
involves propensity reasoning,325 he actually has responded only to a flaw in 
one critic’s arguments.326  Professor Sean Sullivan has put the best gloss on 
Imwinkelried’s argument.  Admitting evidence of the other acts allows the jury 
to reason that it is objectively implausible that all the cyanotic episodes and 
deaths were accidental.  If it is unlikely that all were accidental, then it is more 
likely that Woods is responsible for one or more of them.  And that makes it 
more likely that she is responsible for Paul’s cyanotic episode and death.327 
The problem is that the other acts tend to prove Woods’s guilt only if 
Woods actually is responsible for at least some of the other cyanotic episodes 
and deaths.  Suppose it turned out that all the other cyanotic episodes and deaths 
actually resulted from natural causes.  How would the fact that Woods had been 
extremely unlucky tend to prove that she murdered Paul?328  According to 
 
324. The alleged murder victim, Paul, suffered three of the twenty total cyanotic episodes 
mentioned by the Woods court.  Woods, 484 F.2d at 129. 
325. Imwinkelried, Cosby and Weinstein, supra note 305, at 12–13.  
326. In support of this rebuttal claim, Imwinkelried cites to one of his earlier articles.  Id. at 12 
n.78.  In the earlier article, Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 314, at 443–48, he criticized 
Professor Morris’s claim that the doctrine of chances assumes that if at least one of the other acts is 
intentional, all must be intentional.  Morris, supra note 5, at 201–02.  Imwinkelried is right and Morris 
is wrong about this.  The doctrine of chances would still work, for example, if one of the seventeen 
cyanotic episodes in Woods had been the result of natural causes.  It just means that the factfinder 
would be inferring Woods’s guilt from evidence that she caused only sixteen other cyanotic episodes.  
That still involves a propensity inference.  Imwinkelried also argues that this propensity inference 
posits “an intermediate inference of the accused’s constant, unchanged bad character” that is 
inconsistent with the idea of free will.  Imwinkelried, Need to Refine, supra note 314, at 868.  But that 
is a straw-man argument.  No critic of the doctrine of chances denies the notion of free will or contends 
that a person of bad character always acts badly.  Woods may have been occasionally—or even 
frequently—quite sweet to her children.   
327. See Sullivan, supra note 164, at 34.  Professor Sullivan also seems to find Imwinkelried’s 
analysis a bit obscure.  Id. (noting that Imwinkelried’s reasoning “appears to be as follows”). 
328. In 1999, British solicitor Sally Clark was convicted of murdering her two children.  Gene 
Find Casts Doubt on Double “Cot Death” Murders, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2001, 6:45 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jul/15/johnsweeney.theobserver [https://perma.cc/WA4H-
BGEJ].  One died at eleven weeks of age; the other, at eight weeks.  Id.  She insisted that both children 
died naturally.  Id.  The Crown called an eminent British pediatrician to testify that the odds of a child 
suffering an innocent “cot death” was 1/8,543.  Id.  The odds of two consecutive cot deaths, he testified, 
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Imwinkelried, it is “the objective improbability of so many accidents befalling 
the defendant” that gives rise to what he says is the objective, nonpropensity 
inference of defendant’s guilt.  If she was unlucky so many times before, she 
must be guilty this time.  But that’s absurd.329  It is like saying that if someone, 
using a pair of good, unloaded dice, rolled six consecutive sevens—a 1/46,656 
likelihood330—it would be highly likely that he would roll a seven on the next 
toss.  
Unfortunately, the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of chances means 
that courts are applying it in ever more tenuous situations.  Consider a recent 
habeas case, Miller v. Baldwin.331  The defendant had been convicted in a single 
trial of murdering his two wives five years apart.  Like the women in Felix 
Vail’s life, Miller’s wives had disappeared “under similarly suspicious 
circumstances.”332  Miller claimed that the two murder charges were improperly 
joined.  The trial court had agreed to join them only after determining that, 
because of the doctrine of chances, if the cases were tried separately, evidence 
of the first wife’s disappearance would be admissible in defendant’s trial for 
murdering the second, and vice versa.333  The Ninth Circuit approved:  
It is a permissible inference, referred to as the “doctrine of 
chances,” to consider two otherwise independent events that, 
taken together, are unlikely to be coincidental.  That differs 
from the inference covered by the character evidence rule, 




were (1/8,543)2 or approximately one in 73,000,000.  Id.  Two years later, Manchester University 
researchers discovered a gene linked to cot death.  Id.   
 Clark’s conviction was subsequently overturned.  Clare Dyer, Sally Clark Freed After Appeal 




329. See Sullivan, supra note 164, at 41.  
330. The odds of rolling a seven are 1/6.  The odds of rolling six consecutive sevens are (1/6)6.  
If the dice are good, the odds of rolling a seven on the next toss are 1/6. 
331. 723 F. App’x 408 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2000 (2018).  
332. Id. at 409.  Although the Ninth Circuit does not describe the similarities, the district court 
opinion does.  Miller v. Baldwin, No. 3:96-cv-00114-CL, 2016 WL 3951394 (D. Or. Apr. 7, 2016).  
The details are reminiscent of Felix Vail and his missing companions. 
333. Miller, 723 F. App’x at 410. 
334. Id. (citation omitted). 
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Note the recursive nature of this reasoning.335  The jury is being asked to infer 
that the uncharged disappearance of Wife A is a murder from the fact of the 
charged disappearance of Wife B.  Having done this, the jury can now infer that 
Wife B’s disappearance was a murder.  But if the defendant did not murder 
Wife A, her disappearance would not tend to prove that he murdered Wife B.  
In other words, the charged offense is being used to prove that the uncharged 
act is a crime so it can then be used to prove the defendant is guilty of the 
charged offense.336  
G.  Conclusion 
It should be clear that courts frequently admit other-acts evidence even 
when its probative value flows solely from a propensity inference, and often 
from a character-propensity inference.  To be fair, in recent years a few courts 
of appeals—notably the Third,337 Fourth,338 and Seventh Circuits339—have 
criticized this and sought to rein in the practice.340  But these circuits still fall 
outside the mainstream, and even they are not always consistent in recognizing 
when a character-propensity inference is at work.341  The recent amendments to 
 
335. Imwinkelried’s proposed jury instruction suffers from the same defect.  See supra note 323. 
336. This illustrates a related issue that crops up in many character-evidence-rule cases.  The 
threshold level of proof for getting other-acts evidence before the jury is quite low.   The Supreme 
Court has ruled that this is a conditional relevancy problem.  Under Rule 104(b), that means the 
prosecution need offer only sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the 
defendant did the other act.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1988).  Many states 
use a similarly low threshold standard.  See 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, at § 5257 (collecting state 
tests).  Ironically, Louisiana departs from the norm and requires the prosecution to present clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other acts.  State v. Vail, 150 So.3d 576, 589 
(La. App. 2014), cert. denied, 176 So. 3d 401 (La. 2015).  The Vail court acknowledged the paucity of 
evidence that Vail killed the other two women, but perversely concluded that this supported the trial 
court’s decision to admit the evidence.  Id.  “Defendant’s apparent lack of direct culpability weighs in 
favor of admission because it minimizes impermissible negative inferences about his character.”  Id.  
337. See United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 242–44 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Caldwell, 
760 F.3d 267, 274–81 (3d Cir. 2014). 
338. See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 265–71 (4th Cir. 2017).  
339. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853–60 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 
673 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2012). 
340. See generally Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 787–96.   
341. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2020) (upholding 
admission of 2007 conviction for sale of cocaine on street corner to prove that in 2016 defendant knew 
how to package, price, and purchase cocaine); United States v. Morgan, 929 F.3d 411, 427–29 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (upholding, in prosecution in which defendant conceded possession of methamphetamine 
but denied he intended to distribute it, admission that he distributed methamphetamine on other 
occasions; court simply asserts that this evidence “was clearly relevant for the non-propensity purpose 
of proving the required intent”); United States v. Torrez, 869 F.3d 291, 301–02 (4th Cir. 2017) 
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Rule 404(b) do not address the underlying causes that drive courts to sidestep 
Rule 404(b)’s command.  Change can only be accomplished by confronting 
them.  The first step is to come to an understanding of what character means.  
Any such understanding, however, first requires a brief examination of why we 
have the character-evidence rule. 
IV.  WHY CHARACTER EVIDENCE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN EXCLUDED 
The character-evidence rule has long been rooted in the notion that the 
unfair prejudice associated with character evidence categorically outweighs its 
probative value.342  Like almost everything else associated with the character-
evidence rule, nearly every proffered proposition is controversial. 
A.  The Probative Value of Character Evidence 
Although most people frequently rely on character evidence in their daily 
life, a rich debate has long persisted about its probative value.  Some 
commentators contend that character evidence is irrelevant to proving a 
person’s conduct;343 others claim it can be highly probative.344  To some extent, 
this disparity reflects the type of character evidence on which the author 
primarily focuses.  Those who disparage character evidence tend to focus on 
 
(upholding, to demonstrate defendant’s “modus operandi, motive, and intent” in trial for murdering 
woman, evidence that defendant attempted to abduct and assault another woman and abducted and 
raped third woman).  
342. Some commentators have put forward other rationales for the character evidence rule.  
Professor Leonard posed a cathartic theory to explain why evidence law disregards psychological 
research that, in Leonard’s view, had undermined the validity of character evidence.  David P. Leonard, 
The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986–87).  He argued that trials have an important cultural meaning and constitute a 
“social (even moral) drama calculated to reach acceptable conclusions” and that this requires jurors to 
hear evidence that they intuitively believe is valid.  Id. at 41; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: 
Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 60–63 (1993) 
(endorsing cathartic function); cf. D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 70–71, 175–76 (2001) 
(expressing frustration as juror at inability to hear evidence about defendant’s and victim’s background 
and describing reaction upon learning after trial about victim’s past act). 
343. E.g., 22A  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5239, at 261 (2012) (“The basic reason for the inadmissibility of evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is that such evidence is irrelevant to prove the conduct in question.”); Leonard, 
supra note 342, at 31 (“[T]he rules governing the use of character evidence to prove conduct often 
allow the admission of evidence which fails the test of logical relevancy.”).  
344. E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. 
STATE L. REV. 967, 979 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, Minimizing] (character evidence often “highly 
probative”); Mike Redmayne, The Relevance of Bad Character, 61 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 684, 693 (2002) 
(“[C]onvictions, particularly those for serious crimes, make people stand out from the crowd.”); 
Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1242 (“[C]haracter evidence, though it may not be conclusive, is quite 
often capable of altering the evidentiary tally.”). 
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character at the most general level—for example, whether the person in 
question has an untruthful, violent, or careless disposition.345  Those who 
defend character evidence’s probative value are more likely to be thinking of 
specific acts that bear at least a moderate degree of similarity to the charged 
crime. 
Typical of the former group are scholars who seized on a mid-twentieth 
century attack by some personality and social psychologists on character-trait 
theory.  These psychologists rejected the then-prevailing wisdom that 
individuals possess character traits that lead them to behave consistently in 
diverse situations: that honest people, for example, will tend to behave honestly 
in a wide variety of circumstances.346  Spurred by studies that showed 
inconsistency in individuals’ cross-situational behavior, they argued that 
human behavior was situationally driven.347  Whether someone tells the truth is 
determined by circumstances, not by some character trait.348  Before too long, 
however, most psychologists—including the leading proponent of 
“situationism”—retreated from this rather extreme view349 to a more nuanced 
position, often referred to as interactionism.350  Human behavior in a given 
situation is determined by both a person’s innate characteristics and the 
 
345. But see David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent in the 
Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 254 (2011) (“[S]ocial science has now reached a 
consensus generally rejecting the logical relevance of offering prior similar acts to show that the 
defendant has the propensity to commit a criminal act or possesses the intent to do so.”). 
346. Gordon Allport was the leading exponent of this theory.  See GORDON W. ALLPORT, 
PERSONALITY—A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1937); Gordon W. Allport, Traits Revisited, 
21 AM. PSYCH. 1 (1966); Leonard, supra note 342, at 26. 
347. See, e.g., WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968); see also DONALD 
R. PETERSON, THE CLINICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1968); Kenneth S. Bowers, Situationism 
in Psychology: An Analysis and a Critique, 80 PSYCH. REV. 307, 308 (1973) (“[T]he situationist assault 
on traits has by and large been quite successful.”). 
348. A character in the movie Chinatown provides a ringing endorsement of situationism.  Noah 
Cross, played by John Huston, justifies his incestuous relationship with his daughter to private 
detective Jake Gittes, played by Jack Nicholson: “I don’t blame myself.  You see, Mr. Gittes, most 
people never have to face the fact that at the right time and the right place, they’re capable of 
ANYTHING.”  CHINATOWN (PARAMOUNT PICTURES 1974), 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071315/characters/nm0001379 [https://perma.cc/D8QW-D75N].  
349. Walter Mischel, Alternatives in the Pursuit of the Predictability and Consistency of 
Persons: Stable Data that Yield Unstable Interpretations, 51 J. PERSONALITY 578 (1983). 
350. See, e.g., David C. Funder, Towards a Resolution of the Personality Triad: Persons, 
Situations, and Behaviors, 40 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 21, 22 (2006) (“Nowadays, everybody is an 
interactionist.”); Robert E. Wilson, Renee J. Thompson & Simine Vazire, Are Fluctuations in 
Personality States More Than Fluctuations in Affect?, 69 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 110 (2016); Yuichi 
Shoda & Walter Mischel, Applying Meta-theory to Achieve Generalisability and Precision in 
Personality Science, 55 APPLIED PSYCH.: AN INT’L REV. 439, 443 (2006). 
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particulars of the situation.351  Under this view, one could predict a person’s 
response in a given situation, but only by knowing how that person had reacted 
in enough similar situations.  For a group of legal scholars, these attacks on 
traditional character-trait theory demonstrated the futility of relying on 
character evidence.  As one commentator put it, “[T]he theory of behavior that 
was so compatible with the law’s notions about character has ceased to have 
any scientific recognition.”352  
A strong pushback came from scholars who focused less on character-trait 
theory generally353 and more on whether other-acts evidence typically used in 
litigation had probative value.  In an influential article, Susan Marlene Davies 
argued that past behavior may be highly probative of a defendant’s behavior in 
similar circumstances.354  Professor Roger Park, the most analytically rigorous 
of the commentators on the character-evidence rule, more thoroughly 
challenged the relevance to criminal trials of the personality and social 
psychologists’ attacks on character-trait theory.355  He argued that, when joined 
with evidence specific to the alleged crime that already points to a defendant’s 
guilt, proof that a defendant had engaged in a similar-type of low-base-rate 
conduct (such as murder) may be highly incriminating.356  Buttressing his 
arguments with references to recidivism data and other studies, he convincingly 
demonstrated that claims that character evidence was categorically unreliable 
 
351. Wilson, supra note 350.  
352. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Indeterminable 
Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758, 783 (1975) (emphasis in original); see also 1 IMWINKELRIED, 
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 2:19; Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil 
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 32 (1988); Miguel Angel Mendez, 
California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent 
Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1052 (1984); Robert B. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea 
for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 351 (1979); see also supra note 342. 
353. The traits typically studied by personality psychologists are far removed from the kind of 
evidence Rule 404(b) governs.  See SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 60, at 151 (listing types of 
personality traits studied); John M. Digman, Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor 
Model, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 417 (1990) (tracing history of development of five-factor personality 
model, which consists of extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and intellect, or 
some variant of each).  
354. Davies, supra note 31, at 533; see Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1240 n.29 (noting 
importance of Davies’s article).  
355. Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 728–38. 
356. Id. at 721–28. 
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were wildly exaggerated.357  Other scholars reached similar conclusions.358  The 
appropriate question for gauging the probative value of other-acts evidence is 
not whether it is accurate in predicting whether someone will again engage in 
similar behavior at some indeterminate time.359  It is whether—when viewed in 
the context of other evidence already pointing toward a defendant’s guilt—a 
defendant who has committed the other act is more likely to be guilty than if he 
had not committed the other act.360   
But establishing that some other-acts evidence may have substantial 
probative value does not resolve the admissibility question.  Some other-acts 
evidence may have little probative value.  More important, Rule 404(b) is based 
on a judgment about the balance between probative value and unfair prejudice 
of this type of evidence in the long run of cases.  And every commentator 
concedes that this type of evidence poses the risk of unfair prejudice.  How 
extensive this risk is, however, is much debated. 
B.  The Risk of Unfair Prejudice  
Some prominent commentators still contend that the introduction of other-
acts evidence against an accused almost invariably sounds a death knell for the 
defense.361  These claims are hyperbolic and can be refuted both anecdotally362 
 
357. Id. at 725–28.  Park also argued that certain character traits, such as violence, may be more 
stable and, therefore, more probative than others.  Id. at 735–36; see also Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 
1241. 
358. MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 66 
(1990); Friedman, Minimizing, supra note 344, at 978–79; Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1242; OFFICE 
OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT, supra note 2, at 725–26.  Some have argued that certain types of character 
traits, such as violence, might be sufficiently predictive of behavior as to be highly probative without 
reference to similarity of situation.  Jan Chaiken, Marcia Chaiken & William Rhodes, Predicting 
Violent Behavior and Classifying Violent Offenders, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING 
VIOLENCE 218, 280 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994). 
359. See Redmayne, supra note 344, at 692 (distinguishing between using character for 
predictive and historical purposes). 
360. See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (defining relevance in terms of whether it “has any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”); George F. James, Relevancy, 
Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 699 (1941). 
361. 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 1:2; Capra & 
Richter, supra note 34, at 772. 
362. A dramatic example involves the 2003 murder trial in Galveston, Texas, of New York 
millionaire Robert Durst.  The jury acquitted Durst of murder even though it learned that he had been 
posing in Galveston as a mute woman out of fear he was going to be indicted for murdering his wife 
in New York.  See Gary Cartwright, The Verdict, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 2004), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-verdict-5/ [https://perma.cc/468R-HW9P].  Durst was 
later the subject of the HBO documentary The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst, which 
includes extensive coverage of this trial.  The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst (HBO series 
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and systematically.  Data from a study of 358 criminal trials in four jurisdictions 
from 2000 to 2001363 showed that about 20% of defendants whose prior 
convictions were admitted into evidence were acquitted.364  This approximated 
the acquittal rate for defendants whose prior convictions were not admitted.365  
Kalven and Zeisel’s classic study of the American jury showed that, in the great 
majority of cases in which a defendant’s prior record was elicited, jurors were 
no more likely to reach a guilty verdict than the presiding judge.366  This result 
has been replicated in two studies.367  Therefore, the introduction of other-acts 
evidence certainly does not sound like an inevitable death knell for a defendant.  
But for several reasons it may still create a risk of unfair prejudice and result in 
too high a rate of conviction.  
i.  The Danger of Overestimation–Cognitive Error and the Like  
Every commentator acknowledges the possibility that jurors may overvalue 




363. Los Angeles, California; Maricopa County, Arizona; Bronx, New York; and the District of 
Columbia.  PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIA P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT & G. THOMAS 
MUNSTERMAN, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 27, 32 (2002), 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/juries/id/27/rec/1 [https://perma.cc/2EXC-J28J]. 
364. Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and 
Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 503–04 (2011).  
Laudan and Allen looked at the data from the 251 trials in this study that involved defendants with 
prior criminal records.  Id.  
365. Id. at 504.  We should, however, hesitate to draw too much from this data.  The data tells 
us nothing about the relative strength of the cases against the defendants in this study who had prior 
records and chose to go to trial as opposed to those without prior records who chose to go to trial.  
Moreover, the data indicates whether a defendant’s prior conviction was admitted, but not whether 
other-acts evidence not involving a conviction was offered against a defendant.  Laudan and Allen’s 
explanation for the similar conviction rates for defendants whose prior convictions were and were not 
admitted is unconvincing.  They contend that jurors are somehow able to divine when a defendant has 
a prior conviction even when they are presented no such evidence.  Id. at 522. 
366. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179, 215–18 (1966); Joseph 
L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-examination of the 1966 Kalven-Zeisel Study of Judge-Jury 
Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 169, 174–75 (2004).  
Of course, this may just mean that judges are as likely as jurors to be unfairly prejudiced by this type 
of evidence.  This is a real possibility.  See infra note 374.  
367. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148–51 (2007); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas 
Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A 
Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 
(2005).  
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it actually is.368  Scholars commonly invoke cognitive errors such as 
fundamental attribution error to support this claim.369  According to this view, 
people suffer from dispositional bias.  They tend to overestimate the extent to 
which character traits cause people to act and undervalue the role of situational 
influences.370  Overvaluation of character evidence may also result from jurors 
employing a story-telling model, rather than Bayesian reasoning, to reach their 
verdicts.371  Jurors may well find it easier to fit evidence of a defendant’s other 
wrong-doing into a story of guilt than into one of innocence.  Moreover, social 
psychologists contend that “motivated inculpation”—the inclination to punish 
people with bad character—further influences the way jurors judge evidence.372  
Critics contend, however, that the link between studies demonstrating the 
frequency of such cognitive errors in daily life and how real jurors actually 
reason when deciding real cases is, at the least, exaggerated.373  Ultimately, 
however, no one seriously denies that jurors will overvalue character evidence 
to at least some extent, and studies that demonstrate that judges likewise fall 
 
368. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 1:3; 
LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 1.2; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, 
§ 4:30. 
369. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 165, 197 (2006); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges 
to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087, 1092–93 (2003); Imwinkelried, 
Reshaping, supra note 65, at 742–43; Davies, supra note 31, at 527; Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 
563. 
370. See generally RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).  Some point to the representativeness heuristic as 
another explanation for jurors’ tendency to overvalue the probative evidence of character evidence.  
See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086–87 (2000). 
371. Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About 
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 152–53 
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal 
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 515–19 (2004); Mark D. Alicke, Evidential and Extra-
Evidential Evaluations of Social Conduct, 9 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 591 (1994). 
372. Janice Nadler & Pam A. Mueller, Social Psychology and the Law, in 1 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 124, 140 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Nadler & 
Mueller, Social Psychology]; Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and 
the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 (2012); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 368 (1992). 
373. See, e.g., Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 738; Friedman, Minimizing, 
supra note 344, at 979; Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1547, 1599–1608 (1998); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT, supra note 2, at 732.  
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prey to a variety of cognitive errors buttress the case for taking seriously the 
case that real jurors overvalue other-acts evidence.374 
ii.  The Danger of Overestimation–Round Up the Usual Suspects 
Virtually every writer agrees that some police practices provide another 
avenue that may lead jurors to place too much weight on other-acts evidence.  
Innocent people with criminal records are more likely to become suspects in an 
unsolved crime than those with an unblemished past.  Confronted with a 
burglary in one part of town, police may quite naturally suspect someone they 
know has committed other burglaries in that part of town and seek to build a 
case against that person.375  A prior criminal record may also lead to a 
misidentification of the perpetrator.  Crime victims often initially identify their 
assailants by looking at a photo array.  These photo arrays are typically drawn 
from mug shots; that is, from pictures taken of people who have previously 
been arrested and booked.  Moreover, the police may select for the photo array 
mug shots of those suspected or convicted of a crime similar to the one now 
being investigated376—the usual suspects.377  Given the high rate at which 
victims erroneously select the wrong person from photo arrays, a good number 
of innocent people wind up being tried simply because they had previously 
engaged in similar conduct.378  Yet jurors are unlikely to know that in such cases 
the defendant’s past conduct—rather than supplementing other proof of the 
defendant’s guilt—is in fact the reason the defendant was erroneously charged.  
This means the jurors are likely to overestimate the probative value of the other-
acts evidence.379 
 
374. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1291 
(2005) (judges affected by anchoring phenomenon); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (magistrate judges were 
susceptible to five common cognitive illusions); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil 
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 113 (1994). 
375. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 353; 
Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 772. 
376. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 353. 
377. Hence the term “round up the usual suspects,” which is frequently invoked in the literature.  
E.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 17–20 (2012); 
LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 353; Park, 
Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 749; Baker, supra note 112, at 581; Rothstein, supra 
note 288, at 1263.  The term is an homage to the closing scene of the classic film Casablanca.  
CASABLANCA (WARNER BROS. 1942). 
378. See infra note 409.  
379. This adverse effect is likely exacerbated for racial minorities.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, Policy 
104D: Cross-Racial Identification, 37 SW. L. REV. 917 (2008). 
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iii.  Nullification 
Apart from the danger that jurors will overvalue the evidence is the risk that 
hearing a defendant has committed other bad acts will incline jurors to convict 
even if the evidence fails to establish guilt on the charged crime.  This may be 
a conscious decision by jurors.  Wigmore wrote of the “deep tendency of human 
nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a 
bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught.”380  
Additionally, a more subtle process may be at work.  Knowledge of a 
defendant’s past wrongdoing may make jurors more prone to convict because 
it leads them to undervalue the cost of an erroneous conviction and so, even on 
an unconscious level, effectively lower the burden of proof standard.381  This 
nullification concern has been widely cited to justify the character-evidence 
rule382 and, for some, is the most cogent justification for the rule.383  
C.  Unfair Surprise and Waste of Time 
Concerns of unfair surprise and judicial inefficiency have regularly been 
offered to support the character-evidence rule.  Particularly in the era before 
notice requirements,384 but even afterwards,385 commentators have argued that 
it is unfair to expect a defendant to be able to anticipate and defend against 
charges of misconduct extrinsic to the charged crime.  Some have also claimed 
that allowing such evidence would waste time and tend to confuse the issues.386  
But these claims cannot remotely justify the categorical exclusion of character 
evidence.  Unfair surprise can easily be addressed with adequate discovery and 
 
380. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 57.  Wigmore also notes that jurors might convict solely because 
they believe the defendant managed to escape previous wrongdoing without punishment.  Id. § 194.  
381. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 349–50; 
LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 141, CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS: PREVIOUS MISCONDUCT OF A DEFENDANT 126 (1996).  
382. E.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 1:3; 
Davies, supra note 31, at 525; Leonard, In Defense, supra note 65, at 1184;  see Michelson v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (noting that character evidence is ordinarily inadmissible because “it 
is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad 
general record”). 
383. E.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 565; Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 
3, at 745. 
384. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 525 (1898); WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 194; Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact 
Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 957–58 (1933). 
385. E.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:22; Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 
565; Leonard, In Defense, supra note 65, at 1185–86. 
386. Leonard, In Defense, supra note 65, at 1185–86; Kuhns, supra note 62, at 777. 
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notice requirements.387  Concerns that court time will be frittered away proving 
a defendant’s prior misdeeds carry little weight with regard to prior convictions, 
which can expeditiously be established through the record of conviction.388  
More to the point, these arguments depend on underlying concerns about 
character evidence’s lack of probative value.  If the evidence is strong enough, 
no one would say that it is inefficient to admit it.  Indeed, Rule 404(b) authorizes 
the use of other-acts evidence when it is offered for a noncharacter-propensity 
purpose. 
D.  What Empirical Studies Tell Us 
Over the past half-century, researchers have conducted numerous studies 
using mock jurors to study the impact of other-acts evidence.  Unfortunately, 
they are not terribly helpful in guiding how the law of evidence should address 
other-acts evidence.389  Problems with these studies—at least in terms of their 
pertinence to law reform—are well documented.  The mock jurors rarely are 
demographically representative of the jury population.390  They are typically 
given a barebones set of facts that are often designed more to produce 
interesting results for the researchers than to mirror what goes on in a 
 
387. Harris v. State, 597 A.2d 956, 959 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 729; see FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3). 
388. Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1249; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT, supra note 2, at 
729–30; see FED. R. EVID. 803(22). 
389. Studies that attempt to assess how mock jurors use convictions offered as impeachment 
evidence are more useful.  The point of these studies is simply to determine whether mock jurors 
impermissibly use the evidence for substantive purposes and not just for their bearing on the witness’s 
credibility.  See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: 
When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).   
390. See, e.g., Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting 
Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 480 (1988) 
(noting use of students as mock jurors).  More recent online efforts reach beyond students but still 
appear to produce an unrepresentative group of participants.  The participants in one recent study, see 
Sevier, supra note 5, at 466–67, are vastly more educated and liberal than the average adult.  More 
than 90% of the participants in that study had at least some college education; nearly 60% were college 
graduates; and 47% self-identified as liberal (or very liberal).  Id.  In comparison, the national figures 
are 60% of all adults have at least some college education; only 32% are college graduates; and only 
24% self-identify as liberal.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2018 tbl. 1 (Feb. 21. 2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/education-
attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html [https://perma.cc/95BK-NK5T]; Lydia Saad, The U.S. Remained 
Center-Right, Ideologically, in 2019, GALLUP (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/275792/remained-center-right-ideologically-2019.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SB8U-DKNQ]; cf. Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-
Making, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 223, 224 (1990) (noting that “different studies have found mock jurors’ 
verdicts to be more lenient, less lenient, and no different from those of ‘actual’ jurors”).  
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courtroom.391  Mock jurors do not deliberate in a way that captures how real 
jurors render verdicts.392  And the results of the studies are, in most respects, 
underwhelming.393  Most show an increase in mock jurors’ willingness to 
convict when they are told that the defendant has committed other similar 
crimes, but the magnitude of the effect varies.394  With regard to dissimilar 
convictions, some studies show an increased likelihood in mock jurors’ 
willingness to convict; some show no effect; and some show a decreased 
likelihood of conviction.395  Discrepancies in these findings should come as no 
surprise.  Study designs can easily be manipulated to produce greater or lesser 
effects.  The marginal impact of introducing a similar conviction is going to be 
greater where other evidence the mock jurors have been given creates a close 
case than when it already presents a very strong case against the defendant.  
Varying the recency and degree of similarity of the other bad acts is also going 
to affect the results.  If mock jurors deciding a murder case can’t discriminate 
between the probative value of a recent attempted murder and a temporally 
 
391. Laudan & Allen, supra note 364, at 501–02; MacCoun, supra note 390, at 224.  For 
example, in one study participants were given a 400-word description of a case in which the defendant 
was on trial for breaking and entering.  A. N. Doob and H. M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence 
on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88 (1973).  They 
were told that the defendant testified but did not give any important evidence.  Id.  They were then told 
that the defendant had five prior convictions for breaking and entering and two for possession of stolen 
property.  Id.  
392. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and The Jury As Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
407, 432–33 (2013); see, e.g., Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect 
Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 291, 295–96 (1983) (after spending ten 
minutes reading booklets detailing facts of case, mock-juror students individually completed a 
questionnaire and then were given thirty minutes to deliberate in six-person juries). 
393. See JENNY MCEWAN, THE VERDICT OF THE COURT: PASSING JUDGMENT IN LAW AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 168 (2003) (results are “inconclusive”); Laudan & Allen, supra note 364, at 500 (results 
are “all over the map”).   
394. See, e.g., Sevier, supra note 5, at 484–86; Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 57, at 347; Sally 
Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A 
Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 737–38, 743–45 (2000) (summarizing previous research 
and reporting results of own study); Edith Green & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior-Record 
Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1995); W.R. Cornish & A.P. Sealy, 
Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208 (1973); Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod & 
Rebecca Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, 
Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1985); cf. Eugene Borgida 
& Roger Park, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 19 (1988) (prior conviction made mock jurors more likely to convict when using subjective 
entrapment standard; no difference when using objective standard). 
395. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 389, at 43–44 (increase); Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 
394, at 743–45 (decrease); Cornish & Sealy, supra note 394, at 222 (decrease in some scenarios; no 
effect in others).  See generally LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 141, supra note 381, 
at 318–41 (summarizing British research). 
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distant, drunk-and-disorderly-conduct incident, as they were asked to do in a 
recent study,396 we might as well abandon the jury system.  Most importantly, 
what these studies do not show—and cannot show—is whether the introduction 
of other-acts evidence increases or decreases the accuracy of jurors’ verdicts.  
The studies, after all, involve fictional scenarios with no right answer.397 
For the same reason, studies of real juries are largely unhelpful.  Kalven 
and Zeisel’s landmark jury study attempts to explain why judges and juries 
disagree in about 20–25% of cases.398  But Kalven and Zeisel make no effort to 
determine whose verdict was the correct one; nor could they.  Later studies of 
real juries399 suffer from the same shortcoming. 
E.  Evaluating the Traditional Arguments 
What should be clear by now is that how to balance the categorical 
probative value and prejudicial impact of character evidence remains 
controversial and cannot be resolved with any certainty.  Nevertheless, I believe 
that critics of the character-evidence rule—those who seek to robustly limit the 
admission of other-acts evidence—have underestimated its probative value and 
overemphasized its deficiencies relative to other types of evidence that are 
routinely admitted. 
The analysis of Professor Park and some of the other scholars who focus 
pointedly on the probative value of other-acts evidence in the real-life setting 
of a trial400 is substantially more compelling than that of those who rely on 
psychologists’ attacks on character-trait theory or mock-jury studies.401  It is 
our common experience, however, that provides the strongest argument that 
 
396. Sevier, supra note 5, at 484–87.  The mock jurors in this study were more likely to convict 
when (a) the prior other act was a murder rather than a drunk and disorderly conviction, (b) there were 
five prior violent acts rather than one, and (c) the prior acts occurred in the last year rather than five 
years ago.  Id.  Based on these unremarkable results, the author concluded “jurors appear unlikely to 
overvalue propensity evidence.”  Id. at 488. But such a study cannot possibly support such a 
conclusion, and the author acknowledges this at the very end of the article.  Id. at 507.  
397. Some studies use bowdlerized versions of real-life cases, see, e.g., Cornish & Sealy, supra 
note 394, but these also lack a “right” answer.  Some studies seek to discern mock jurors’ reasoning 
processes.  They may, for example, try to show that an increase in mock jurors’ willingness to convict 
can be explained more by the change the other-acts evidence produced in their feelings about the mock 
defendant than in their evaluation of the strength of the substantive case.  See, e.g., Alicke, supra note 
371; Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 57, at 355.  Again, because there is no “right” answer about how 
much probative value the other-acts evidence had, there is no way of telling whether introduction of 
the evidence led to better results through improper reasoning or worse results.  Such studies may, 
however, add weight to fears about unfair prejudice through jury nullification. 
398. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 366. 
399. See supra notes 363–67. 
400. See supra text accompanying notes 353–60. 
401. See supra text accompanying notes 346–52, 389–97. 
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other-acts evidence offered for a propensity inference is sufficiently probative 
to warrant admission in a wide range of cases.  Anyone who reads even a 
fraction of the thousands and thousands of appellate cases addressing Rule 
404(b) or its state equivalents402 understands that courts admit other-acts 
evidence in lots of cases.403  Thousands of judges over scores of years have 
concluded that the probative value of other-acts evidence outweighs the 
prejudicial impact of the evidence.404  And as I have argued, many of these cases 
involve courts’ turning a blind eye to the fact that the evidence was probative 
only through a propensity inference.  These decisions reflect the kinds of 
judgments we routinely make in our daily lives.405  Who among us, when 
choosing between two otherwise equally attractive candidates to sublet our 
apartment, would pick the one we just discovered had trashed the last apartment 
he sublet?  If, after hosting a small dinner party, you discovered that a small, 
valuable piece of silver was missing and learned that one of your dinner guests 
had three shoplifting convictions, who would you first suspect was the thief?  It 
is commonly understood that relevance is typically a product of human 
experience, not scientific proof.406 
 
402. Westlaw’s Notes of Decisions feature, for example, lists nearly 3,400 entries under Federal 










403. Some commentators contend that courts rarely exclude character evidence.  E.g., Daniel D. 
Blinka, Character, Liberalism, and the Protean Culture of Evidence Law, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 87, 
110 (2013) (character evidence rule is “honored only in the breach”); Melilli, supra note 373, at 1548 
(character-evidence rule “is more rhetoric than substance; the practice in American courts belies any 
real commitment to excluding character evidence”).  These assertions are hyperbolic.  See infra note 
587. 
404. This judgment is buttressed by the fact that many other legal systems are significantly less 
averse to character evidence.  See Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal 
Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 64 (1995); Imwinkelried, Reshaping, supra note 65, at 745; Morris, 
supra note 5, at 207.  
405. The writers of the final episode of the long-running comedy series Seinfeld understood this 
well.  The show’s four main characters were charged with violating a Good Samaritan law after they 
witnessed a mugging and mocked the victim rather than taking any action to help him.  Seinfeld: The 
Finale (NBC television broadcast May 14, 1998).  At their trial, the prosecution introduced a litany of 
other-acts evidence to establish the characters’ long history of callous and indifferent acts.  Id.  
406. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (1972) (citing James, supra note 360, at 
696 n.15).  
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To be sure, our conventional wisdom may be flawed.  Other-acts evidence 
is far from perfect.  Cognitive error abounds.  But that is true for most evidence 
that is routinely admitted.  Critics of character evidence have held it to a far 
higher standard than lots of other types of evidence whose deficiencies have 
been much more thoroughly documented.407  The inaccuracy of eyewitness 
identifications408 and the risks they present to accurate factfinding are well 
established.409  The defects of human memory, including the extent to which it 
may be easily manipulated, have been widely demonstrated.410  The ability of 
jurors to consistently deduce from demeanor whether a person is telling the 
truth has been debunked.411  Yet these all remain central components of our trial 
system. 
Moreover, while critics are correct to point out that jurors’ reasoning 
processes may induce them to overestimate the probative value of character 
evidence, that does not end the analysis.  Almost invariably, jurors want to 
know something about the character of the persons whom they are judging.412  
Absent character evidence, they are inevitably going to resort to other cues to 
make inferences about the characters in the drama that comprises their case.  
 
407. Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1244–46. 
408. SIMON, supra note 377, at 53 (“The single most important observation from the research 
on eyewitness identification is that it is substantially less accurate than generally believed.”).  See 
generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, 33 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 498 (2019); 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996). 
409. Exoneration studies demonstrate that mistaken eyewitness identifications are the cause of a 
substantial percentage of mistaken convictions.  The National Registry of Exonerations attributes more 
than one-quarter of the erroneous convictions in its database to mistaken witness identifications.  % 
Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/62VV-69J3]; see State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885 (N.J. 2011) (“In 2006, this 
Court observed that eyewitness ‘[m]isidentification is widely recognized as the single greatest cause 
of wrongful convictions in this country.’” (quoting State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888 (2006)) (alteration 
in original)). 
410. Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every 
Judge and Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1331, 1356–60 (2015); C.A. Morgan III, Steven Southwick, George Steffian, Gary A. Hazlett & 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Misinformation Can Influence Memory For Recently Experienced, Highly 
Stressful Events, 36 INT’L J.L. & PSYCH. 11 (2013); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness 
Memory for People and Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 617 
(2013). 
411. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 377, at 125 (meta-analysis of studies shows that people perform 
only slightly better than coin-flip in determining accuracy from demeanor and are overconfident in 
their ability to do so); Bennett, supra note 410, at 1346–48; Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078–88 (1991) (reviewing studies). 
412. See, e.g., BURNETT, supra note 342, at 70–71, 175–76. 
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Defense attorneys often clean up their clients’ appearance413 because studies 
show that jurors are biased by a defendant’s attractiveness.414  More 
perniciously, jurors may resort to racial, ethnic, religious, or gender biases to 
make judgments about a defendant’s character.415  The question, therefore, is 
not whether jurors are going to be affected by their views of the defendant’s 
character; it is whether the introduction of other-acts evidence exacerbates or 
mitigates this problem and to what extent 416  
In the end, there can be no certain resolution to the debate about the relative 
probative value of other-acts evidence and the risk it poses of unfair prejudice 
as a categorical matter.  My sense is that other-acts evidence is more probative 
than the many critics of character evidence contend.  But I also believe that we 
need to pay heed to the dangers of unfair prejudice.  What should be absolutely 
clear is that character must be defined in a manner consistent with a judgment 
about when—categorically—the probative value of other-acts evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
V.  WHAT IS CHARACTER 
A.  Introduction 
As has often been observed, courts, commentators, and rule drafters have 
devoted surprisingly little effort to defining character.417  Expressions of despair 
 
413. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 349; 
Foster, supra note 352, at 36.  
414. See, e.g., Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, 
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1315 (1994); John E. Stewart II, Defendant’s Attractiveness as 
a Factor in the Outcome of Criminal Trials: An Observational Study, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 348 
(1980). 
415. Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 321, 330–
31 (2015); Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 741; Nadler & Mueller, Social 
Psychology, supra note 372, § 6.2, at 139–40; Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 414. 
416. Professor Park argues that the admission of other-acts evidence is likely to impel jurors to 
make more accurate character attributions.  Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 740–
41.  Drawing on the work of Ross and Nesbitt, he analogizes trials without character evidence to the 
“interview illusion,” the commonly-held and mistaken assumption that a brief admissions or 
employment interview with an applicant produces a good deal of information about the person that 
aids in projecting the applicant’s success.  Id. at 740.  An applicant’s personal history is a better 
predictor of success.  See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 136–38 (1991).  
417. See, e.g., SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 60, at 143; 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 
6, § 5233, at 23; Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Character 
Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1922–24 (2012); Blinka, supra note 403, at 139–40.  
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at the prospect of arriving at a clear definition418 seem to outnumber sustained 
efforts to produce one.419  
The problem of defining character runs along two dimensions.  The first 
focuses on broadly described attributes.420  We might ascribe to a person any of 
a broad range of attributes: honest/dishonest, violent/peaceable, tall/short, 
modest/boastful, emotional/unemotional, careless/careful, intelligent/stupid, 
cautious/impulsive, compulsive/lackadaisical, racist/tolerant.  Which of these 
should be considered character traits?  
The second dimension concerns the specificity of the other-acts conduct 
and its match to the charged conduct.  Other-acts evidence may manifest a 
defendant’s conduct at a fairly general level—for example, that the defendant 
has engaged in various types of conduct that all involve dishonesty, offered to 
prove the defendant committed fraud.  Or such evidence may describe instances 
of a very specific type of conduct—for example, that the defendant courted a 
series of unmarried mothers who had life insurance and then attempted to 
collect the insurance proceeds when they mysteriously wound up dead—that 
matches the conduct for which the defendant is charged.  Should these both be 
considered “character”?  
The law of evidence fails to provide a clear answer to what character means 
as to either of these two dimensions.  Although I believe that, for purposes of 
implementing Rule 404(b) in a coherent manner, the second dimension is more 
 
418. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Kurland, Psychological Research on Character as a Process in 
Judgment and Decision-Making and Its Potential Implications for the Character Evidence Prohibition 
in Anglo-American Law 5 (May 8, 2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182702 
[https://perma.cc/WWT4-YAH5] or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182702 [https://perma.cc/S7DV-
EALL] (“Arriving at a definitive definition of character as a construct is a fool’s errand.”); Sevier, 
supra note 5, at 448 (noting that what constitutes character trait is sometimes “hotly contested”); United 
States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1998) (“We doubt that a fully satisfactory, comprehensive 
definition of ‘character evidence’ is possible . . . .”); State v. Williams, 874 P.2d 12, 25 (N.M. 1994) 
(Montgomery, C.J., concurring) (“I am unable to do what all the text-writers and other legal authorities 
have failed to do.  I am unable to outline the contours of the term ‘character’ . . . .”). 
419. See, e.g., 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5233–5234; Anderson, supra note 417; Blinka, 
supra note 403; Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 718–20. 
420. This is not explicitly an other-acts evidence problem covered by Rule 404(b).  Instead, the 
admissibility of evidence of broadly described attributes falls under Rule 404(a).  But to the extent that 
an attribute simply represents the sum of a person’s other acts, it implicitly implicates Rule 404(b).  
See State v. Hirsch, 717 N.E.2d 789, 799 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding trial court erred under Rule 
404(b) in admitting evidence that defendant was known as “Rambo” and “Psycho Johnny”); Logan v. 
State, No. 05-97-01291-CR., 2000 WL 254297 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2000) (rejecting defendant’s 
Rule 404(b) argument because he failed to timely object when prosecution offered evidence that his 
nickname was “Little Killer”); United States v. Burris, ARMY 20150047, 2018 WL 7286000, *4 
(Army Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2018) (holding nickname “Beast” was not inadmissible character 
evidence under Rule 404(a) and was admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt under Rule 
404(b)). 
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important, the attempts to define character have thus far focused primarily on 
the first dimension.  And they have not proved terribly helpful. 
B.  The Current State of the Law 
Many definitions of character simply equate it with disposition.  Some of 
these leave disposition wholly undefined,421 while others—tracking 
McCormick’s oft-quoted definition422—provide a few illustrative examples that 
fail to provide much guidance.423  Some definitions equate character with 
personality or psychological bents.424  Wigmore425 and a good number of other 
commentators426 contend that character refers only to dispositions or traits that 
reflect a person’s moral fiber.  The Model Code of Evidence defines character, 
but in a way that both reaches beyond moral considerations and is utterly 
unenlightening.427  The drafters of Rule 404 were somewhat enigmatic about 
the relationship between character and morals.  In their Note to Rule 406,428 
they quote McCormick’s definition, which hints at moral considerations, but in 
 
421. E.g., Laprime v. Pallazzo, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).  The original Uniform 
Rules of Evidence simply substituted “disposition” for “character,” but made no attempt to define 
“disposition.”  UNIF. R. EVID. 55 (1953).  Professor Tillers offered a somewhat different take on 
character, contending that “it is far better to think of character as the ‘animating spirit’ or the ‘internal 
operating system’ of a human organism.”  Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782 (1998). 
422. “Character is a generalized description of a person’s disposition, or of the disposition in 
respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness.”  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
supra note 201, § 195, at 686. 
423. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 694 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cortez, 
935 F.3d 135, 138 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 
1981).  
424. E.g., United States v. Williams, 900 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Doe, 
149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 921 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
425. Wigmore defined character as a person’s “actual moral or psychical disposition, or sum of 
traits.”  WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 52, at 121.  In later sections, Wigmore repeatedly referred to the 
moral dimension of character.  See id. §§ 64, 67, 68. 
426. See, e.g., 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5233.1; Anderson, supra note 417, at 1921; 
Kuhns, supra note 62, at 779; Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 451; Rothstein, supra 
note 288, at 1264; Davis, supra note 266, at 624–26; David Torrance, Evidence of Character in Civil 
and Criminal Proceedings, 12 YALE L.J. 352, 352 (1903); cf. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
34, § 7.11 (distinguishing syndromes from character because they do not involve “appraising the 
personal qualities of a particular person”); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(A) (2020) (providing that 
“[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character, such as a moral quality, is not admissible” 
(emphasis added)). 
427. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 304 (AM. L. INST. 1942) (“Character . . . means the 
aggregate of a person’s traits, including those relating to care and skill and their opposites.”).  
428. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee’s note (1972). 
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their Note to Rule 405, they state that character usually, but not always, carries 
moral overtones.429 
Agreement is easy to find at the extremes.  Honesty/dishonesty, 
peaceableness/violence, and carelessness/carefulness are universally 
recognized as character traits for purposes of the character-evidence rule;430 
height, intelligence, strength, and skill (and their opposites) are not.431  But what 
about attributes that may be considered more attitudinal?  Is being racist, sexist, 
or ageist a character trait?432  Another set of questions revolves around what is 
sometimes called the medicalization of deviance.433  No one would consider 
epilepsy or schizophrenia a character trait;434 they are diseases.  But alcoholism 
or drug addiction—now both considered diseases435—have traditionally been 
 
429. “Traditionally character has been regarded primarily in moral overtones of good and bad: 
chaste, peaceable, truthful, honest.  Nevertheless, on occasion nonmoral considerations crop up, as in 
the case of the incompetent driver, and this seems bound to happen increasingly.”  FED. R. EVID. 405 
advisory committee’s note (1972). 
430. See, e.g., id. (honesty, peacefulness, and incompetent driver are character traits); MICHAEL 
R. FONTHAM, TRIAL TECHNIQUE AND EVIDENCE 155 (3d ed. 2008) (competence, industriousness, 
carefulness, and klutziness); Sevier, supra note 5, at 448; United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (diligence). 
431. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 84, 86, 87 (strength, mental powers, and skill are not character 
traits); 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5233.2 (physical characteristics); United States v. West, 670 
F.2d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1982) (intelligence); United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 138 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1991) (slowness to answer, forgetfulness, and poor ability to express oneself).  But see MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4.23 (personal skills or capacities are not character, but being highly 
athletic is character); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 304 (quoted in supra note 427); H. Richard 
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 879 (1982) (referring to “criminal sophistication” as character trait).  
432. The answer has significant ramifications for discrimination lawsuits.  See Lisa Marshall, 
The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment 
Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1071 (2005) (arguing that courts ignore Rule 404 when they 
admit evidence of past acts of discrimination in employment discrimination cases).  
433. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: 
FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS (2d ed. 1992). 
434. See, e.g., Ford v. John Does, 198 F.3d 245, *9–10 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table) (allowing 
testimony about symptoms and behaviors of schizophrenia); Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 901 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contrasting character traits 
to medical conditions); cf. United States v. Bindley, 157 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 1998) (admitting 
evidence of defendant’s schizophrenia without mention of Rule 404); Koch v. Sports Health Home 
Care Corp., 54 F.3d 773, *3, *9–12 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that court had previously allowed evidence 
of epilepsy to prove propensity and affirming admission that plaintiff suffered from major depression 
to prove her wound was self-inflicted); United States v. Revel, 971 F.2d 656, 659 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(discussing, without mentioning Rule 404, evidence that defendant suffered from schizophrenia and 
could not form requisite intent). 
435. DSM, supra note 44, at 490–503, 540–50 (alcohol-related disorders and opioid-related 
disorders); see Ortiz v. City of New York, No. 15cv2206 (DLC), 2017 WL 5613735, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
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treated by courts and commentators alike as a character trait whose 
admissibility is subject to the Rule 404(b).436  Judge Posner’s “firebug” may be 
a pyromaniac,437 Winona Ryder, a kleptomaniac;438 a mother who repeatedly 
visits illness upon her child might suffer from Munchausen Syndrome By 
Proxy,439 a serial assaulter, from intermittent explosive disorder.440  Then there 
is sexuality.  Traditionally, a sexually-active woman was considered 
promiscuous, and courts treated promiscuity as a character trait441—albeit one 
which, until the latter part of the twentieth century, they were all too willing to 
admit despite the character-evidence rule.442  Not that long ago, courts debated 
whether homosexuality should be treated as a character trait.443  Even for those 
 
Nov. 21, 2017) (“While discussions of the admissibility of evidence of alcohol abuse and alcoholism 
have existed mainly in the context of character and habit evidence, there is reason for courts to 
understand alcoholism outside these bounds.  Today, alcoholism is considered as much a disease as a 
reflection of character or habit.” (citation omitted)). 
436. E.g., United States v. Kadouh, 768 F.2d 20, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1985) (treating cocaine 
addiction as character, but admissible to prove motive); Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 589 F.2d 791, 794 
(5th Cir. 1979) (excluding evidence of “character trait of drinking to excess”); United States v. Tan, 
254 F.3d 1204, 1208–14 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding evidence of defendant’s prior drunk driving offenses 
may be admissible to prove defendant’s awareness of risk, but remanding with instructions to conduct 
Rule 403 balancing); United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding evidence 
of previous intoxication inadmissible to prove propensity, but admissible to prove defendant’s 
awareness of risk).  Despite treating addiction as a character trait, courts often find evidence of a 
defendant’s addiction probative of motive and, therefore, admissible under Rule 404(b).  See supra 
notes 265–66.  See generally Davis, supra note 266, at 631–37. 
437. See supra text accompanying notes 271–73 and infra text accompanying note 480. 
438. See supra text accompanying notes 276–79 and infra text accompanying note 481. 
439. See supra text accompanying notes 42–49 and infra text accompanying note 496. 
440. See infra text accompanying notes 482, 487; Laprime v. Pallazzo, 100 F.3d 953, *1 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had anti-social personality 
disorder); State v. Ferguson, 803 P.2d 676, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting claim that comment 
that defendant was “paranoid” violated character-evidence rule). 
441. They also regarded its opposite—chastity—as a character trait.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) 
advisory committee’s note (1972). 
442. See generally Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the 
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977).  Rule 412 now addresses the admissibility of evidence of a 
person’s prior sexual conduct, and Rules 413–415 govern the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual 
assaults and other misconduct.  FED. R. EVID. 412–415. 
443. See, e.g., Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 901 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Swygert, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing whether “homosexuality is more like a medical 
condition than a character trait”); State v. Williams, 874 P.2d 12, 25 (N.M. 1994) (Montgomery, C.J., 
concurring) (concluding that “enjoyment of anal sex—even if described as a ‘disposition’ or a 
‘propensity,’ is more like a physical or mental characteristic, testimony concerning which is not 
precluded by Rule 404, than it is like a generalized trait similar to honesty, temperance, or 
peacefulness”); cf. Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1981) (treating bisexuality as character).  
Until 1973, the American Psychiatric Association considered homosexuality a disease.  Jack Drescher, 
Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565, 565 (2015). 
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who believe that character traits are limited to those with moral overtones, 
deciding which of these involve moral overtones is no easy task.444  Some 
mental illness may tend to foreclose moral judgment,445 but others—like some 
of the ones just mentioned—may well call forth moral condemnation.446  
Depending on the situation, an attribute may elicit praise or condemnation.  We 
laud the airline pilot who coolly and unemotionally responds to crisis and lands 
the plane,447 while decrying the family member who coolly and unemotionally 
responds to the death of a child.448  An understanding of what the character 
evidence rule covers demands resolution of what attributes count as character. 
Regarding the second dimension, evidence law has long done little more 
than contrast character evidence with habit evidence.  Habit is admissible to 
prove propensity,449 character is not.450  The distinction between habit and 
character rests on the specificity of the conduct.451  McCormick famously 
described character as “a generalized description of one’s disposition, or of 
one’s disposition in respect to a general trait”; habit, on the other hand, is “more 
specific” and “describes one’s regular response to a repeated specific 
 
444. In one of the few sustained efforts to define character, Barrett Anderson argues morality is 
the factor that distinguishes character from noncharacter propensities.  Anderson, supra note 417, at 
1936–45.  His solution is to assign the trial judge the task of subjectively determining “whether, more 
likely than not, the average juror from the community would find morality implicated by the proof of 
a trait.”  Id. at 1952 (footnote omitted).  He quickly concedes, however, that, while some traits are easy 
to categorize, others are not, and offers little more than cursory guidance as to how a court should 
discharge its obligation.  Id. at 1953–54.  
445. The criminal law bases the insanity defense on lack of moral responsibility.  WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a) (5th ed. 2010). 
446. 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5233, at 28. 
447. See SULLY (Village Roadshow Pictures 2016). 
448. See THE QUEEN (Granada Productions 2006); cf. Becky Krystal, Chuck Yeager, Test Pilot 
Who Broke Sound Barrier, Dies at 97, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/chuck-yeager-dead/2020/12/07/d88a6bc8-3906-
11eb-9276-ae0ca72729be_story.html [https://perma.cc/54W6-W9GE] (noting that when Yeager’s 
older brother accidentally shot and killed his infant sister, Yeager’s father “[r]ather than erupting in 
hysterics, . . . calmly told his children, ‘I want to show you how to safely handle firearms.’”).  
449. FED. R. EVID. 406. 
450. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
451. Crawford v. Tribeca Lending Corp., 815 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2016).  The primary 
explanation for the different treatment of character and habit evidence is that habit evidence is 
substantially more probative of how a person behaved on a given occasion than is character.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 406 advisory committee’s note (1972) (“Agreement is general that habit evidence is highly 
persuasive as proof of conduct on a particular occasion.”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 
201, § 195.  Another theme, however, is that habit evidence is less likely to be morally tinged, and, 
therefore, poses less risk of unfair prejudice.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:21.  
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situation.”452  Honesty and peacefulness illustrate character; routinely going 
down a particular staircase two steps at a time illustrates habit.453  Most 
commentators, courts, and rule drafters have long been content to rely on this 
dichotomy. 454  But generalized descriptions of disposition and habit describe 
two ends of a spectrum.455  A broad array of conduct falls between the two.  Just 
because something doesn’t qualify as a habit doesn’t make it character.  People 
may engage in fairly specific conduct but with insufficient regularity and 
frequency to qualify it as habit.456  Courting a series of unmarried women with 
children who have life insurance and attempting to collect the insurance 
proceeds when they wind up dead may not qualify as habit evidence, but that 
doesn’t mean it is character evidence.  The challenge is to recognize that much 
lies between generalized descriptions of disposition and habit and then to 
articulate how much of the spectrum should fall within the character-evidence 
rule.457  
 
452. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee note (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 162 
(John W. Strong ed., 1954)).  The Model Code of Evidence defined habit as “a course of behavior of 
a person regularly repeated in like circumstances.”  MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 307(1). 
453. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee note. 
454. E.g., WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 63, § 404.3 (“While gradations of gray 
undoubtedly exist between these polar concepts, the law requires designation of the propensity as either 
character or habit to determine whether Rule 404 or Rule 406 applies.”); Sandifer v. Hoyt Archery, 
Inc., 907 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the line between inadmissible character 
evidence and admissible habit evidence” quite often “may become blurred” (quoting Reyes v. Mo. Pac. 
R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794–95 (5th Cir. 1979))); Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 
1519, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The difficulty in distinguishing inadmissible character evidence from 
admissible habit evidence is great.”); FED. R. EVID. 404, 406; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 304, 
307.  But see infra text accompanying notes 504–15. 
455. Despite this, some of the definitions of character that have been offered are broad enough 
to embrace both character and habit.  For example, one of the leading treatises for students defines 
character as “a person’s disposition or propensity to engage or not engage in various forms of conduct.”  
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 
§ 4.11, at 191 (4th ed. 2012); see also State v. Dan, 20 P.3d 829, 831 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (character 
means “a person’s disposition or propensity towards certain behavior” or “a person’s tendency to act 
in a certain way in all varying situations of life” (quoting State v. Carr, 725 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Or. 
1986))). 
456. Conduct must be engaged in both frequently and regularly to qualify as habit.  See GOODE 
& WELLBORN, supra note 80, at 308.  
457. More precisely, it is the relationship between the other-acts evidence and the charged 
conduct that determines whether a character-propensity inference is needed.  Evidence that a person 
always gripped the handrail while going down a particular flight of steps would be admissible as habit 
evidence to prove the person gripped the handrail while going down that particular flight of steps on a 
particular occasion.  But if offered to prove that the person drove cautiously on a particular occasion, 
the same evidence would be inadmissible character evidence.  See Fed. R. Evid. 406 advisory 
committee’s note (1972). 
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Ultimately, we must acknowledge forthrightly that character—for purposes 
of Rule 404(b)—is purely a legal construct.458  Only someone who has gone to 
law school would think of “bank robber” as a character trait.  But Rule 404(b) 
ordinarily precludes a prosecutor from offering evidence that a defendant on 
trial for bank robbery had previously committed two bank robberies.  The 
paradigmatic example of inadmissible other-acts evidence is that the defendant 
has previously committed the same type of crime as the one for which he now 
stands charged.459  Therefore, we cannot simply turn to definitions of character 
that lexicographers provide us.460  Nor can philosophers provide guidance, even 
though they have been exploring the nature of character for thousands of 
years.461  Their quest to explicate moral virtue, ponder what constitutes the life 
well-lived, or discern right from wrong simply does not speak to how character 
should be defined for purposes of the character-evidence rule.462  Likewise, 
social and personality psychologists’ study of generalized character traits463 
yields little insight into how other-acts evidence should be treated.464  Rule 
404(b) aims to help factfinders deduce what happened on a particular occasion.  
Its concern is whether information about a person’s “character” helps a jury 
 
458. In contrast, Professor Graham contends that character “is most accurately conceived as a 
social and cultural construct.”  22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5233.2.  While that conception may be 
helpful in understanding how society generally views character, it ignores the underlying purpose of 
the character-evidence rule and sabotages his attempt to come to a meaningful definition of character 
for purposes of Rule 404(b).  See also Blinka, supra note 403 (character must be understood as a social 
construct). 
459. Roger Park described this as a Level Two propensity to distinguish it from more broadly 
described attributes.  Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 718–19. 
460. Even if we did, dictionary definitions of character are as ambiguous as those offered by 
courts and commentators.  For example, the Oxford English Dictionary offers as its first relevant 
definition: “The sum of the moral and mental qualities which distinguish an individual or a people, 
viewed as a homogeneous whole; a person’s or group’s individuality deriving from environment, 
culture, experience, etc.; mental or moral constitution, personality.”  Character, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014).   
461. See generally Marcia Homiak, Moral Character, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/moral-character/ [https://perma.cc/PTR2-DGY2]; 
Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 35, 42–51 (1998); Joel J. Kupperman, The Indispensability of Character, 76 PHIL. 
239 (2001); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 905 
(1973).  
462. See, e.g., JOHN DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER 1 (2002); Candace L. Upton, The Structure 
of Character, 13 J. ETHICS 175, 176 (2009) (“Character trait attributions should enable us morally to 
appraise ourselves and others . . . .”); Lelling, supra note 461, at 42–43 (discussing Aristotle’s view of 
character). 
463. See supra note 353 and text accompanying notes 390–97. 
464. Aside from lexicographers, philosophers, and social and personality psychologists, many 
others have assayed the nature of character.  See generally MARJORIE GARBER, CHARACTER: THE 
HISTORY OF A CULTURAL OBSESSION (2020). 
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determine accurately the facts of the case.  Character, therefore, must be defined 
in a way that corresponds to this underlying rationale for Rule 404(b).  
C.  Grappling with Character 
i.  Personal Attributes and Medical or Psychological Conditions 
I first consider whether personal attributes that may be considered 
attitudinal should be considered character and then turn to attributes that can be 
described as a medical or psychological condition.  I conclude that neither 
should be classified as character. 
Evidence that a person is a racist, sexist, ageist, misogynist, or homophobe 
should not be categorically excluded by Rule 404(b).  At the outset, these can 
more appropriately be described as comprising a constellation of beliefs rather 
than anything we would typically think of as character.  If these are considered 
character, what about other attitudinal attributes, like being an atheist, cultist, 
anti-Zionist, or Islamaphobe?  More important, treating attitudinal attributes as 
character conflicts with the accuracy concerns underlying Rule 404(b).  The 
case for concluding that this type of evidence is categorically more prejudicial 
than probative is weak.  To be sure, someone who is a racist does not always 
act in a discriminatory manner, and this type of evidence undoubtedly carries 
the risk of unfair prejudice.  But classifying attitudes as character would result 
in their being categorically inadmissible for a propensity inference.  In a 
prosecution for the murder of a gay victim, evidence that the defendant spouted 
homophobic vitriol would be inadmissible.465  Likewise, in a prosecution for 
bombing a mosque or a synagogue, evidence of the defendant’s anti-Muslim or 
anti-Semitic views would be categorically excluded.  It is hard to imagine a 
world in which courts would categorically exclude such evidence, and they do 
not.  But instead of simply stating that this is not character evidence, courts 
ignore the problem466 or invoke one or more of the permissible purposes listed 
 
465. Of course, if the defendant were charged with a hate crime, the evidence would be 
admissible because the defendant’s hate-based motive would be an element of the crime.  For that 
purpose, its probative value would not require a propensity inference.  See United States v. Jenkins, 
120 F. Supp. 3d 650, 658 n.8 (D. Ky. 2013) (noting that such evidence was admitted in hate-based-
crime trial under 18 U.S.C. § 249).  All but five states have hate-crime laws; about 30 states include 
crimes based on sexual orientation.  State Scorecards, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/state-scorecards [https://perma.cc/DDR3-NKSF].  
466. See Marshall, supra note 432, at 1072 (“Faced with a discrimination plaintiff offering proof, 
courts respond to the mandates of Rule 404 in one of two ways: They either ignore the Rule or misapply 
it.”).  
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in Rule 404(b),467 with motive as the preferred choice.468  But as explained 
earlier, this is pure propensity reasoning.469  To say that being a racist gives 
someone a motive for acting in a racist way is to fall prey to tautology.  
Removing such attitudinal attributes from the class of character evidence 
does not mean that this type of evidence is freely admissible.  It merely relegates 
its admissibility—at least in terms of probative value and prejudicial risk 
concerns—to case-by-case adjudication under Rule 403.  A recent murder trial 
in Ohio illustrates how this works.  Ray Tensing, a police officer at the 
University of Cincinnati, stopped Samuel DuBose for driving with a missing 
license plate.470  After a several minute exchange, DuBose, who was black and 
unarmed, suddenly started his car and began driving off.471  Tensing shot and 
killed DuBose.472  Charged with murder, Tensing claimed he shot DuBose 
because his arm was caught in the car and he was being dragged off.473  The 
entire incident was captured on the officer’s bodycam.474  At Tensing’s trial, 
the prosecution introduced evidence that, when he shot DuBose, Tensing was 
wearing, under his uniform, a T-shirt with a picture of a confederate flag.475  
The jury hung.476  When the case was retried, the new trial judge excluded 
 
467. See, e.g., Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 998–1000 (Colo. 2002) (treating misogyny as 
character evidence, but upholding admission of evidence of defendant’s misogyny to prove motive). 
468. See, e.g., Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 
“numerous cases which have held that, as a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior discriminatory 
treatment of a plaintiff or other employees is relevant and admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to establish whether a defendant’s employment action against an employee was motivated 
by invidious discrimination”).  But cf. United States v. Hazelwood, 979 F.3d 398, 408–11 (6th Cir. 
2020) (treating defendant’s racist statements as character evidence but rejecting prosecution’s 
argument that evidence was admissible for non-character purpose). 
469. See supra Part III.E. 
470. Jess Bidgood & Richard Pérez-Peña, Mistrial in Cincinnati Shooting as Officer Is Latest 
Not to Be Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/us/raymond-
tensing-samuel-dubose-cincinnati.html [https://perma.cc/TJF3-M8TM]. 
471. Id. 
472. Lisa Cornwell, Deadlocked Jurors Force Mistrial in Police Shooting, Protestors March 
Through Cincinnati After Decision, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 13, 2016, at B5. 
473. Id. 
474. Id. 
475. Kevin Grasha & Sharon Coolidge, Trial Revelation: Tensing Wore Confederate Flag Shirt 
Under Uniform, ENQUIRER (Nov. 4, 2016, 6:29 AM), 
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/tensing/2016/11/04/what-expect-friday-tensing-murder-
trial/93257366/ [https://perma.cc/W7ZU-MNLR].  The reaction was predictable.  The victim’s fiancée 
remarked, “It says a lot about the nature of his intent, and the person he is.”  Id.  A state senator, 
observing the trial, commented, “[I]t speaks to Tensing’s mindset.”  Id.  The prosecution also offered 
evidence that 80% of Tensing’s traffic stops involved black drivers.  Cornwell, supra note 472. 
476. Cornwell, supra note 472. 
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evidence of the T-shirt on Rule 403 grounds.477  Once again, the jury hung.478  
Both the decision to admit and to exclude this evidence seem reasonable calls 
by the respective trial judges.  The evidence was both probative and prejudicial, 
and reasonable minds could differ about the balance between the two.  What 
does not seem reasonable is deciding that this type of evidence should be 
categorically excluded from the factfinding process. 
Although diseases like epilepsy or schizophrenia have traditionally not 
fallen under the character umbrella, determining how to handle the wide array 
of mental disorders modern psychiatry recognizes is highly problematic.  In 
addition to alcoholism and drug addiction,479 the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) includes a host of 
mental disorders that may well be offered to prove that a defendant committed 
a charged crime: pyromania,480 kleptomania,481 intermittent explosive 
disorder,482 a range of paraphilic disorders—including voyeurist,483 
exhibitionist,484 and pedophilic disorders485—and the highly general diagnosis 
of conduct disorder.486  What is troublesome about many of these is that their 
diagnostic criteria often seem to be dominated by the repeated occurrence of 
the behavior; that is, by the type of other-acts evidence that has traditionally 
been considered character evidence.  Classifying a mental disorder (as opposed 
to the underlying conduct) as noncharacter, therefore, would give prosecutors 
an easy opportunity to circumvent Rule 404(b).  
Consider, for example, intermittent explosive disorder (IED).  A diagnosis 
of IED can be made when the following criteria are met: a person has three 
behavioral outbursts in one year that involve property damage or physical 
assault and that are neither premeditated nor designed to achieve some tangible 
objective; the level of aggressiveness displayed is grossly out of proportion to 
the provocation or to any precipitating psychosocial stressors; the outbursts are 
 
477. Dan Sewell, Judge: No Confederate Flag T-shirt in Officer’s Retrial, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS, May 27, 2017, at B6. 
478. Bidgood & Pérez-Peña, supra note 470.  
479. DSM, supra note 44, at 481–590.  In its chapter on substance-related and addictive 
disorders, DSM-5 includes alcoholism under alcohol-related disorders.  Id. at 490–503.  This chapter 
also catalogs a number of different types of drug addictions, such as opioid-related disorders, id. at 
540–50, and stimulant-related disorders, id. at 561–70.  
480. Id. at 476–77. 
481. Id. at 478–79. 
482. Id. at 466. 
483. Id. at 686–88. 
484. Id. at 689–91. 
485. Id. at 697–700. 
486. Id. at 469–71. 
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associated with financial or legal consequences; and the outbursts are not 
explained by or attributable to another mental disorder, medical condition, or 
the physiological effects of a substance.487  
Pedophilic disorder provides an even more dramatic example.  For anyone 
over the age of eighteen, only two criteria must be met.  First, in a six-month 
period, the person must have “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child 
or children”; second, either the person must have acted on these sexual urges or 
the sexual urges or fantasies must have caused marked distress or interpersonal 
difficulty.488  But the DSM’s discussion of the diagnostic features of this 
disorder makes clear that the diagnosis may be made solely on the basis of 
recurrent behavior involving sexual activity with a child over at least a six-
month period.489  In other words, evidence of a few other acts is enough to 
diagnose someone as suffering from pedophilic disorder. 
These examples are sobering.  It would seem to make little sense to 
categorically exclude evidence that a defendant engaged in the behaviors that 
comprise the mental disorder but allow an expert to testify that the defendant 
suffers from the mental disorder that the behaviors manifest.  This would be 
especially problematic if the expert were allowed to relate the behaviors in 
explaining the basis for her opinion.490  Classifying mental disorders as 
noncharacter evidence would authorize courts to allow such testimony.  
On the other hand, classifying mental disorders as character evidence would 
result in the exclusion of highly probative evidence of the type courts frequently 
allow.491  For example, if Battered Woman’s Syndrome (BWS)—a form of 
posttraumatic stress disorder492—were considered a character trait, evidence 
that a woman suffered from it would ordinarily be inadmissible to prove how 
she acted on a particular occasion.  But court acceptance of such evidence to 
 
487. Id. at 466. 
488. Id. at 697. 
489. Regarding individuals who deny fantasies or urges involving children, or distress or 
interpersonal difficulty resulting therefrom, the DSM says: “Such individuals may still be diagnosed 
with pedophilic disorder . . . provided that there is evidence of recurrent behaviors persisting for 6 
months . . . and evidence that the individual has acted on sexual urges . . . . Presence of multiple 
victims . . . is sufficient but not necessary for diagnosis . . . .”  Id. at 698. 
490. See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
491. The reference here is solely to situations where evidence of a mental disorder is being 
offered to prove that the person acted in accordance with that mental disorder on a particular occasion.  
Even if classified as character evidence, proof of a mental disorder would still be admissible when 
character was itself an essential element of a claim or defense, as is the case when a defendant raises 
an insanity defense.  
492. See Andrew P. Levin, Stuart B. Kleinman & John S. Adler, DSM-5 and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 146, 154 (2014).  
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prove that a woman acted in self-defense or under duress493 is widespread.494  
Testimony that a victim suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder is also used 
to explain, for example, a child-victim’s failure to promptly report episodes of 
sexual abuse.495  Courts admit evidence that a defendant suffers from 
Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy496 to prove that the defendant injured a child 
as charged.497  Evidence of drug addiction and alcoholism is widely admitted,498 
 
493. Under an exception to Rule 404(a), criminal defendants may offer character evidence to 
prove they acted in accordance with their character on a particular occasion.  FED. R. EVID. 
404(a)(2)(A).  But in states like Washington, which does not permit opinion testimony to prove 
character, WASH. R. EVID. 405, expert testimony could not be admitted under this exception.  To justify 
admitting BWS evidence, therefore, the Washington Supreme Court resorted to sleight of hand.  It 
denied that the evidence was offered as character evidence, contending instead that it was used only to 
aid the jury in determining whether the defendant was reasonable in believing that she faced imminent 
serious bodily injury.  State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984).  Even in states where opinion 
evidence is permitted to prove character, many courts have sanctioned BWS evidence without invoking 
the Rule 404(a) exception or its state equivalent.  For example, both the majority and concurring 
opinions in State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984), one of the earliest cases to sanction admission of 
BWS evidence, discuss at length the relevancy of such evidence and whether it is a proper subject for 
expert testimony, but never mention that it involves character evidence.  See also Ibn-Tamas v. United 
States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (no mention of character evidence); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 
892 (Me. 1981) (same).  See generally Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1988) (extensively 
discussing admissibility issues and never mentioning character evidence or Rule 404).  But see State 
v. Curley, 250 So.3d 236, 246–47 (La. 2018) (citing relevant exception to state character evidence 
rule).  
494. Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322 (2012) (“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, what became known as 
battered woman self-defense achieved acceptance within the case law of numerous states.” (emphasis 
in original)); Lauren Champaign, Battered Woman Syndrome, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 59, 59–60 
(2010) (“Today, every jurisdiction accepts expert testimony on BWS to support claims of self-defense, 
and several states have codified its use.”).  See generally CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE 
HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, 
EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 12.1–
.17 (2019–20 ed.). 
495. E.g., United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997); People v. Fasy, 829 
P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. 1992); People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 871 (Mich. 1995); People v. 
Carroll, 740 N.E.2d 1084, 1090–91 (N.Y. 2000).  
496. In the DSM-5, Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy is now called Factitious Disorder Imposed 
on Another.  DSM, supra note 44, at 325. 
497. E.g., State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 895 (S.C. 2005); Williamson v. State, 356 S.W.3d 1, 
22–23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801, 804–08 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).   
498. Courts most often say it is being offered for a nonpropensity purpose, typically, to show 
motive, see supra note 436, or because the person’s drinking habits qualified as habit.  See Loughan v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1523–24 (11th Cir. 1985) (admitting evidence that 
defendant drank too much because it constituted habit, not character); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 
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and for good reason: the link between substance abuse and crime is strong.499  
The case that the probative value of mental disorders taken as a whole is 
categorically outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice cannot be sustained.  
If evidence of at least some mental disorders should not be categorically 
excluded, two options are available.  First, courts might pick and choose which 
mental disorders qualify as character and which do not.  But it is hard to imagine 
how courts would do so in a principled way.  Determining the categorical 
balance of probative value and prejudicial risk of one mental disorder as 
opposed to another would be a daunting task.  Labeling, say, pedophilic 
disorder a character trait and Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy noncharacter 
(or vice-versa) would certainly perplex many an observer.500  Moreover, it is 
highly likely that different courts would reach different conclusions about a 
mental disorder; pedophilic disorder would be a character trait in some 
jurisdictions and not in others.501  In all probability, a court’s determination 
would more likely be affected by its view of the probative value of the disorder 
 
F.2d 1265, 1268–69 (8th Cir. 1984) (drinking “habits”); State v. Kately, 637 A.2d 214, 216–18 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (admitting evidence that defendant and friends had habit of drinking beer 
nightly). 
499. See Trevor Bennett & Jason Edwards, What Has Been Learned from Research on the 
Drugs–Crime Connection?, in THE HANDBOOK OF DRUGS AND SOCIETY (Henry H. Brownstein ed., 
2016); Davis, supra note 266, at 620; Matthias Pierce, Karen Hayhurst, Sheila M. Bird, Matthew 
Hickman, Toby Seddon, Graham Dunn & Tim Millar, Insights Into the Link Between Drug Use and 
Criminality: Lifetime Offending of Criminally-Active Opiate Users, 179 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 309 (2017), doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2017.07.024; Frank A. Sloan, Lindsey M. Chepke 
& Dontrell V. Davis, Addiction, Drinking Behavior, and Driving Under the Influence, 49 SUBSTANCE 
USE & MISUSE 661 (2014), doi:10.3109/10826084.2013.858167; see also Park, Character at the 
Crossroads, supra note 3, at 726 (discussing North Carolina study of fatal car accidents that 
demonstrated very strong link between prior driving-while-intoxicated arrest and being victim of fatal 
car accident while intoxicated). 
500. It is true that Rules 413–415, by exempting evidence of sexual assaults and child 
molestations from the ban on character evidence, manifest a determination by Congress that this type 
of evidence is categorically more probative than prejudicial.  But that was a highly controversial 
decision and many states have resisted adopting similar provisions.  See, e.g., 23 GRAHAM, supra note 
34, § 5381 n. 36 (listing only a handful of states that have adopted version of Rule 413).  Moreover, 
Congress did not declare that this was not character evidence.  To the contrary, Federal Rules 413–415 
provide that such evidence may be considered on any matter as to which it is relevant.  FED. R. EVID. 
413–415.  See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that Rule 414 
authorizes admission of defendant’s prior acts to prove “disposition of character”). 
501. Nearly twenty years ago, Professor Leonard argued that whether a particular medical 
condition should be considered character evidence should turn on the degree of scientific consensus 
and whether jurors were likely to view the person as suffering from a medical condition or a character 
defect.  Leonard, Character and Motive, supra note 6, at 529–35.  This view, however, focuses only 
on the unfair prejudice side of the balance.  Likewise, Barrett Anderson concentrated primarily on the 
moral implications jurors would draw and the consequent dangers of unfair prejudice.  Anderson, supra 
note 417, at 1951–55. 
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in the particular circumstances posed by the case of first impression rather than 
a judgment about the disorder’s categorical probative value. 
The alternative is that all mental disorders should be considered 
noncharacter.  This, too, is hardly an appealing option.  It could certainly be 
argued that it cedes too much power to psychologists and psychiatrists to 
determine what is inadmissible character evidence and what is not.  
Nevertheless, it is the option I prefer.  Casting all psychological diseases as 
character would render all such evidence inadmissible when offered for a 
propensity inference and thereby vest even more power in the therapeutic 
community.  As I argued with respect to how to classify attitudinal attributes, 
treating diseases as noncharacter has the virtue of merely relegating admission 
decisions to case-by-case adjudications under Rule 403.  Unfortunately, that is 
also its vice: trial judges have not been nearly as punctilious in excluding 
unreliable expert testimony in criminal cases as they have on the civil side of 
the docket.502  Trial judges should be especially cautious in admitting testimony 
about a mental condition offered for a propensity inference.  The more the 
diagnosis is simply based on otherwise inadmissible other acts, the more trial 
judges should hesitate to admit the evidence.  Trial judges should also be 
especially attentive to the probative power of the evidence in the context of the 
case.  A motion in limine hearing, for example, might reveal that a defendant’s 
posttraumatic stress syndrome typically manifests itself under certain 
circumstances.  If those circumstances do not match well with the particulars 
of the case, the court should reject the testimony.  If they do, the court might 
admit it.  Even so, the court should be careful to limit the witness’s ability to 
testify about the instances of the person’s conduct that led the expert to the 
diagnosis.503  Clearly this is not an ideal solution.  The best argument I can make 
for it—and it is one I make with some trepidation—is that it is better than either 
the alternative approach or the status quo. 
ii.  Specific Propensity 
It is time to examine how the specificity of other-acts conduct affects 
whether it should be considered character evidence.  We can picture other-acts 
evidence offered for a propensity purpose as falling on a spectrum.  The current 
state of Rule 404(b) law does little more than identify three points on this 
 
502. See, e.g., Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some 
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) 107, 109 (2005); Munia Jabbar, 
Note, Overcoming Daubert’s Shortcomings in Criminal Trials: Making the Error Rate the Primary 
Factor in Daubert’s Validity Inquiry, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2034, 2046 (2010). 
503. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the 
proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury 
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”).   
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spectrum.  At the far left lies pure character-propensity evidence: proof that a 
defendant had committed other crimes that share nothing in common with the 
charged crime other than they manifest the same character trait.  If a defendant 
were on trial for securities fraud, evidence that she had previously been 
convicted of perjury and of evidence tampering would be probative only 
because the other acts tend to show her dishonest character.  At the far right of 
the spectrum lies habit evidence: highly specific conduct offered to prove the 
person behaved in that highly specific way on a particular occasion.  Evidence 
that a defendant always stopped at a particular bar on his way home from work 
on Thursdays and had three martinis would be admissible to prove that he 
stopped at that bar and had three martinis on his way home from work on a 
given Thursday.  Between these end points lies same-crime evidence: proof that 
a defendant had previously committed the same crime for which he now stands 
trial.  As we have seen, this is a paradigmatic form of inadmissible character 
evidence.   
It is the area of the spectrum between same-crime evidence and habit 
evidence that demands exploration.  A few commentators have briefly noted 
that some other-acts evidence that falls short of habit might not constitute 
character evidence.  In 1995, Professor Paul Rothstein proposed that some 
propensities are too specific to be called character504 but conceded that this was 
just a “tentative suggestion, admittedly somewhat incomplete.”505  It certainly 
was.  He offered only two examples—a female who rubbed up against male 
victims to distract them while she stole their wallets506 and drowning wealthy 
spouses in the bathtub507—and made no effort to provide any further guidance 
as to how to determine where character ends and specific propensity begins.  
Twenty years later, Rothstein briefly reprised this thought, but without 
advancing the ball.508  In the late-1990s, Professor Park likewise suggested that 
 
504. His discussion totaled two pages.  Rothstein, supra note 288, at 1264–65. 
505. Id. at 1264. 
506. This example came from Jones v. State, 376 S.W.2d 842, 842–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).  
See Rothstein, supra note 288, at 1261. 
507. Rothstein, supra note 288, at 1264.  Note that this is simply a gender-neutral “brides in the 
bath” example. 
508. Paul F. Rothstein, Comment: The Doctrine of Chances, Brides of the Bath and a Reply to 
Sean Sullivan, 14 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 51, 61 (2015).  Rothstein noted the difficulty of stating 
where the line should be drawn between general propensity and specific propensity.  Id.  The closest 
he came to articulating how this should be done was to list some of the acceptable uses for other-acts 
evidence set forth in Rule 404(b).  “‘Pattern’, ‘plan’, ‘motive’, ‘design’, ‘modus operandi’, etc. are 
appropriate words to apply to this evidence . . . because they involve reasoning based on non-
character-type propensity, i.e., specific propensity.”  Id. at 62 (emphasis in original).  This simply 
invites courts to continue to invoke these terms indiscriminately.  See supra Part III.  In his treatise, 
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if a propensity is sufficiently narrowly defined it is not a character propensity.  
But he too devoted little effort to articulating when propensity is sufficiently 
narrowly defined.509  Professor Richard Lempert and his co-authors have also 
argued that a character-propensity inference is absent when conduct reaches a 
certain level of specificity.510  Unlike Rothstein and Park, they offer a 
description of when this occurs.  But, perhaps because they tie it to their reading 
of the conclusions of social and personality psychologists,511 their description 
is far too narrow.  They say that other-acts evidence should be admissible when  
(1) the evidence reveals a behavioral trait that is highly specific 
in time and place (or sufficiently habitual that it semi-
automatically appears across time and space) and manifests 
itself in only a limited range of actions; and (2) the action 
alleged in the lawsuit occurred at or in that particular time, 
place and manner.512   
This would not seem to cover, for example, evidence that a defendant had 
previously courted a series of single mothers, all of whom wound up dead after 
he convinced them to buy life insurance and name him as beneficiary, offered 
to prove that his last wife’s mysterious death was murder.  It is hard to see how 
these actions reveal a behavioral trait that is highly specific in time and place 
 
Rothstein reverts to the traditional character/habit dichotomy.  ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at practice 
cmt I. 
509. Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, 718–20.  Park offered some examples, but 
only two are apposite: robbing banks using poetic threats and—of course—drowning brides in the bath 
after insuring their lives.  Id. at 719.  In another article, he offered a third example: lurking in the back 
seat of empty cars in a shopping center before sexually assaulting the car owner.  Park & Bryden, supra 
note 140, at 178.  Another of Park’s examples—warning dental patients of the dangers of anesthetic—
is easily classified as habit.  See, e.g., Kornberg v. United States, 693 F. App’x 542, 544 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that doctors’ regular practice of reviewing with patients the risks of surgery was admissible 
habit evidence); Jacob v. Kippax, 10 A.3d 1159, 1164 (Me. 2011) (holding admissible as habit 
evidence oral surgeon’s testimony about routine practices relating to tasks in issue); Dawkins v. 
Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1154–56 (R.I. 2011) (holding admissible doctor’s testimony about routine 
practice in dealing with patients with swelling or tenderness in snuffbox area of wrist).  Finally, other 
examples he gave do not rely on a propensity inference for their probative value.  For example, he 
listed abusing a particular spouse as an example of a sufficiently narrowly-defined propensity.  Park, 
Character at the Crossroads, supra note 3, at 719.  But when offered to prove the defendant spouse 
killed the victim spouse, evidence that the defendant had previously abused the victim speaks to the 
nature of the relationship between the two of them and the defendant’s motive to kill the victim.  No 
propensity inference is needed.  See supra note 239.  In contrast, if the same evidence were offered to 
prove that the abuser had killed someone else, it would be classic inadmissible character evidence.  
Finally, he suggested the use of gambling debts to prove a motive to embezzle, Park, Character at the 
Crossroads, supra note 3, at 720, but this too requires no propensity inference.  See supra note 265. 
510. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 384–86. 
511. Id. at 384 nn.57–58; see supra Part IV.D.  
512. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 384 
(emphasis in original).  
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or how the charged crime occurred at or in that “particular time, place and 
manner.”513  Nor could these actions be meaningfully said to be “sufficiently 
habitual” that the trait they reveal “semi-automatically appears across time and 
space.”514  In the end, Lempert and his co-authors concede that the line between 
character- and noncharacter-propensity-inferences “cannot be defined 
precisely.”515 
The failure of some of the most distinguished contemporary evidence 
scholars to articulate where character-propensity inferences end and 
noncharacter-propensity inferences begin—and the unwillingness of almost 
everyone else even to consider the issue—spotlights the difficulty of the task.  
Lempert and his co-authors are right: such a line cannot be precisely defined.  
But that does not mean that the enterprise should be abandoned.  Almost no one 
is satisfied with the current state of affairs in which courts profligately admit 
other-acts evidence either by mistakenly denying that it requires a propensity 
inference or by mindlessly invoking one or more of the permissible purposes 
listed in Rule 404(b)(2).  In this Part, I hope to stake out some broad principles 
and identify some markers in an attempt to locate and describe the noncharacter 
region of the spectrum.  I will try to articulate the factors courts should consider 
and provide guidance as to how demanding they should be.  I will then illustrate 
how I would apply these principles in the same way courts confront other such 
elusive questions: on a case-by-case basis.  
In determining whether other acts manifest a specific-enough propensity, 
the most important factors are the level of specificity of the other acts and the 
match to the charged crime.  Evidence that a defendant committed other crimes 
using the same unique manner as the charged crime—like the Wet Bandits—
should not be considered character evidence.  This type of modus operandi or 
signature evidence is especially probative because the factfinder is being asked 
to make only a small inferential leap: that someone who has previously 
committed a particular type of crime in a distinctive manner is the person who 
committed the same type of crime in the same distinctive manner.  Our 
experience tells us that someone who has repeatedly committed a particular 
type of crime in a distinctive way is likely to use the same methodology when 
 
513. It is not clear how the other acts and the action alleged in the lawsuit could occur “at or in 
that particular time, place and manner.”  By definition, other acts occur at different times and rarely in 
the same place. 
514. Indeed, this description does not seem even to account for some of the examples of 
noncharacter-propensity inferences they give.  They state that modus-operandi evidence falls within 
this heading.  But modus-operandi behavior also appears “across time and space” and can hardly said 
to be a form of “semi-automatic” behavior. 
515. LEMPERT, GROSS, LIEBMAN, BLUME, LANDSMAN & LEDERER, supra note 144, at 386. 
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committing other such crimes.  Moreover, it is unlikely that anyone else would 
have employed the same distinctive methodology.516  
But other acts committed without a “signature” methodology may still have 
sufficient specificity and match to escape characterization as character 
evidence.  The circumstances under which a defendant commits the same type 
of crime may be sufficiently specific and similar—even if the defendant 
executes the crime by different methods—to warrant labeling the other acts as 
noncharacter evidence.  Consider, for example, a defendant on trial for setting 
fire to an apartment building in a blighted neighborhood not long after he 
purchased it, announced he would renovate it, and insured it for an amount 
double the purchase price.  Proof that he had previously destroyed apartment 
buildings in other blighted neighborhoods soon after he purchased them and 
insured them for double the purchase price should not be considered character 
evidence, even if the defendant employed a variety of destructive means.517  
This is substantially more specific—and more probative—than offering 
evidence that a defendant had engaged in other acts of generic insurance 
fraud.518 
Courts must demand, however, that the similarities between the other acts 
and the charged crime are meaningful.  Lawyers are especially skilled in 
highlighting similarities, even if they are meaningless.  The way in which courts 
have admitted other-acts evidence to show modus operandi should read as a 
cautionary tale.  The law is littered with cases in which the “distinctive” 
similarities between the other acts and the charged crime are either contrived or 
commonplace.519 
 
516. Admittedly, the possibility of a copycat criminal exists.  Discussions of copycat crimes, 
however, usually refer to crimes that were inspired by another’s criminal acts, real or fictional.  See, 
e.g., Ryan Bort, Zach Schonfeld & Stan Ziv, Eight Horrible Real-Life Crimes That Were Inspired by 
a Movie (or Novel), NEWSWEEK (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/nine-horrible-real-life-
crimes-were-inspired-movie-or-novel-583828 [https://perma.cc/E2GB-9QGX]. 
517. See, e.g., State v. Shindell, 486 A.2d 637, 639–42 (Conn. 1985) (involving destruction of 
buildings by hand and by fire); United States v. DeCicco, 370 F.3d 206, 209, 213 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(holding trial court erred in excluding evidence that defendant had previously twice tried to burn down 
same warehouse that was subject of charged arson).  
518. Defendant’s other arsons in United States v. Pritchard, 964 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2020), for 
example, lack the requisite specificity and similarity.  The charged crime involved arson of defendant’s 
own house to collect fire insurance.  Id. at 517–18.  The other-acts were setting fires to a close friend’s 
house and the defendant’s and a niece’s car, all to collect insurance.  Id.  The Sixth Circuit, however, 
found that the evidence was admitted for a nonpropensity purpose.  Id. at 524.  The defendant 
convinced his wife to join in his plan to burn down their house by telling her about the previous arsons.  
Id.  
519. See supra note 213 and text accompanying notes 219–33 and infra text accompanying notes 
551–65. 
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Beyond specificity and match, the frequency with which a defendant has 
engaged in the other-acts behavior may be an important, although not 
necessarily determinative, factor.  We certainly want to allow evidence of 
conduct that fails to qualify as a habit only because it falls somewhat short of 
the frequency and regularity that habit evidence requires.520  Evidence that a 
defendant downs at least two stiff drinks five nights out of seven might not be 
sufficient to establish a habit.521  But it should be probative enough not to be 
categorically excluded as proof that she had been drinking on the night she 
allegedly killed a pedestrian in a hit-and-run accident.  So should some other-
acts evidence that occurs less frequently or regularly than near-miss habit 
evidence.  Noncharacter evidence may include other acts that have occurred 
only a small number of times if sufficiently specific and similar.  The Wet 
Bandits, for example, may have had time to stuff the sink drain and leave the 
water running in only three of twelve burglaries.  That they did so those three 
times should be admissible to prove they committed the charged burglary, 
which involved a stuffed drain and running water. 
The similarity of triggering circumstances and temporal proximity should 
also be considered.  Evidence that a defendant drank five nights out of seven 
several years before when she was desperately unhappy says little about the 
defendant’s propensity to drink if the defendant was regularly attending 
Alcoholics Anonymous and in a good psychological state at the time of the 
alleged hit-and-run accident.522  Other acts that occurred in the distant past, 
especially if they have gone unrepeated in the intervening years, are likely to 
have little probative value in demonstrating a specific propensity to commit the 
charged conduct. 
These factors all are aimed at identifying those types of other acts whose 
categorically high probative value tips the scales in favor of admissibility.  On 
the prejudice side of the scales, however, there is little reason to believe that 
these types of other acts categorically involve additional danger of prejudicial 
effect.  If anything, the danger that the jury will give too much weight to the 
evidence because of cognitive errors likely lessens as the other acts reflect a 
more specific propensity rather than a general disposition.  Nor should the 
danger of nullification increase just because the defendant’s past criminality 
involved more specific means.  And while a defendant’s specific modus 
 
520. See GOODE & WELLBORN, supra note 80, at 308. 
521. See United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that two factors 
for determining “whether a behavior pattern has matured into a habit” are adequacy of sampling and 
uniformity of response). 
522. Cf. Hasan v. AIG Prop. Cas. Co., 935 F.3d 1092, 1100 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
business’s routine practice of purchasing wine for plaintiffs before bankruptcy did not establish that 
business purchased wine for plaintiffs after it became insolvent). 
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operandi may increase the likelihood that the police arrested him because they 
“rounded up the usual suspect,” it does not increase the likelihood that an 
innocent person was arrested.  To the contrary: if modus operandi is highly 
probative, the danger the jury will overestimate the value of the other-acts 
evidence because of the “round up the usual suspect” phenomenon diminishes. 
Multi-factor tests like this one are easily and rightfully criticized as an 
invitation for courts to do what they want.523  This discussion, however, surfaces 
two additional data points that can be added to the general disposition-to-habit 
spectrum: near-miss habit and true modus-operandi evidence.  These two 
additional points lie closer on the spectrum to habit than to same-crimes 
evidence.  It is in this general area that I would locate the dividing line between 
character and noncharacter evidence.  To qualify as noncharacter evidence, the 
other acts should be much more like near-miss habit and true modus-operandi 
evidence than same-crime evidence.  I intend this to be a demanding standard 
for two reasons. 
First, except for proving state of mind, which I address separately below,524 
as a categorical matter there is less need for other-acts evidence than ever 
before.  Prosecutors now have access to an array of evidence they could scarcely 
have dreamed of a few generations ago, much less when the character-evidence 
rule became entrenched.  Crimes are more and more likely to be recorded, 
whether by increasingly prevalent surveillance cameras525 or a bystander’s 
phone.526  Suspects’ whereabouts can be traced through cell-phone pings,527 
GPS systems,528 or apps that track a user’s location.529  Technology now affords 
criminals various options—of which they frequently avail themselves—for 
 
523. See, e.g., Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995) (criticizing 
proposed multi-factor test as hard to apply, unpredictable, and invitation to appellate litigation). 
524. See infra Part VI. 
525. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 Cameras Help Solve Chicago’s Crime Problem?, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-police-
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/4PNC-6VMJ] (“Now, in the United States, the technology race is 
on.  Linked cameras are becoming commonplace in cities like New York and Baltimore.”).   
526. Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, 96 
N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1671–72 (2018) (“Recordings by members of the public . . . are widely recognized 
by the police as valuable in investigations because they generate leads and evidence.”).   
527. Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United States 
v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 805–06 
(2013). 
528. Adam Koppel, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law 
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 1061, 1065 
(2010). 
529. Matthew DeVoy Jones, The “Orwellian Consequence” of Smartphone Tracking: Why a 
Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Required Prior to Collection of GPS Data From 
Smartphones, 62 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 211, 221–22 (2014). 
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recording damning evidence in a manner that may be difficult to delete, such as 
text messages,530 Facebook or Instagram posts,531 or tweets.532  Sophisticated 
forensic tests, most notably DNA testing, provide prosecutors evidence of 
unmatched precision.  Combined with accessible and robust databases, these 
forensic tools are used to solve cases, both current and cold,533 with increasing 
efficiency.534  At the very least, these developments significantly diminish—as 
a categorical matter—the need for other-acts evidence to prove the actus reus 
of a crime.  In comparison, when courts centuries ago declared character-
propensity evidence inadmissible,535 forensic evidence was nonexistent536 and 
professional police forces were only just beginning.537  Without an eyewitness 
or confession, building a criminal case was no easy task.  In retrospect, the 
 
530. See, e.g., Dickens v. State, 927 A. 2d 32, 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (holding admissible 
threatening text messages sent by defendant to murder victim); State v Mulcahey, 219 A.3d 735, 741 
(R.I. 2019) (allowing text messages sent by defendant to the victim as evidence in sexual assault case). 
531. See, e.g., Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (upholding 
admission of “a Facebook video showing the defendant sitting in the stolen car and wearing the 
victim’s stolen watch just hours after the carjacking occurred”); State v. Gibson, Nos. L-13-1223, L-
13-1222, 2015 WL 1962850, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 2015) (affirming admission of Facebook 
profiles to prove that defendants participated in criminal gangs). 
532. See, e.g., State v. Hannah, 151 A.3d 99, 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (upholding 
admission of tweets in assault case); State v. Linzy, No. E2016–01052–CCA–R3–CD, 2017 WL 
3575871, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding admission of defendant’s tweets in murder trial). 
533. See, e.g., Heather Murphy & Tim Arango, Joseph DeAngelo Pleads Guilty in Golden State 
Killer Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/us/golden-state-
killer-joseph-deangelo.html [https://perma.cc/JC67-B7NM]; Ed Shanahan, A Father and Son, Brutally 
Murdered. 32 Years Later, an Arrest., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/nyregion/dna-cold-case-connecticut.html 
[https://perma.cc/6N5J-J3NK]; Robert Salonga, ‘She Fought Desperately’: Arrest in 1973 Killing of 
Stanford Grad After DNA Genealogy Probe, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/11/21/dna-genealogy-sleuthing-spurs-arrest-in-1973-killing-of-
stanford-grad/ [https://perma.cc/L2CT-QV94]. 
534. They are also used to expose erroneous convictions.  See DNA Exonerations in the United 
States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-
states/#:~:text=130%20DNA%20exonerees%20were%20wrongfully,75%25)%20of%20these%20cas
es [https://perma.cc/265F-KRJM]. 
535. See Stone, supra note 384, at 959–66; Leonard, In Defense, supra note 65, at 1170–76. 
536. For example, the first known use of fingerprint evidence to secure a conviction came in a 
Bengali criminal case in 1898.  Its evidentiary use began in England in 1902, and in this country in 
1910.  NAT’L INST. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FINGERPRINT 
SOURCEBOOK 1-15 to -17 (2011).   
537. The Metropolitan Police Services, regarded as the first police department, was established 
in 1829.  See J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events 
Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1964).  New York City organized the first American urban police department in 
the mid-1840s.  Raymond W. Kelly, The History of New York City Police Department, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145539NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW9L-WFND].  
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courts’ traditional willingness to forswear other-acts evidence seems a bit 
startling.  Of course, as the earlier discussion shows, courts did not entirely 
disown such evidence.  Necessity impelled them to admit other-acts evidence, 
even when its probative value flowed solely from a propensity inference.  That 
is what has led to our current state of affairs.  The point here is that the 
character-evidence rule is a categorical one.  And in deciding how to construe 
what is character and what is not, we should bear in mind that categorically 
there is less need for other-acts evidence than ever before.  Its marginal 
probative value is categorically diminished. 
Second, liberalizing the admissibility of other-acts evidence is likely to 
have a disparate racial impact.538  Non-whites are arrested and convicted at 
higher rates than whites539—even when they have similar baseline rates of 
criminality.540  They are more likely to be swept up in a misdemeanor system 
that encourages the poor to plead guilty even when they are innocent.541  
 
538. See Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act 
Evidence, and the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2016); Chris 
Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule 404(b) 
Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2007). 
539. Imprisonment rates for African-American men are almost six times greater than for white 
men; Hispanic men are imprisoned at two and one-half times the rate of white males.  E. ANN 
CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2018, at 16, tbl.10 (2020). 
540. For example, drug-arrest rates for African-Americans are far higher than for whites, even 
though they use drugs at comparable rates.  See generally Ricky Camplain, Carolyn Camplain, Robert 
T. Trotter II, George Pro, Samantha Sabo, Emery Eaves, Marie Peoples & Julie A. Baldwin, 
Racial/Ethnic Differences in Drug- and Alcohol-Related Arrest Outcomes in a Southwest County From 
2009 to 2018, AJPH (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305409 [https://perma.cc/54ZS-7V5C] 
(concluding that racial and ethnic minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and that 
overrepresentation cannot be attributed to greater use of drugs and alcohol).  Compare U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., USE OF SELECTED SUBSTANCES IN THE PAST MONTH AMONG PERSONS 
AGED 12 YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: UNITED STATES, SELECTED 
YEARS 2002–2017 (2018), in NAT’L SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH tbl. 20 (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2018/020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7FS-KTV5] (finding similar 
drug-use rates between whites and African-Americans), with Howard N. Snyder, Alexia D. Cooper & 
Joseph Mulako-Wangota, U.S. Arrest Estimates: Arrest Rates of Whites for Drug Abuse Violations, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/P5ZE-U2GH] (finding drug-arrest rates between 200 and 500 per 100,000 for whites 
from 1980 to 2015), and Howard N. Snyder, Alexia D. Cooper & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, U.S. Arrest 
Estimates: Arrest Rates of Blacks for Drug Abuse Violations, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/65NP-NZBP] 
(finding drug-arrest rates between 500 and 2,000 per 100,000 for African-Americans from 1980 to 
2015). 
541. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR 
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 
(2018). 
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Consequently, not only are non-whites more likely to be the subjects of other-
acts evidence, the other-acts evidence is less likely to be accurate.  At the same 
time, other-acts evidence may tend to reinforce implicit biases that already exist 
among many factfinders.542  Therefore, the designation of other-acts evidence 
as noncharacter should be limited to the types that are especially probative. 
It is time to put some flesh on the bones by giving examples of how I would 
apply the principles I have laid out.  I start by revisiting two of the cases in 
which courts admitted other-acts evidence as proof of a defendant’s common 
plan or scheme.543  Under the scheme I propose, State v. Roth544—the modern-
day “brides in the bath” case—provides an easy example of other-acts evidence 
that should be classified as noncharacter.  Recall that Roth was charged with 
murdering his fourth wife, a single mother who married him after a short 
courtship and upon whose life he purchased a substantial life insurance 
policy.545  Evidence that Roth had previously courted another single mother, 
married her, purchased an insurance policy, and collected on it when she 
plunged to her death, and that he had courted other single mothers and put 
similar schemes in motion is both highly specific and eerily similar to the 
charged conduct.  It clearly falls in the vicinity of near-miss habit and true 
modus-operandi evidence.  
In contrast, the other-acts evidence in United States v. Kravchuk546 presents 
a close case but should still be considered character evidence.  Kravchuk was 
tried for stealing money from an automatic teller machine (ATM) in a 
convenience store.547  His other acts consisted of two previous ATM theft 
attempts within seven months, both involving the same co-participants.548  In 
one, they removed an ATM from a mall; in the other, they attempted, but failed, 
to remove an ATM from a different convenience store.549  While this is more 
specific than a generic theft and there are multiple acts temporally close to the 
charged crime, the evidence falls short of the specificity and similarity I would 
demand to declare it noncharacter.  The two other acts involved an attempt to 
remove an ATM machine; the charged crime did not.  The location of the crimes 
 
542. See Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 187, 204–06 (2010). 
543. I skip the cases discussed under the “intent” heading, see supra Part III.A, because I will 
deal with those cases under another change I propose to Rule 404(b).  See infra Part VI. 
544. 881 P.2d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
545. See supra text accompanying notes 145–64. 
546. 335 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2003). 
547. Id. at 1151.  
548. Id. at 1152, 1156. 
549. Id. at 1156. 
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varied: two in a convenience store, one in a mall.  This evidence falls outside 
the general vicinity of near-miss habit and true modus-operandi evidence.550  
United States v. Henthorn551 exemplifies the kind of other-acts evidence 
that courts strain to admit but would not be admissible under my proposal.  
Henthorn’s wife of twelve years died when she fell more than 100 feet off a 
cliff in a remote spot in Rocky Mountain National Park.552  Between three 
insurance policies on her life and an annuity, Henthorn stood to collect $4.7 
million.553  The prosecution accumulated substantial evidence, detailed by the 
court, to prove that her fall was no accident.554  But the prosecution wanted 
more.  It offered evidence that seventeen years before, Henthorn’s first wife had 
also died under questionable circumstances.  While they were changing a flat 
tire on the side of a road in a remote and heavily forested spot, she was pinned 
under the car and died of internal injuries.555  Henthorn collected $600,000 in 
life insurance payments.556  Although his actions raised some suspicions, 
Henthorn was never prosecuted for this death.557  The trial court admitted the 
evidence to prove plan, intent, and lack of accident.558  The court of appeals 
affirmed, relying heavily on the similarities it discerned between the two 
deaths.559  Both occurred in a remote location, which impeded communication, 
delayed emergency responders, and reduced the chances of an accidental 
witness.560  After both deaths, Henthorn told inconsistent stories, collected 
significant insurance proceeds, and lied about the applicable insurance 
policies.561  And Henthorn quickly had both bodies cremated over family 
objections and spread the ashes on the same mountain.562  But these similarities 
 
550. I would easily classify the other-acts evidence in United States v. Riepe, 858 F.3d 552, 558 
(8th Cir. 2017), the third case discussed in the Plan section, see supra text accompanying notes 172–
88, as character evidence.  But it would fall within the exception I propose for state of mind.  See infra 
Part VI. 
551. 864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017). 
552. Id. at 1245. 
553. Id. at 1247 n.5. 
554. Id. at 1245–47.  This included what may have been a previous attempt by Henthorn to 
murder his wife.  If it was, it would have tended to show the state of Henthorn’s feeling toward his 
wife and would have been probative without a propensity inference.  See supra note 239.  
555. Id. at 1249. 
556. Id. at 1250. 
557. Id.  Law enforcement briefly investigated the death, but concluded it was accidental.  Id. 
558. Id. at 1248. 
559. Id. at 1249. 
560. Id. at 1251. 
561. Id. 
562. Id.  
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amount to little more than that the two deaths occurred in remote locations563 
and Henthorn received substantial life insurance payments.564  Moreover, 
temporal proximity is absent—seventeen years separated the events.565  That 
Henthorn may have killed his first wife to collect insurance is far closer to the 
same-crime evidence that lies at the core of the ban on character-propensity-
inference evidence than it is to the specificity and temporal proximity I would 
require to classify it as noncharacter evidence.   
I argued that true modus-operandi evidence, exemplified by the Wet 
Bandits or a recent case566 in which the defendants—dressed as funk legend 
Rick James and movie character Youngblood Priest567 and wearing orange 
construction vests—robbed a series of cash-and-check stores, should not be 
considered character evidence.  Nor should other highly specific ways of 
committing a crime that really do not qualify as unique modus-operandi 
evidence.  Consider Davis v. State,568 a sexual assault case.  The victim went to 
Davis’s house to smoke methamphetamine.569  Afterwards, she drank a wine 
cooler Davis gave her and blacked out.570  She testified that when she awoke 
she had memories of someone having sex with her.571  DNA testing identified 
Davis as her assailant, and a blood test revealed that she had very high levels of 
a common date-rape drug.572  To rebut Davis’s claim of consent, the prosecution 
offered evidence that he had sexually assaulted three other women within a year 
of the charged assault.573  In each instance, the victim went to Davis’s house to 
use methamphetamine.574  After each of the victims used drugs, he gave her an 
 
563. Id.  The court’s recitation that in both instances communication was impeded, emergency 
response time slowed, etc. merely catalogs the consequences of being in a remote location.  These are 
not additional similarities in any meaningful sense. 
564. Id.  The court’s observation that Henthorn quickly had both bodies cremated and spread the 
ashes in the same place exemplifies the kind of false similarities that courts should avoid.  Neither case 
involved a question about the physical cause of death.  An autopsy would not have revealed whether 
Henthorn’s wife was pushed or accidentally fell off the cliff or whether the auto slipped or was pushed 
off the jack.  The relevance of his spreading his deceased wives’ ashes in the same place is a mystery. 
565. Id.  The court downplayed this temporal gap by noting that Henthorn’s first wife died after 
they had been married for twelve years and that his second wife died after they had been married for 
thirteen years.  Id.  Perhaps the court considered a dozen years of marriage a triggering circumstance. 
566. United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 259–62 (7th Cir. 2018). 
567. See SUPER FLY (Superfly Ltd. 1972). 
568. 581 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 2019). 
569. Id. at 888. 
570. Id.  
571. Id. 
572. Id. at 888–90. 
573. Id. at 891–92. 
574. Id. 
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incapacitating alcoholic drink and sexually assaulted her.575  This is not modus-
operandi evidence in the sense that the defendant committed the crime in a 
unique way that was unlikely to be used by anyone else.  To the contrary: the 
use of date-rape drugs is all too common.576  Nevertheless, the other-acts 
evidence in Davis involved several other sexual assaults, committed in the same 
specific manner, which matched the charged crime.  
Other evidence that courts have admitted under the modus operandi heading 
should be rejected.  I discussed earlier the Lane case, where the court contrived 
to list an array of similarities between the charged crime—the kidnapping, 
sexual assault, and murder of an eight-year-old girl—and the extrinsic 
offense—the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a nine-year-old girl ten 
years later in another state.577  The list of similarities primarily consisted of the 
type of facts that are common to a kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder.  The 
two unique similarities noted by the court—the defendant participated in the 
search for both victims and took what the court referred to a trophy (the 
underwear of the victim)—fail to establish sufficient specificity and similarity 
between the two crimes.578  In addition to the temporal and physical distance 
between the two crimes, the court omits many details regarding how the crime 
was actually committed.579  Unfortunately, that evidence may not have been 
available, but it would still be critical in establishing that sufficient similarity 
existed between the two. 
I would exclude the other-acts evidence in most of the cases discussed 
above in which courts admitted the evidence under the doctrine of chances.  For 
example, the other acts in the Vail case—the disappearance of two other women 
associated with defendant—share neither specific similarity nor temporal 
proximity to the charged murder of his wife.  His wife drowned in 1962; the 
prosecution had no idea how Vail might have engineered the deaths of the other 
two women eleven and twenty-two years later.  In York, there was temporal 
 
575. Id.  
576. See, e.g., Suzanne C. Swan, V. Diane Woodbrown, Andrew T. Schramm, Peter R. Warren, 
Nicole V. Lasky, Bonnie S. Fisher, Janaé E. Bonsu, Ann L. Coker & Corrine M. Williams, Just a Dare 
or Unaware? Outcomes and Motives of Drugging (“Drink Spiking”) Among Students at Three College 
Campuses, 7 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 253, 254 (2017); Benedict Carey, When a Rapist’s Weapon Is a Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/health/when-rapists-weapon-is-a-
drug.html [https://perma.cc/JP5T-N7QU]. 
577. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see supra text accompanying 
notes 219–33. 
578. Because I believe that recognized psychological conditions should not be considered 
character, see supra Part V.C.ii, evidence that the defendant possessed multiple sexual disorders, 
including pedophilia, however, would be admissible subject to Rule 403 balancing.  
579. Another way of inflating the degree of similarity between the charged crime and other acts 
is to ignore relevant dissimilarities between the two.  Obviously, courts should not do this.  
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proximity, but the charged crime—an arson caused by explosive devices that 
resulted in the death of York’s business partner—bore no particular 
resemblance to the death of his wife, who was shot through the temple.  York 
did seek to collect insurance proceeds both times, but this simply puts the other-
acts evidence on the same plane as the Henthorn case.  
Rex v. Smith,580 the original Brides in the Bath case—presents a stronger 
case for admission.  In less than thirty months, Smith was thrice widowed by 
bathtub drownings of women he had married.  As Professor Sullivan admirably 
recounts, the deaths were similar “[i]n even minor details.”581  For example, he 
married each under a different name; each one executed a will in Smith’s favor 
within a week of her death; shortly before each wife’s death, Smith made other 
financial arrangements from which he would profit; and the bathrooms were all 
unlocked.582  These similarities are sufficiently specific and temporally related 
to warrant admissibility as noncharacter evidence.  There is no need to resort to 
the doctrine of chances.  The other-acts evidence in the infamous Woods case—
where the defendant was prosecuted for suffocating to death her infant, adopted 
son—could likewise have been admitted without relying on the doctrine of 
chances.  Inflicting upwards of seventeen cyanotic episodes on eight other 
children, six of whom died, is a highly specific way of acting.  It falls close 
enough to the near-habit and true modus-operandi types of conduct to be 
considered noncharacter.583 
I harbor no illusions that the analysis I propose here offers easy solutions.  
Judgment calls are inevitable.  In individual cases, other-acts evidence that I 
would continue to classify as character will be highly probative.  Henthorn is 
one such example.  Courts desiring to admit such evidence may well be tempted 
to define character more narrowly than I propose and become even more 
profligate in admitting other-acts evidence.  But that is the inevitable 
consequence of a categorical rule of exclusion.  And, as the recent attempt to 
amend Rule 404(b) proves, a categorical other-acts evidence rule is not going 
away.584  Moreover, I acknowledge that one should be cautious in basing a 
 
580. [1915] 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153. 
581. Sullivan, supra note 164, at 30. 
582. Id. 
583. Moreover, recently disclosed information indicates that Woods may have suffered from 
Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy, a condition that had yet to be described at the time.  See DI MAIO 
& FRANSCELL, supra note 311, at 83–86.  If so, it would have been a disease, not a character trait, that 
provided the motive for Woods to act.   
584. In an ideal world, I would propose replacing Rule 404(b)(2)’s nonexclusive list of 
permissible purposes with a simple statement that other-acts evidence may be admissible when offered 
for a noncharacter-propensity purpose.  The Advisory Committee’s unwillingness to do anything more 
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proposal primarily on a reading of appellate decisions.  After all, they represent 
only a tiny fraction of tried, much less filed, actions.585  In fact, jury studies 
show that in the great majority of criminal trials Rule 404(b) actually keeps 
juries from learning of a non-testifying586 defendant’s prior convictions.587  
Introducing another avenue for circumventing the character-evidence rule 
might lead to more run-of-the-mill other-acts evidence being admitted.  In the 
end, however, I do not believe this is likely to happen.  A study of the admittedly 
skewed sample of criminal cases that comprise the appellate reports reveals a 
willingness of prosecutors to push the boundaries of Rule 404(b) that is nearly 
matched by trial courts’ willingness to accede.  As things stand, the doctrinal 
tools available to trial courts to admit other-acts evidence are more than ample.  
The ability to define character should not result in other-acts evidence being 
admitted where currently it is excluded.  
Giving form to the notion of character, however, would allow courts to 
admit other-acts evidence where its probative value flows from a propensity 
inference, but not a character-propensity one.  In such cases, courts would no 
longer have to deny that a propensity inference is at work.  This should have a 
modest spillover effect: it will be harder for courts to pretend in other cases that 
other-acts evidence is probative without a propensity inference.  But especially 
in one area, the pressure to pretend will persist.  Unless it is addressed head-on, 
courts will continue to dissemble, and the distorted view of propensity will 
continue unabated. 
 
than tinker with Rule 404(b), however, makes clear that such a proposal would go nowhere.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 7–8 and infra text accompanying note 632. 
585. The vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain.  See LINDSEY DEVERS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, RESEARCH SUMMARY: PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 1 (2011), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.p
df [https://perma.cc/KF5X-HJRB] (stating that scholars estimate that 90 to 95% of both federal and 
state cases are resolved through plea bargaining).  And most cases resolved at trial are not appealed.  
See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 663 (2004) 
(calculating 39.6% appeal rate of cases resolved after trial). 
586. Most federal and state court rules allow a party impeaching a witness to attack the witness’s 
character for truthfulness by showing certain prior convictions.  See FED. R. EVID. 609; 28 VICTOR J. 
GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6131 (2d ed. 2020) (summarizing state rules).  While 
these studies fail to indicate whether juries learned of other-acts evidence that did not involve a 
conviction, it is unlikely that including such data would change these results in a significant manner. 
587. Kalven and Zeisel report that in 87% of the cases in which the accused had one or more 
prior convictions but did not testify, the jury did not learn of the convictions.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
note 366, at 147.  The corresponding figure in a study by the National Center for State Courts of 
criminal cases from four jurisdictions was 91.2%.  Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a 
Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on 
Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1375 (2009).  
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VI.  A TRUE EXCEPTION FOR INTENT 
Of all the permissible purposes Rule 404(b) lists for other-acts evidence, 
intent is the one most relied on by the courts.588  And, as discussed earlier, courts 
routinely admit other-acts evidence to prove intent even when it does so only 
through a character-propensity inference.589  Even courts of appeals that have 
demanded in recent years that prosecutors and courts articulate a propensity-
free chain of inferences590 have exhibited a tendency to backslide when other-
acts evidence is offered to prove intent.591  The character-propensity use of 
other-acts evidence to prove intent is hardly a new development.592  Wigmore 
first propounded his doctrine-of-chances theory in 1904 to explain why other-
acts evidence should be admissible to prove intent.593  More than eighty years 
later, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of other-acts evidence to 
prove intent.594 
For good reason: Where intent is truly a controverted issue, Rule 404’s 
categorical judgment that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative 
value of other-acts evidence—even when it requires a character-propensity 
inference—is probably wrong.  On the probative value side, when the actus reus 
is established and the only real issue in the case is the defendant’s state of mind, 
the inferential leap from the other-acts evidence to a conclusion about the 
defendant’s state of mind is relatively short.595  Moreover, the need for other-
acts evidence is particularly acute when commission of the physical act may be 
accompanied by an innocent, or merely a lesser, state of mind than intent.596  
Beechum illustrates this.597  Beechum conceded the actus reus—possession of 
a silver dollar that was not his; he contended only that he did not intend to steal 
it.  Although a factfinder might not find Beechum’s story highly plausible, to 
avoid conviction he needed only to produce a reasonable doubt in the mind of 
one juror.  Evidence that Beechum had stolen other items he was supposed to 
 
588. See supra note 81.  
589. See supra Part III.A.  
590. See supra text accompanying notes 337–39. 
591. See supra note 341. 
592. See generally Reed, supra note 6.  
593. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 302. 
594. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (“Extrinsic acts evidence may be 
critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the 
actor’s state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from 
conduct.”). 
595. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 34, § 4:34.  
596. See 22B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5239, at 106; Capra & Richter, supra note 
34, at 807 (noting that “proof of state of mind is elusive”). 
597. See supra text accompanying notes 95–106. 
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have delivered was both highly probative of his intent to steal and particularly 
needed to establish his state of mind.  It is hard to imagine a legal system that 
would routinely preclude a jury from considering such evidence.598  In fact, ours 
does not.  Courts invariably admit other-acts evidence to prove intent when it 
is the only truly contested issue.599 
The problem is that many courts admit other-acts evidence regardless of 
whether intent is really a contested issue.  Many courts hold that a defendant 
puts intent in issue simply by pleading not guilty.600  This leads to cases like 
United States v. Smith.601  Smith was charged with, among other things, 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.602  According to the prosecution, 
a police officer stopped Smith for speeding.603  Believing that he smelled 
marijuana, the officer called for a K-9 unit to conduct a dog sniff around the 
car.604  As the K-9 unit approached, Smith sped off.605  The police tracked the 
car down, but not before Smith had abandoned it and fled on foot.606  A search 
of the car uncovered about two kilos of cocaine.  Eighteen months later, Smith 
was finally arrested.607  At trial, his sole defense was mistaken identity; he 
claimed he was not the driver of the car.608  Despite this, the prosecution was 
allowed to introduce Smith’s eight-year-old conviction for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the 
 
598. Professors Daniel Capra, the long-standing Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and Liesa Richter, a consultant to the committee, have argued against a 
“wholesale ban” on propensity inferences because it may be appropriate to use other-acts evidence to 
prove intent even when such use requires a propensity inference.  Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 
806–07. 
599. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:11 (noting 
that there are numerous cases admitting such evidence where defendant concedes doing the physical 
act but contends it was an accident, i.e., that defendant lacked required intent).  
600. See, e.g., United States v. Shelledy, 961 F.3d 1014, 1022 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cockrell, 587 F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 
2009).  See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 8:11; 
Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 797.  
601. 789 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2015). 





607. Id. at 926–27. 
608. Id. at 927–28.  The prosecution had ample evidence to rebut this defense.  Among other 
things, the driver gave the officer who stopped him a driver’s license that identified him as the 
defendant, and the search also yielded a wallet, cell phone, and prescription pill bottles all linked to the 
defendant.  Id. at 926–27.   
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evidence was admissible to prove Smith’s “intent and knowledge.”609  It 
expressly rejected his argument that the evidence was inadmissible in light of 
his mistaken identity defense.610  By entering a general denial, Smith had placed 
his knowledge and intent in issue.611 
Other courts demand more than a not guilty plea—at least in some 
instances—to put intent in issue.612  For example, the Seventh Circuit 
distinguishes between specific and general intent crimes.  Intent is 
“automatically” in issue when the charge involves a specific intent crime,613 but 
for general intent crimes the defendant must meaningfully place intent in 
issue.614  Exactly what this means, however, is less than clear: the 
specific/general intent distinction is famously an analytical muddle.615  Not 
surprisingly then, the Seventh Circuit’s explanation for its approach is hardly 
satisfying.  According to the court, the key distinction is that “for general-intent 
crimes, the defendant’s intent can be inferred from the act itself, so intent is not 
‘automatically’ at issue.”616  But some forms of murder are considered specific-
 
609. Id. at 929–30. 
610. Id. at 930. 
611. Id.  
612. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Hall, 
858 F.3d 254, 265 (4th Cir. 2017).  See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT 
EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 5:10; Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 797. 
613. United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1022 (7th Cir. 2009). 
614. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2014). 
615. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 230–31 n.3 (AM. L. INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985) (noting that concept of general intent has been an “abiding source of 
confusion and ambiguity”); LAFAVE, supra note 445, § 5.2(e) (“‘General intent’ is often distinguished 
from ‘specific intent,’ although the distinction being drawn by the use of these two terms often 
varies.”).  Even the Seventh Circuit acknowledges the confusion these terms engender.  Its pattern 
criminal jury instruction manual warns courts that the “[d]istinctions between ‘specific intent’ and 
‘general intent’ more than likely confuse rather than enlighten juries.”  PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 4.12 (2019), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-
instructions/Pattern_Criminal_Jury_Instructions_2012ed_includes_2015-2019_changes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KB8-AFL2]. 
 To cite but one example, federal courts of appeal cannot agree on whether attempted bank robbery 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a specific or general intent crime.  Compare United States v. Darby, 857 
F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (specific intent), with United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55, 57–58 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (general intent).  The Seventh Circuit is undecided.  United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 
891 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011). 
616. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858; see also United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (“We have previously distinguished between situations in which intent is in issue because 
the government must show specific intent as an essential element of the crime and when intent is 
only a formal issue that can be inferred from the act.”).  The leading criminal law hornbook, 
however, describes several other ways of distinguishing between general- and specific-intent crimes 
and concludes that “specific intent” is most commonly used to designate a mental element that does 
not attach to any of the actus reus elements of the crime.  LAFAVE, supra note 445, § 5.2(e). 
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intent crimes617 although a murderer’s intent can often be inferred from the act 
of killing itself. 
To be fair, the Seventh Circuit ultimately places little weight on this 
distinction.  Even though intent is automatically at issue in a specific-intent 
crime, the Seventh Circuit requires a trial court to factor into its Rule 403 
rulings the extent to which the defendant is actually contesting intent.618  United 
States v. Miller619 illustrates this.  Miller was charged, among other things, with 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  Police found the cocaine—
packaged in bags, some with price tags—in a bedroom they claimed was 
Miller’s.620  His defense was that he was not staying in that bedroom and the 
drugs were not his.621  The Seventh Circuit ruled that, even though this was a 
specific-intent crime,622 the trial court erred in admitting Miller’s previous 
conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute: intent was at issue 
in “only the most attenuated sense.”623  
Other courts reject outright the idea that a not-guilty plea automatically puts 
intent in issue624 and simply consider the extent to which intent is contested.  
For example, in United States v. Asher,625 a jailer was charged with assaulting 
an inmate and filing a false report to cover up the assault.  Asher denied the 
assault.626  He contended the inmate’s severe injuries were caused by a slip and 
fall.627  The prosecution sought to prove Asher’s intent to assault by introducing 
evidence that Asher beat another inmate a few years before.628  Asher, however, 
contended that he was not disputing intent and offered to stipulate that if the 
jury found he beat the inmate he would concede he possessed the necessary 
intent.629  Despite this, the trial court admitted the other-acts evidence.  The 
 
617. See, e.g., Morgan v. Israel, 735 F.2d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 1984) (referring to first-degree 
murder as specific-intent offense). 
618. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857–61.  
619. 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). 
620. Id. at 694. 
621. Id. at 696. 
622. Id. at 697.  This provides another illustration of the flawed distinction the Seventh Circuit 
draws between general and specific intent.  Had Miller possessed the cocaine—packaged with price 
tags—the jury would have had little difficulty inferring his intent to distribute.   
623. Id. 
624. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 860 F.3d 233, 247 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that not-
guilty plea puts intent at issue, but court must determine whether “intent is at issue in a manner that 
allows Rule 404(b) evidence”); United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 2012); cf. 
United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 335 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A] lack of dispute or concession of a 
central allegation may significantly reduce the probative value of particular evidence and, thus, call 
its admissibility into question.”).   
625. 910 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2018). 
626. Id. at 858. 
627. Id.  
628. Id. at 857. 
629. Id. 
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Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the offer to stipulate, the danger 
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the 
evidence.630  
What we are left with is a mess.  When intent actually is controverted, most 
courts readily admit other-acts evidence even if it proves intent only through a 
character-propensity inference.  When intent is not actually controverted, some 
courts pretend that it is and admit the evidence; some resort to the muddled 
specific/general intent distinction, at least to discern initially whether intent is 
in issue; and some simply look at the facts of the case.  If a court decides that 
intent is not actually controverted, it may factor that into its admissibility 
ruling.631  And in some cases the defendant’s posture may not be clear.  Indeed, 
the Advisory Committee recently rejected a proposal to amend Rule 404(b) to 
require that other-acts evidence be admitted only when whatever purpose for 
which it was offered was actively contested by the evidence’s opponent.632  In 
a recent article, the reporter and academic consultant to the committee offered 
a number of reasons why they opposed such a requirement, including the 
difficulty of defining “active contest” and disagreement among courts about 
what constitutes controverting an issue.633 
 
630. Id. at 860–63; see also United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 2017) in which 
the defendant was charged with, among other things, possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute.  Police found about six kilos of marijuana inside a dead-bolt-locked bedroom.  Hall, 858 
F.3d at 259.  Hall conceded that he knew the marijuana was there but claimed that he had no control 
over it.  Id. at 263.  The court of appeals concluded that because Hall neither contested that he knew 
of the drug’s presence or that it was to be distributed, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
Hall’s prior possession with intent to distribute.  Id. at 276. 
631. A court’s ability to do this may be circumscribed by the Supreme Court’s discussion in 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) about the effect of a defendant’s offer to stipulate to 
an element of the offense.  The Court rejected the notion that a defendant could, by stipulating to an 
element of the charge, foreclose the prosecution from proving that element in the way it best saw fit.  
Id. at 186–90.  It exempted Old Chief from this general rule because of the relatively unique nature 
of his prosecution.  Id.  Old Chief was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Id. at 
174.  His offer to stipulate to his legal status as a previously convicted felon provided the prosecution 
everything it needed to prove that element of the crime and did not in any way diminish the 
prosecution’s ability to tell the story of the events at issue.  Id. at 189–90.  Regarding Rule 404(b) 
issues in other types of cases, however, the Court stated that when the prosecution seeks to introduce 
other-acts evidence “on some issue other than status . . . Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to 
seek its admission.”  Id. at 190; see 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra 
note 24, § 8:12 (“[F]or the most part the courts have been reluctant to read Old Chief broadly and 
extend its precedential value to other settings.”).   
632. Memorandum from Hon. Debra A Livingston to Hon. David G. Campbell, supra note 40 
(including an Excerpt from the May 30, 2019 Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10-23_scotus_package_final_for_posting_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3GB-V3NB]. 
633. Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 811–12.  They also noted difficulty in deciding when a 
defendant would have to actively contest an issue as well concerns that an “active contest” 
requirement would undermine and obfuscate the meaning of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 
(1997).  Capra & Richter, supra note 34, at 811, 814. 
2021] PUT CHARACTER BACK INTO CHARACTER EVIDENCE 807 
 
I believe this problem should be met head-on.  First, Rule 404(b)634 should 
be amended by creating a true exception635 for other-acts evidence that is 
offered to prove intent.636  Other-acts evidence should be admissible to prove 
intent through a character-propensity inference.637  But this exception should be 
limited to the set of cases where the probative value of the other-acts evidence 
categorically outweighs its prejudicial effect: where intent is controverted.  This 
most clearly comprises those cases where the actus reus is established and the 
only real issue in the case is the defendant’s638 state of mind.  It would also 
reach cases where the actus reus is controverted and the defendant is unwilling 
to concede that if the actus reus is established, the state of mind is also 
established.  
To avoid controversy about whether intent is controverted, I propose a 
relatively simple standard.  The defendant should bear the burden of 
establishing that intent is not controverted.639  A defendant must timely agree 
not to controvert state of mind by means of direct testimony, cross-examination, 
or argument to the jury.640  Under such an agreement, a defendant could contest 
the nonmental elements of the crime but would not be permitted to contend that 
 
634. Because this proposal would authorize the use of character evidence to prove that a person 
acted in accordance with that character on a particular occasion, Rules 404(a) and 405 would also 
have to be amended.  There are several ways to do this.  A less desirable alternative would be to set 
forth the exception in a new rule, as was done in Rules 413 through 415.  See infra note 637. 
635. I say “true” exception because courts often carelessly refer to the Rule 404(b)(2) list of 
permissible (that is, noncharacter-propensity) purposes for which other-acts evidence may be offered 
as “exceptions” to the rule excluding other-acts evidence when offered for a character-propensity 
inference.  See, e.g., United States v. Pritchard, 964 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 823 (7th Cir. 2011). 
636. I use “intent” here, as Rule 404(b) does, see 22B GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5250, as a 
short-hand for states of mind that are described by the sometimes bewildering array of terms used in 
federal statutes.  See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAWS 119–20 (1970).  
637. A similar judgment about the categorical balancing of probative value and prejudicial 
effect led to the creation of Rules 413 through 415, which operate as exceptions to the character-
evidence rule for certain types of other-acts evidence.  They authorize the admission of a defendant’s 
previous acts of sexual assault or child molestation to prove, through a character-propensity 
inference, that the defendant committed the charged sexual assault or child molestation.  FED. R. 
EVID. 413–415.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2014).  
638. This exception would primarily be used to prove a defendant’s state of mind.  But the 
exception would also apply when other-acts evidence is offered to prove a nondefendant’s state of 
mind, as it sometimes is now used in “reverse” Rule 404(b) cases.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Montelongo, 420 F.3d 1169, 1172–75 (10th Cir. 2005).  In such situations, it is the party against 
whom the other-acts evidence is offered who would have to controvert or concede the existence of 
the state of mind. 
639. Again, I use “defendant” here as shorthand for the party opposing the use of the other-acts 
evidence. 
640. This would effectively overrule, for this set of cases, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 
172 (1997), where the Court severely limited a defendant’s ability to stipulate an issue out of the 
case.  See supra note 631. 
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whoever did the actus reus lacked the required state of mind.  I would allow the 
trial court to require the defendant to agree to a jury instruction that captures 
this agreement.  A defendant would also be precluded from seeking a jury 
instruction on a lesser included offense that is inconsistent with the 
agreement.641  I would also leave it to the trial court to determine the timing of 
a defendant’s agreement.  In a relatively simple case, the court might require 
the defendant to do this before trial, within a reasonable time after receiving the 
prosecution’s Rule 404(b) notice.642  In more complex cases, the court might 
provide the defendant additional time to make the declaration.  The court, 
however, should not push back the deadline too far.  It should not unduly impair 
the prosecution’s ability to present its other-acts evidence if the defendant 
ultimately declines to agree not to controvert state of mind. 
Under this proposal, cases like Beechum will be easy to decide.  Beechum 
was caught with the goods; his only possible defense was that he lacked the 
intent to steal.  Evidence of his prior theft would be admissible to prove his 
intent to steal expressly through a character-propensity inference.  There will 
no longer be a need to pretend that it is probative without such an inference.  
Likewise, in many drug cases where the defendant is caught holding the 
baggies, a character-propensity inference may be drawn from the defendant’s 
prior crimes to establish an intent to join the conspiracy or an intent to 
distribute.  This proposal allows courts to do what they already frequently do, 
but in an intellectually honest way. 
On the other hand, this proposal should put an end to cases like Smith.  He 
could pursue his mistaken identity defense while agreeing that the driver—
whoever it was—possessed the two kilos of cocaine found in the car with the 
intent to distribute it.  Evidence of his previous conviction for the same offense 
would then be inadmissible to prove, through a character-propensity inference, 
his intent and knowledge.643  Putting the onus on the defendant to clearly agree 
not to contest intent should also make it easier for courts to identify whether 
intent is in issue.  In United States v. Henry,644 for example, the defendant was 
charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.  To prove 
intent, the prosecution introduced evidence of Henry’s two-year-old conviction 
for the same crime.645  Henry’s primary defense was that he did not possess the 
 
641. See infra text accompanying notes 644–50. 
642. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3). 
643. To be clear, this exception and a defendant’s corresponding ability to block admissibility 
by agreeing not to controvert state of mind apply only when the other-acts evidence is probative 
through a character-propensity inference.  Rule 404 does not bar the admission of other-acts evidence 
that tends to prove intent without a character-propensity inference.  See supra Part II.  Such other-
acts evidence is admissible without the proposed exception. 
644. 848 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).  
645. Id. at 6. 
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drugs.646  He argued on appeal that, because his intent was not in issue, the trial 
court should have excluded the other-act evidence.647  The court of appeals 
noted, however, that Henry’s defensive posture was somewhat ambiguous.648  
He informed the court before trial that he would be contesting possession, but 
not intent, and his counsel’s opening statement reflected that approach.649  But 
he also submitted a proposed jury instruction that included the lesser included 
offense of simple possession, which indicated that he had not forsworn a contest 
about his intent to distribute.650  
This does not mean that other-acts evidence would automatically be 
admissible any time a defendant failed to agree not to contest state of mind.  A 
defendant could invoke Rule 403 and argue that the probative value of the 
other-acts evidence, even through the permitted character-propensity inference, 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Banks651 
illustrates this point.  Recall that Banks was charged with conspiracy to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute, and the court admitted evidence of a ten-year-
old marijuana possession conviction to prove his knowledge of and intent to 
join the conspiracy.652  Under my proposal, Banks’s ten-year-old conviction 
could be offered to prove his state of mind through a character-propensity 
inference.  But its probative value for that purpose is low, and Banks could 
certainly argue that the danger of unfair prejudice was substantially greater.653  
This proposal would yield several benefits.  First, it would square the text 
and application of the rule with its underlying purpose of promoting accurate 
factfinding.  When offered to prove intent through a character-propensity 
inference, other-acts evidence should be admissible only when it is 
categorically more probative than prejudicial.  This proposal would codify that 
this occurs only when the evidence is offered to prove a controverted state of 
mind.  When a defendant, however, agrees not to controvert intent, such other-
acts evidence categorically loses much of its probative value and should be 
inadmissible.  
 
646. Id.  
647. Id.  
648. Id.  
649. Id. 
650. Id. at 9–10. 
651. United States v. Banks, 706 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2013); see supra text accompanying notes 
88–92. 
652. Banks, 706 F.3d at 903–04. 
653. Moran provides another example.  Recall that the defendant there conceded that there was 
a rifle on the back seat of the car he was driving but claimed that he did not know it was there.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 120–27.  Moran’s ten-year-old felon-in-possession conviction could 
be offered for a character-propensity inference to prove that he knowingly possessed the rifle.  But its 
probative value for that purpose is low, and Moran could successfully argue that the danger of unfair 
prejudice was substantially greater.  
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Second, it would clarify when courts may admit other-acts evidence under 
a related permissible purpose listed in Rule 404(b)(2): “lack of accident.”  
Prosecutors often reflexively invoke this permissible purpose in response to a 
defendant’s “accident” defense.  Sometimes “accident” is about state of mind; 
other times, it is not.  A murder defendant who admits shooting the victim, but 
claims it was an accident because he thought the gun was unloaded is 
controverting his intent.654  Other-acts evidence would be admissible under the 
proposed exception to prove the defendant did not act accidentally—that the 
defendant intended to kill the victim.  But other-acts evidence would not be 
admissible to prove lack of accident in cases like Vail or Henthorn, where the 
accident defense is that the victim’s conduct was accidental.  Both Vail and 
Henthorn denied doing the act that caused their wives’ deaths.  Vail claimed 
that his wife accidentally fell out of their boat; Henthorn, that his wife 
accidentally fell off a cliff.  In exchange for rendering other-acts evidence 
inadmissible, each would surely have readily agreed not to controvert intent if 
the jury found he had pushed his wife. 
Finally, creating a true intent exception would obviate the need for courts 
to resort to the dissembling to which they now so frequently resort.  Like giving 
form to the notion of character, this should have a spillover effect.  If courts can 
honestly acknowledge when other-acts evidence is probative of intent only 
through a character-propensity inference, it will make it harder for courts to 
dissemble when other-acts evidence is offered for another purpose listed in Rule 
404(b).  Perhaps paradoxically, creating this exception should reduce the 
frequency with which courts admit other-acts evidence for a character-
propensity purpose—not just when offered to prove intent, but also when 
offered under the guise of any of the other permitted purposes listed in Rule 
404(b)(2). 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The specter of cases like State v. Vail hangs heavily over Rule 404(b).  The 
rule is based on a categorical judgment about the relative probative value and 
unfair prejudice of other-acts evidence when it is offered for a character-
propensity inference.  Cases like Vail, which decidedly defy this categorical 
judgment, tempt courts to find ways to admit other-acts evidence even though 
its probative value flows only from the forbidden inference.  And courts have 
often admitted such evidence by denying—expressly or implicitly—that a 
character-propensity inference was at work.  This is the inevitable consequence 
 
654. E.g., Boliek v. Bowersox, 96 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Tard, 593 F. 
Supp. 1091, 1093 (D. N.J. 1984); People v. Guajardo, 832 N.W.2d 409, 412, 416 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2013).   
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of a rule that applies a categorical judgment to such a broad range of evidence.  
Unfortunately, the body of case law that courts have created invites prosecutors 
to introduce precisely the type of low-probative-value other-acts evidence that 
Rule 404(b) was designed to exclude.  The way to reverse this practice and to 
get courts to apply Rule 404(b) in a manner that aligns with its goal of furthering 
accurate factfinding is, paradoxically, to make it easier to allow courts to admit 
high-probative-value other-acts evidence.  
I have suggested two ways of doing this.  First, courts must confront an 
issue they have long avoided.  They must grapple with the meaning of character.  
Abandoning the character/habit dichotomy and recognizing that, in addition to 
habit, there are types of other-acts evidence that should not be considered 
character is the first step.  Courts can then admit these types of high-probative-
value evidence even as they acknowledge that a propensity inference is 
required.  Likewise, evidence of a person’s attitudes or psychological or 
medical conditions should not be considered character.  Second, Rule 404(b) 
should be amended by adding a true exception that allows other-acts evidence 
to prove intent through a character-propensity inference.  But this exception 
would also allow a defendant to block the admission of such evidence by 
agreeing not to controvert state of mind.  
Because courts will be able to admit these categories of high-probative-
value other-acts evidence even when the probative value flows from a 
propensity inference, they will no longer have to deny that a propensity 
inference is required.  In time, a new body of case law should emerge that offers 
prosecutors fewer avenues for arguing that low-probative-value other-acts 
evidence should be admitted.  I do not pretend this is a cure-all.  Deciding which 
other-acts evidence bears sufficient indicia of specificity to qualify as 
noncharacter inevitably will involve contentious judgment calls.  Beyond that, 
there will always be hard cases, like that of Felix Vail, where courts will all too 
likely embrace Oscar Wilde’s advice and yield to temptation.   
